Judicial Review Before \u3ci\u3eMarbury\u3c/i\u3e by Treanor, William Michael
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2005 
Judicial Review Before Marbury 
William Michael Treanor 
Georgetown University Law Center, wtreanor@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1033 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=722443 
 
58 Stan. L. Rev. 455-562 (2005) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE MARBURY 
William Michael Treanor* 
While scholars have long probed the original understanding of judicial 
review and the early judicial review case law, this Article presents a study of the 
judicial review case law in the United States before Marbury v. Madison that is 
dramatically more complete than prior work and that challenges previous 
scholarship on the original understanding of judicial review on the two most 
critical dimensions: how well judicial review was established at the time of the 
Founding and when it was exercised. Where prior work argues that judicial 
review was rarely exercised before Marbury (or that it was created in Marbury), 
this Article shows that it was far more common than previously recognized: there 
are more than six times as many cases from the early Republic as the leading 
historical account found. This Article further shows that all the cases in which 
statutes were invalidated fell into one of three categories: courts invalidated 
statutes affecting the powers of courts or juries, even when the legislation could 
plausibly be squared with constitutional text and prior practice; state courts 
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invalidated state statutes for inconsistency with the Federal Constitution; and 
federal courts invalidated state statutes-again, even when they could plausibly 
be defended as constitutional. Scholars have missed this structural pattern, and 
the dominant view has been that only clearly unconstitutional statutes were 
invalidated. This Article shows, instead, that the early case law reflects a 
structural approach to judicial review in which the level of scrutiny was closely 
linked to the nature of the challenged statute, and that courts aggressively 
protected their power, the power of juries, and the power of the national 
government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant questions for originalists-perhaps the most 
significant question-is: What was the original understanding of judicial 
review? Scholars and jurists have sharply disagreed on the answer. Opinions 
range from the claim that judicial review was not part of the original 
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understanding at all1 to the contention that the original conception of judicial 
review was so expansive that courts had the power to invalidate statutes on 
broad natural law grounds. 2 The Supreme Court has claimed originalist 
sanction for the view that it is "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional 
text,"3 and in the past decade has struck down a string of congressional statutes 
on originalist grounds.4 The dominant scholarly view-presented most 
compellingly by Larry Kramer in his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 
analysis of the Supreme Court's 2000 Term5 and his recent book, The People 
Themselves6-is dramatically at odds with this approach and holds that, while 
judicial review was part of the original understanding, it was rarely exercised, 
and only clearly unconstitutional statutes were struck down. 
This Article presents the most complete historical account of the richest 
source of evidence on the original understanding: the case law before 
Marbury? It specifically focuses on the cases in which at least one judge found 
a statute unconstitutional. 8 Far more than any previous work, this Article, rather 
than accepting at face value judicial assertions that only clearly unconstitutional 
statutes or statutes violative of natural law were being invalidated, carefully 
probes judicial reasoning and its application to statutory and constitutional text. 
This historical analysis leads to a view of judicial review in the founding era 
that is sharply different from all the varying schools of thought, both with 
respect to the frequency of judicial review and with respect to when it was 
exercised, and thus this Article supports a reconceptualization of the original 
understanding. 
This Article shows, first, that judicial review was dramatically better 
established in the years before Marbury than previously recognized. While 
there has been a range of opinions about early judicial review, none of the 
modern commentators has grasped how common it was for courts to invalidate 
statutes. The most influential modern account asserts that there were five such 
decisions in state and federal courts in the critical period between the 
Constitution and Marbury.9 In contrast, this Article discusses thirty-one cases 
l. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS l (1962). 
2. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 
ll27 (1987). 
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34. 
5. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
6. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004 ). 
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803). 
8. I hope to explore in a subsequent article the pre-Marbury cases in which 
constitutional challenges failed. 
9. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37, 60 
(1990). 
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in which a statute was invalidated and seven more in which, although the 
statute was upheld, one judge concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. 
The sheer number of these decisions not only belies the notion that the 
institution of judicial review was created by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, 
it also reflects widespread acceptance and application of the doctrine. 
Moreover, the fact that judicial review was exercised so frequently indicates 
that courts were not as reluctant to invalidate statutes as Kramer contends. At 
one level, then, this study provides some support for the modem Court's 
expansive view of its powers pursuant to the original understanding-a view 
that the Court has claimed but that no previous historical study has previously 
supported. 
Second, as it focuses on the statutes challenged in these cases and the 
constitutional texts at stake, this Article contends that the early practice reflects 
a structural and process-based approach to judicial review. With the exception 
of two instances in which a state court found a state statute unconstitutional 
because it violated the Federal Contract Clause, 10 exercises of judicial review 
were of two types. First, when legislation affected coordinate constitutional 
departments that were not part of the political process that had produced the 
legislation-either juries or courts--courts repeatedly invalidated that 
legislation. They did so even when there was no obvious inconsistency between 
the legislation and constitutional text. Of the twenty-one cases in this category, 
there were colorable arguments in favor of the statutes in eighteen. Second, 
federal courts closely scrutinized state legislation for its constitutionality; in 
most cases in which a statute was struck down, the statute either ran afoul of 
the Federal Constitution or implicated a sphere of federal power (such as the 
ability to confer citizenship, regulate foreign commerce, or resolve boundary 
disputes between states). In seven of the eight cases in which a federal court 
invalidated a state statute, there were plausible grounds for supporting the 
rejected statute's constitutionality. 
In contrast, I have found no case outside these categories in which a statute 
was invalidated. There is little evidence that anyone thought that judicial 
review was only appropriate in the categories of cases I have outlined. Rather, 
the difference is that the standard of review was different outside of these 
categories. 
Thus, analysis of the early case law indicates that both Kramer's approach 
and the Court's approach miss the original understanding in ways of profound 
importance for modem originalist jurisprudence. Where Kramer describes a 
consistent pattern of deference, this Article shows that the standard of review 
varied with subject matter and that, in the two categories of cases described 
above, courts were not deferential and could apply an expansive conception of 
judicial review. Indeed, in twenty-five of the twenty-nine cases in these two 
10. For discussion of these cases (the names of which have not been preserved), see 
infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
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categories, there were plausible grounds supporting the invalidated statute. 
When the category of state court invalidation of state statutes on federal 
constitutional grounds is added so that all cases are represented, one finds that 
in twenty-four of the thirty-one cases in which statutes were invalidated, there 
were plausible arguments in favor of the statute. 11 In short, the case law is 
dramatically at odds with the view that only clearly unconstitutional statutes 
were invalidated. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court's expansive view of its power to invalidate 
legislation that is at odds with its conception of the original understanding 
misses the fact that early courts were-except in the limited categories of cases 
described above-strikingly deferential and overturned no statutes outside 
these limited categories. In addition, the early case law is almost a mirror image 
of modern case law. In the leading modern cases, the Supreme Court has acted 
expansively in striking down congressional legislation on federalism grounds. 
Early practice was the opposite. While these early federal court cases have been 
largely overlooked, they show that, in the period covered here, exercises of 
judicial review served to keep state legislatures, rather than Congress, in check. 
In contrast, in Hylton v. United States, 12 the one Supreme Court case involving 
a substantive challenge to an assertion of congressional authority, the Court 
unanimously upheld the statute in the face of a strong textualist challenge. 
Part I of this Article establishes the background for the presentation of the 
early case law. It discusses the competing views on the original understanding 
of judicial review. It also discusses the two sources of evidence on the original 
understanding other than the post-1776 case law: judicial precedent before the 
American Revolution and the (remarkably few) early statements about judicial 
review that occurred outside of the context of litigation (such as Alexander 
Hamilton's Federalist 78 13 ). This Part explains why the post-1776 case law 
provides the critical evidence on original understanding. 
Part II looks at the revolutionary-era case law. It examines the seven cases 
from this period that can arguably be considered judicial review cases. The next 
three Parts analyze the case law from the early Republic. Part III brings 
together the state cases in which courts invalidated statutes. Part IV looks at the 
lower federal court cases. Part V studies Hylton and the other relevant Supreme 
Court case law before Marbury. 
Part VI then draws on the previous analysis in two ways. First, it argues 
that the pre-Marbury case law powerfully illuminates Marbury. The prevalence 
of pre-Marbury exercises of judicial review helps explain why the assertion of 
judicial review in Marbury provoked little controversy, a fact that previous 
II. Obviously, all are not in agreement with my assessment of when there were 
plausible arguments in favor of the statutes-however, the crucial factor is the general 
pattern, which I think is clear enough. 
12. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
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scholars have often found surprising. It also makes Chief Justice Marshall's 
often-criticized reasoning in the case understandable: what appears to be a 
puzzling, unconvincing, and uniquely aggressive exercise of judicial review 
was fully consistent with prior judicial decisions in which courts had 
invalidated statutes that trenched on judicial authority and autonomy. Second, 
Part VI seeks to articulate the approach to judicial review underlying the case 
law. There is a dearth of writings from this era on when judicial review should 
be exercised, and there was certainly some support for the view that judicial 
review should only be exercised in cases of clear unconstitutionality. 
Nonetheless, the case law discussed in this Article principally reflects an 
approach to judicial review that, rather than being limited to cases of clear 
unconstitutionality, embodies a sensitivity to concerns of process and structure. 
The early decisions reflect the view that courts should look closely at 
legislation when it implicated the powers of governmental entities that had not 
participated in its enactment: courts thus looked closely at legislation adopted 
by the political branches that arguably trenched on the powers of juries and 
judges, and federal courts looked closely at state legislation that implicated the 
powers of Congress or the decisions made by "We the People" in adopting the 
Federal Constitution. Judicial review therefore reflected the conception that 
courts had to protect the preconditions for, to use Hamilton's term, "a limited 
Constitution" 1 ~ by protecting the autonomy and power of governmental entities 
not involved in the adoption of the statute under review. This Article does not 
argue for the application of this approach in modem case law. Indeed, this 
Article does not assume that modem jurisprudence should be originalist. The 
purpose of this Article is to uncover what the original understanding was as 
revealed in the richest source: the early case law. It leaves to further discussion 
the question of what consequences should follow from recognition of the 
original understanding. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Constitution does not explicitly give federal courts the power of 
judicial reviewY In the late nineteenth century, in the context of a heated 
political debate about whether courts were exercising the power of judicial 
review too aggressively, scholars began to debate when the power to review 
statutes had first emerged and, to the extent that that lower had been part of the 
original conception of the Constitution, its scope. 1 That debate continues to 
14. /d. at 394. 
15. At the same time, there is a strong textualist argument that judicial review is 
implicit in the Constitution. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of 
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 894-913 (2003) (presenting the textualist 
argument). 
16. See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The 
Emergence of a "Great Case," 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 375, 386-407 (2003). 
November 2005] JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE MARBURY 461 
this day. This Part examines the dominant scholarly positions, the different 
types of evidence bearing on the original understanding, and how probative 
those types of evidence are. 
Perhaps the best-known position is that judicial review of congressional 
legislation was not part of the original understanding and that Marbury 
represented a sharp break with the framers' vision. This view is associated most 
prominently with Professor Alexander Bickel. In his classic work, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, Bickel declared: "[l]f any social progress can be said to 
have been 'done' at a given time and by a given act, it is Marshall's 
achievement. The time was 1803; the act was the decision in the case of 
Marbury v. Madison." 17 
The dominant scholarly view differs from Bickel's in that it acknowledges 
the existence of judicial review before Marbury, but sees it as limited in scope 
and as a rarity. Professor Sylvia Snowiss, whose 1990 book Judicial Review 
and the Law of the Constitution18 is the leading historical study of early judicial 
review, found only five cases in the period between the start of the Federal 
Constitutional Convention and Marbury in which courts refused to apply 
statutes because they were unconstitutiona1. 19 "The absence of active judicial 
17. BICKEL, supra note 1, at I. 
18. SNOWISS, supra note 9. 
19. See id. at 37-38 & nn.57-60. According to Snowiss, the five judicial review cases 
in this period were: Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); VanHorne's Lessee v. 
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1792); Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801); Bowman 
v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 252 (1792); and Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20 
(1793). She discusses a sixth case in which an equally divided court upheld a statute: 
Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796). 
While Snowiss's account is the most influential study and has been treated as definitive, 
her list of cases omits reported opinions previously identified by scholars. In putting together 
the group of cases discussed in this Article, I began with the secondary literature examining 
the history of judicial review. Of these secondary sources, I found one particularly helpful. 
See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 
1932). Perhaps because it is seen as reflecting progressive-era biases, scholars have tended to 
disregard Haines's work, but, although its roster of cases is incomplete, it is a valuable 
starting point. See also William E. Nelson, Commentary, Chllnging Conceptions of Judicial 
Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1166 (1972) (treating briefly the changing case Jaw in a way that is also helpful in 
identifying cases). Specialized studies of particular aspects of early judicial review drew my 
attention to opinions not discussed in the larger judicial review literature. For example, 
through William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 
CONN. L. REv. 329 (1995), I became aware of Iredell's dissent in United States v. Ravara, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting), an illuminating opinion at odds with 
Iredell's public writings about the scope of judicial review. 
In addition, the broader secondary literature discussing courts in the revolutionary era 
and the early Republic proved important in identifying relevant cases not discussed in the 
judicial review literature. For example, David Currie's discussion in his Supreme Court 
history of Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), as a possible judicial 
review case, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 20-23 (1985), led to the discussion of Hollingsworth here. It 
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review [during this period]," she concludes, "reflected the understanding that 
this power was confined to the concededly unconstitutional act."20 Gordon 
Wood, the leading historian of the framing, has substantially embraced 
Snowiss' s approach. Following Snowiss, he has argued that judicial review was 
first seen as a "quasi-revolutionary process"21 and that, even as it won 
acceptance in the 1790s, its champions recognized that it "was not to be 
exercised in doubtful cases of unconstitutionality"22 and was to be "invoked 
only on the rare occasions of flagrant and unequivocal violations of the 
Constitution. "23 Other studies echo this view. William Casto, in his study of the 
early Supreme Court, concludes that the Justices believed that a statute could 
also led to my discussion of the analytically similar cases of Brailsford v. Georgia and 
Moultrie v. Georgia (which Currie does not discuss). Neither Brailsford nor Moultrie led to a 
published opinion, and they do not appear to have been previously discussed as judicial 
review cases. See infra Part V.B. With respect to my research into the published opinions 
themselves, one technique that I used should be noted: I benefited significantly from 
computer-assisted research, a resource unavailable to all but the most recent scholars writing 
on this topic, and to my knowledge, one not previously exploited. In particular, the search 
terms "constitutional!" and "unconstitutional!" in the Westlaw database proved helpful, 
although only a small percentage of the cases produced by searching for these terms were 
judicial review cases. 
In addition to listing only a fairly small percentage ofthe published opinions, Snowiss's 
accounts also wholly fail to recognize the existence of unreported decisions. With respect to 
identifying these decisions, I found of particular value Charles Warren, Earliest Cases of 
Judicial Review of State Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE L.J. 15, 24-25 (1925), an 
important work of archival research that has been largely ignored by modem scholars. THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 1985-2004) (consisting of seven volumes published from 1985 to 2004) has also 
been of significance to this project by bringing to light unreported federal court decisions 
(such as Brailsford and Moultrie). Timothy A. Lawrie, Interpretation and Authority: 
Separation of Powers and the Judiciary's Battle for Independence in New Hampshire, 1786-
1818, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310 (1995), draws on original New Hampshire court records to 
present evidence of two previously unknown and unreported decisions. See infra note 262 
(describing these two cases in more detail). A more recently published study of New 
Hampshire archival records finds evidence of at least six, and as many as eleven, judicial 
review cases in New Hampshire in 1786 and 1787, only two of which were previously 
known before the article's publication. See Richard M. Lambert, The "Ten Pound Act" 
Cases and the Origins of Judicial Review in New Hampshire, 43 N.H. B.J. 37 (2002). 
Lambert's and Lawrie's studies suggest that systematic review of other states' archives 
might well bring a significant number of other cases to light. Since The Documentary 
History of the Supreme Court is only concerned with cases that made their way to the 
Supreme Court, review of federal court archives might also reveal additional judicial review 
cases. I have not undertaken such a project of archival review, but if such a project is ever 
undertaken, it might well indicate that exercises of judicial review were even more common 
than this Article indicates. 
20. SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 60. 
21. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall 
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 787, 796 n.41 (1999). 
22. 1d. at 799. 
23. ld. at 798-99. 
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be invalidated only if it were '"unconstitutional beyond dispute. "'24 In his work 
on the first hundred years of the Supreme Court, David Currie declares that a 
"lasting principle[] of construction [was] established before 1801: doubtful 
cases were to be resolved in favor of constitutionality."25 Christopher Wolfe,26 
Robert Clinton, 27 and Michael Klarman28 have offered similar views of the 
24. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 222 (1995). 
25. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 55. 
26. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 104 (1986) ("Judicial review was 
not to be exercised in a 'doubtful case."'). 
27. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 72 
(1989) (embracing Currie's conclusion that federal court case law reflects the view that 
"'doubtful cases were to be construed in favor of constitutionality"') (quoting CURRIE, supra 
note 19, at 55). Clinton argues that some Antifederalists and Republican politicians had a 
more expansive conception of judicial review and argued that courts should strike down 
congressional legislation that exceeded national power or implicated state power. See id. at 
73. Clinton does not, however, argue that this approach was reflected in the case law. 
28. In a thoughtful and intriguing article on Chief Justice Marshall, Professor Michael 
Klarman has briefly suggested that the early conception of judicial review reflected the view 
that statutes had to be concededly unconstitutional and that they had to fall "within the 
special purview of the judiciary." Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" 
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REv. llll, 1120-21 (2001). In other words, both 
preconditions had to be satisfied before a court could overturn a statute. See also CLINTON, 
supra note 27, at 76 (stating that the early cases and the Federalist view reflected the idea 
that judicial review was limited to cases "bearing directly upon the exercise of their own 
functions as courts of law"); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LoNG ROBE: THE ORIGINS 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA 222 (1989) ("[C]ourts could resist or refuse to apply laws 
interfering with the constitutional duties of the judges. But this did not mean that courts 
could go beyond the defense of their own prerogatives."). 
As has been noted, this Article shows that most of the statutes invalidated before 
Marbury were not clearly unconstitutional, and so I disagree with Klarman's first limitation. 
In commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Dean Kramer has indicated that my 
approach is similar to Klarman's with respect to the second limitation in that we both believe 
that "the doctrine of judicial review ... was limited to laws regulating courts and judicial 
process." See KRAMER, supra note 6, at 69 & n.l7l. 
A critical difference between our approaches, however, is that Klarman sees a 
theoretical limitation to judicial review to statutes involving the "special purview of the 
judiciary," Klarman, supra, at 1120, whereas my argument is that statutes involving courts 
and juries were subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. Apart from the pattern reflected in 
the cases, Klarman offers as evidence two comments at the Federal Constitutional 
Convention-one from Elbridge Gerry and one from James Madison. See id. at 1121 n.43. 
For the quotations, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97-98 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (Elbridge Gerry) ("[The judiciary] will have 
a sufficient check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the 
laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality"); id. at 430 (James 
Madison) (suggesting that judicial review should be "limited to cases of a Judiciary 
Nature"). 
Gerry, however, was simply saying that courts will be able to invalidate 
unconstitutional legislation affecting them; he was not arguing that those are the only types 
of statutes courts are able to invalidate. In contrast, Madison's quotation arguably suggests 
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early case law. 
As Snowiss recognizes,29 her conclusion echoes that reached by James 
Bradley Thayer in his 1893 Harvard Law Review article The Origin and Scope 
of American Constitutional Law,30 a classic work that provided critical 
historical justification for the limited conception of judicial review championed 
by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo, as well as by Judge Hand.31 
Thayer argued that the early view was that a court "can only disregard the Act 
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, 
but have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational 
question. "32 
In marked contrast, Professor Suzanna Sherry argues that there was an 
expansive conception of judicial review at the time of the founding. She 
contends that the original understanding was that statutes would be judged for 
their consistency with fundamental princi~les of natural law, as well as for their 
consistency with the written constitution. 3 A substantial body of scholars has 
reached the same conclusion.34 
that at the time of this speech, he might have thought that judicial review should be limited 
to statutes affecting the judiciary. Madison, however, in the course of the convention and the 
following years, took what one of his leading biographers has described as a "bewildering 
number of positions" on interpretive authority and judicial review. See Ralph L. Ketcham, 
James Madison and Judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 158, 158-59 (1957). For example, 
when he introduced the Bill of Rights, Madison espoused an expansive conception of 
judicial review, observing that "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a 
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights." James Madison, Amendments to the 
Constitution, in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 207 (Charles F. Hodson et al. eds., 
1979) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (speech to the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789). 
I have not found other evidence supporting the limited conception of judicial review that 
Klarman articulates, even in cases in which statutes that did not involve the province of the 
judiciary were challenged. For discussion of such cases, see infra Parts II.D. III.A, IV.A, 
V.A, and V.C. Finally, as discussed infra Parts III.A and IV.A, statutes were struck down 
which did not involve the powers of courts or of juries. 
29. See SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 6 n.7. 
30. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
31. For discussion of the article's influence on Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and 
Frankfurter, see Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 V AND. L. REv. 71 (1978). Frankfurter notably 
described Thayer's article as the most important article ever written in American 
constitutional law. See HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES: RECORDED IN 
TALKS WITH DR. HARLAN B. PHILLIPS 299-301 (1960); see also GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED 
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 118-19 (1994) (discussing the influence of Thayer on 
Hand). But see Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 9, 9-11 (1993) (noting that Thayer's conception of constrained judicial review did 
not apply to review of state statutes for consistency with the Federal Constitution). 
32. Thayer, supra note 30, at 144. 
33. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1127 (1987). 
34. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1 (1988); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, 
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Recent Supreme Court opinions also reflect an expansive conception of the 
original understanding of judicial review, although not a natural law conception 
of judicial review. Appealing to original understanding, the Court has 
invalidated a string of congressional statutes on federalism grounds. 35 Implicit 
in these opinions is the idea that fealty to originalism entails not only a 
particular vision of federalism, but also a commitment to an active conception 
of judicial review. In other words, when the Court overturns a congressional 
statute and asserts that it is carrying out the founders' understanding of the 
Constitution, its opinion reflects both a particular view on how the founders 
understood the substance of the Constitution and the view that the founders 
intended that the Court should not defer to congressional constitutional 
judgments about the substance of the Constitution. This view receives 
particularly clear expression in City of Boerne, in which Justice Kennedy 
stated: 
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the 
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law 
is. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, at 177. When the political branches of the 
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and 
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them 
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations 
must be disappointed. 36 
"[T]he duty to say what the law is" is thus traced to Marbury and means that, 
when the Court announces its view, that view trumps any inconsistent 
legislative reading of the Constitution advanced in its wake. 
Morrison offers an even more expansive view of judicial role: 
As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal system of 
Government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of 
power. . . . Departing from their parliamentary past, the Framers adopted a 
written Constitution that further divided authority at the federal level so that 
the Constitution's provisions would not be defined solely by the political 
branches nor the scope of legislative power limited only by public opinion and 
the Legislature's self-restraint. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 
176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (''The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
constitution is written"). It is thus a "'permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system'" that "'the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution."' 
No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the 
and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the 
New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2003). 
35. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
36. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate 
expositor of the constitutional text. . . . "In the performance of assigned 
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret 
the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due 
great respect from the others .... Many decisions of this Court, however, have 
unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury that '[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "'37 
Judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is here portrayed as a central 
part of the original understanding. The framers established a system of 
separation of powers, and it is a "permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system" that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution." "[l]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury is quoted in ways that 
make the opinion stand for not simply the proposition that courts must "say 
what the law is" in order to decide a particular case, but also for the proposition 
that the judicial reading of the Constitution is the correct reading and that the 
other branches cannot legitimately hold competing constructions. "[T]he 
judicial department ... say[s] what the law is" and there is no room for debate 
by the other branches or by the people. 
In his Harvard Law Review Foreword, Dean Kramer offers a powerful 
critique of the originalist underpinnings of the Court's originalism. Offering the 
paragraphs I have just quoted from Morrison as the crystallization of the 
Court's recent jurisprudence, Kramer writes: 
Virtually every statement here is wrong. Or, not so much wrong as made 
without context and grossly oversimplified. This is constitutional history in a 
funhouse mirror, a warped picture whose features are distorted at precisely 
those points where it matters most. The Founding generation did not solve the 
problem of constitutional interpretation and enforcement by delegating it to 
judges. Their thinking was more complex and, frankly, more imaginative than 
that. They were too steeped in republicanism to think that the solution to the 
problem of republican politics was to chop it off at the knees .... And no 
matter how often the Court repeats that it has been the ultimate expositor of 
the Constitution since Marbury, it still will not have been so .... 
I said at the outset that I would not make an originalist claim, and I do not 
mean to do so now. The point is not that the Rehnquist Court's vision of the 
Constitution is wrong because the Founding generation would have rejected it 
or because popular constitutionalism has been a vital part of our practice all 
along, though both things are true. I am not interested (here) in getting into a 
complex debate about how much normative weight history should carry in 
law. My present objective is more modest: to denaturalize a set of assumptions 
that are taken as natural by many, including especially the conservative 
majority on the Rehnquist Court and its supporters off the Court. Insofar as the 
Justices have chosen their path in the belief that, in doing so, they are 
vindicating the Constitution, either as it was originally understood or as it was 
viewed until recently, they are mistaken. It does not automatically follow that 
37. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (some citations omitted). 
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they are wrong to enlarge the scope of their authority. But it does follow that 
they need an explanation and a justification they have yet to provide. Certainly 
more needs to be done than quoting Marbury out of context or offering really 
bad renditions of the Founding. 38 
467 
Building on previous historical work-and in particular, that of Snowiss-
Kramer offers a conception of the original scope of judicial review that is very 
different than that reflected in Rehnquist Court decisions. Kramer argues that 
the original understanding was that judicial power was "a power to be 
employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear 
beyond doubt."39 
In his important book The People Themselves, Kramer develops his 
argument about the original understanding with subtlety and sophistication. 
Kramer argues "[t]hat the Founders expected constitutional limits to be 
enforced through politics and by the people rather than in courts.'40 In the 
debate about the Constitution, the topic of judicial review received little 
attention. In early practice, it was extremely limited in scope: "It was ... a 
power to be employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality of a law 
was clear beyond doubt."41 Breaking with other scholars such as Snowiss who 
stress the constrained quality of early judicial review, Kramer, while seeing 
early judicial review as sharply constrained, recognizes that "judges did not 
confine themselves strictly to the text."42 Jud~es also "drew on well-established 
principles of the customary constitution.''4 Nonetheless, because the only 
statutes held unconstitutional were either at odds with clear text or clearly 
established principles, exercises of judicial review were limited to statutes that 
were "blatantly unconstitutional.''44 
38. Kramer, supra note 5, at 162-63 (internal citations omitted). 
39. /d. at 79. At the same time, Kramer's vision of early judicial review is less 
constrained than Snowiss's vision. Thus, he recognizes that in determining what was 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, judges "were not confined strictly to the text but 
could draw on well-established principles of the customary constitution as well." /d. 
Although his overall conclusions are substantially different from mine, in making this 
argument, Kramer relied in part on an earlier draft of this Article. See id. at 39. For 
discussion of the differences between my views and Kramer's, see infra note 44. For 
Kramer's most detailed discussion of Snowiss's work, see Kramer, supra note 5, at 33 n.114. 
40. KRAMER, supra note 6, at 91. 
41. ld. at 99; see also id. at 92 ("clear beyond dispute"); id. at 102 (stating that 
violations must be '"plain and clear'"). 
42. /d. at 99. 
43. ld. 
44. /d. at 103. Kramer's book cites previous drafts of this Article, see id. at ix, 41, 69, 
279, 291-92, and thus, unlike scholars such as Snowiss, at one level he recognizes the 
comparative frequency of early exercises of judicial review. At the same time, that 
recognition takes the form of a brief acknowledgment rather than a significant aspect of the 
book-Kramer discusses only a handful of the cases from the early Republic-and it is at 
odds with his basic thesis that "constitutional limits [were] to be enforced through politics 
and by the people rather than in the courts." /d. at 91. Moreover, Kramer reads the cases 
differently than I do. Where he argues that the invalidated statutes were at odds with 
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Thus, the issue is squarely joined: What was the original understanding of 
judicial review? As Kramer's work indicates, the answer to this question has 
profound consequences for modern jurisprudence. 
As an evidentiary matter, there are three categories of materials potentially 
bearing on this question: practice prior to the Revolution; contemporaneous 
statements about judicial review that occurred outside the context of litigation 
(such as at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia); and case law in the 
period after the start of the Revolution. 
Practice before the Revolution, however, ultimately offers limited 
illumination because the doctrine of judicial review marked a departure from 
precedent. Arguably, in a handful of cases in the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, British courts took the position that they could pronounce 
void statutes inconsistent with principles of fundamental law.45 The most 
prominent of these decisions is Lord Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case, in 
which he observed: 
[l]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul 
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when 
an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge 
such Act to be void.46 
Historians and legal scholars have debated whether Bonham's Case should be 
read as a declaration of the power of judicial review or simply as an 
embodiment of a principle of statutory construction.47 There is agreement, 
however, that by the time of the American Revolution, the principle of judicial 
constitutional text or clearly established principles, I argue that the scope of review turned on 
the category of cases, and that in certain types of cases courts repeatedly acted aggressively, 
without the support of clear text or well-established principles. 
45. In addition to the case law, one body of material should be noted as bearing on the 
acceptance of judicial review. Private parties in the colonies could appeal cases to the Privy 
Council and challenge colonial statutes as inconsistent with the laws of England. This 
practice arguably preconditioned Americans to accept judicial review because colonial 
legislation was subject to review for its consistency with a higher authority. At the same 
time, this was not judicial review, since the question was not one of constitutionality but of 
consistency with English law. For a superb recent study, see MARY SARAH BILDER, THE 
TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 73-90 (2004); 
the classic work on the topic is JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM 
THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950). 
46. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646,652. Coke's statement was subsequently 
cited with approval in Day v. Savage, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 235,237, and in City of London v. 
Wood, (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602. 
47. Compare, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 177 (1967) (statutory construction), and Samuel E. Thome, Dr. Bonham's 
Case, 54 LAW Q. REV. 543 (1938) (same), with HAINES, supra note 19, at 35 ("According to 
Coke's theory the common law courts were superior in authority to the king and to 
Parliament."), and WOLFE, supra note 26, at 90 ("In the early seventeenth century, during 
the resistance to the Stuart kings, Sir Edward Coke had attempted to establish the principle 
of judicially enforced constitutiona1limits on government."). 
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review had been decisively rejected in Great Britain.48 Asserting the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, Blackstone stated, "[I]f the parliament will positively 
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power in the 
ordinary forms of the constitution, that is vested with authority to control 
it ... .'.49 While there was certainly awareness among revolutionary-era 
American political and legal leaders of Coke's dicta, those leaders also 
recognized that, under mid-eighteenth-century British law, Parliament was 
supreme and no court could overturn its enactments. 50 Thus, for a series of 
reasons-because it is debatable whether British courts had ever asserted the 
power to overturn statutes, because the relevant cases involve dicta, and 
because, whatever the legal rule was in the seventeenth century, the reigning 
orthodoxy at the time of the American Revolution was parliamentary 
supremacy-pre-revolutionary precedents are of little help in understanding the 
contours of judicial review as it developed in this country after the start of the 
Revolutionary War. 
The various statements about judicial review that were made in this 
country after 1776 are more helpful, but still of limited evidentiary value. To 
begin with, they are strikingly few in number. There was no focused discussion 
at the Philadelphia convention of judicial review. It was discussed, but in the 
context of debate about related issues, principally whether there should be a 
Council of Revision, a joint executive-judicial body that would have had the 
48. For example, Charles Haines, who sees Bonham's Case as embodying the principle 
of judicial review, writes, "Whatever effects Coke's attempt to set up a superior and 
fundamental law may have had, the Revolution of 1688 marked the abandonment of his 
doctrine as a practical principle of English politics." HAINES, supra note 19, at 35. Wolfe's 
analysis is to the same effect. See WOLFE, supra note 26, at 91 ("Coke's dictum, however, 
was not ultimately to win out in English constitutional history."). 
49. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *91; see also id. at *160 ("(Parliament 
is] the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside 
somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution ofthese kingdoms."). 
50. See KRAMER, supra note 6, at 20-23. There appear to be only two cases in this 
country before the Revolution in which Bonham's Case was arguably relied on by a lawyer 
seeking to invoke the doctrine of judicial review. 
It has been contended that James Otis, in the 1761 Writs of Assistance case, urged the 
Massachusetts Superior Court to invalidate a statute on Cokean grounds. See, e.g., RAOUL 
BERGER, CONGRESS VS. THE SUPREME COURT 23-28, 349-68 (1969); HAINES, supra note 19, 
at 51-53; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 
547, 689-91 (1999). Closely reading the evidence in the Writs of Assistance case, Kramer 
convincingly argues that Otis was simply arguing that the statute should be read narrowly. 
See KRAMER, supra note 6, at 21-22. 
A better case can be made that George Mason relied on Bonham's Case as support for 
exercise of judicial review in a 1772 case involving a statute allowing enslavement of Native 
American women. See Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jeff. 109, 113-14 (Va. 1772) ("All human 
constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have 
been the adjudications of our courts of justice. And cited 8 Co. 118 a. Bonham's case."). The 
court, however, decided the case on other grounds, ruling that the challenged statute had 
been repealed. See id. at 123. 
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power of vetoing legislation.51 There were some statements expressing 
opposition to judicial review. John Dickinson "thought no such power ought to 
exist,"52 and John Mercer "disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as 
expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void."53 
But there were more statements in favor of the power. Because these statements 
in favor of judicial review are brief and abstract in nature, however, they 
provide little detail concerning what the scope of the power was understood to 
be. There are a couple of statements indicating that courts would be able to 
exercise judicial review to protect their independence. Elbridge Gerry observed 
that judges "would have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own 
department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding 
on their constitutionality."54 James Wilson similarly stated that "Judges, as 
expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their 
constitutional rights."55 There are also statements indicating that judicial 
review did not empower judges to strike down laws with which they disagreed. 
Wilson opined that "Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, 
may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in 
refusing to give them effect,"56 and Mason asserted that judges "could declare 
an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law however unjust 
oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this descri~tion, 
they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free course." Yet 
there is not enough data to assess how broadly representative such statements 
were or to flesh out the speakers' views as to what grounds were a proper basis 
for the exercise of the power of judicial review. 
There are also a small number of discussions of judicial review that 
occurred outside of the Philadelphia convention that are much fuller 
discussions than anything said in the convention. The most notable defenses58 
51. The critical discussions were on July 17, 1787, and July 21, 1787. See 2 RECORDS, 
supra note 28, at 21-36, 71-83. 
52. /d. at 299. 
53. /d. at 298. 
54. 1 RECORDS, supra note 28, at 97. 
55. 2 RECORDS, supra note 28, at 73. 
56. /d. 
57. /d. at 78. For other statements in favor of judicial review, see id. at 28 (Morris), 76 
(Martin), 430 (Madison). For discussion of Madison's statement, see supra note 28. 
58. The most thoughtful critique of judicial review was found in the Letters of Brutus. 
See Brutus XI, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 512-17 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) 
[hereinafter DHRC]; Brutus XII, in 16 DHRC, supra, at 72-75, 120-22; Brutus XV, in 16 
DHRC, supra, at 431-35. The extent to which Brutus's arguments were disseminated is 
disputed. Compare Kramer, supra note 5, at 68 (noting that the limited reprinting of Brutus's 
essays suggests contemporary pertinence and importance were limited), with Editorial Note, 
in 13 DHRC, supra, at 411 (stating that the limited reprinting of Brutus "does not adequately 
illustrate the extent of circulation" since these essays were discussed by newspaper essays in 
places where reprinting had not occurred). The pseudonymous Brutus may have actually 
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were those of Alexander Hamilton (in Federalist 78 and Federalist 81 59), 
future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell (in his 1786 letter "To the Public"60 
and his letter to Richard Spaight the following year61 ), and James Wilson (in a 
speech at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention62 and the Lectures on the Law 
he delivered in 1790-179163). 
Wilson's speeches focused on making the case for judicial review, not on 
articulating a theory of when it should be exercised, and are thus not of much 
value in determining the early scope of judicial review. Iredell, in contrast, set 
forth a view on which judicial review should be exercised. He wrote Spaight: 
"In all doubtful cases ... the Act ought to be supported: it should be 
unconstitutional beyond dispute before it is pronounced such."64 Iredell's 
formulation-combined with the use of similar formulations in a number of 
early judicial decisions-has profoundly shaped the theories of Kramer65 and 
Snowiss, 66 both of whom see Iredell as reflecting the consensus view that 
judicial review was limited to the concededly unconstitutional case. But 
Iredell's out-of-court writings do not make clear what "unconstitutional beyond 
been Melancton Smith. See id. Smith was a New York politician who had earlier attacked 
the court's decision in Rutgers v. Waddington, see infra note 132, which was arguably one of 
the first judicial review cases. 
59. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
60. Letter from James Iredell to the Public ( 1786), in l LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF 
JAMES IREDELL 145 (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1857). 
61. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787) [hereinafter Iredell 
Letter], in I LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 60, at 172. 
62. James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 2 DHRC, 
supra note 58, at 450-51. 
63. JAMES WILSON, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, with That of 
Great Britain, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 309, 329-31 (Robert Green McCloskey 
ed., 1967); see also id. at 309 (comparing English and American constitutions). One other 
early discussion of judicial review should be noted: the future Chancellor James Kent's 
lecture on the subject. See James Kent, Introductory Lecture, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 937 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz 
eds., 1983). Kent articulates a strikingly expansive conception of judicial review, 
highlighting the need to check "the passions of a fierce and vindictive majority" and to 
preserve "the equal rights of a minor faction." /d. at 941. Kent delivered these lectures at the 
start of his legal career and they had little influence. Few attended the lectures and the 
published version found few purchasers. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the 
History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 559 n.58 (1993) ("The pamphlets 
reprinting the lectures bombed on the marketplace as thoroughly as the original lectures."). I 
find no reflection of Kent's broad conception of judicial review in the early case law. 
64. Iredell Letter, supra note 61, at 175. 
65. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 56 (stating that the Iredell approach "became an 
article of faith among the supporters of judicial review"); id. at 79 (noting that what achieved 
acceptance in the 1790s was the theory of review formulated by men like Iredell in the 
1780s). 
66. See SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 34 ("[T]he judicial power contemplated by both 
sides was confined to the concededly unconstitutional act .... This point was most clearly 
expressed by James Iredell .... "). 
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dispute" would mean in practice. Similarly, the mere fact that others employed 
similar phrasing does not mean that they actually employed a constrained 
approach to judicial review. Finally, the fact that Iredell-type language was 
employed in a number of decisions does not mean that it was representative of 
a general consensus that review should be highly constrained. Indeed, in a 
number of opinions discussed here, Iredell repeatedly embraced an aggressive 
conception of judicial review.67 
The final major writings on judicial review are Hamilton's Federalist 78 
and Federalist 81. Federalist 78, in particular, provides a rich source of 
evidence on what one major thinker believed the scope of judicial review 
should be. Nonetheless, its text can be parsed in radically different ways. 
Snowiss, for example, argues that Hamilton in Federalist 78 was embracing the 
position that judges could invalidate only "a concededly unconstitutional 
act."68 Others, however, have seen Federalist 78 as embodying a broad 
conception of judicial review. In his classic The Growth of American 
Constitutional Law, for example, Benjamin Wright, quoting freely from 
Federalist 78, describes its "doctrine" as follows: 
The courts under this doctrine do not simply declare void instances of "direct 
violation" of the Constitution. They become the guardians of the "manifest 
tenor of the Constitution," the spokesmen for "the intentions of the people," 
while the President and Congress are reduced to the position of being always 
potential enemies of the Constitution and of the reserved rights of the people, 
and even the people are to be protected against themselves by the judges.69 
The critical point here is not to argue for a particular reading of Federalist 78, 
but to argue that it can plausibly support a range of readings. 
In sum, the body of statements about judicial review occurring outside of 
the context of litigation-because they are relatively few in number, because of 
their focus, and because they are not concerned with concrete problems of 
constitutional construction-is of limited value in assessing the original 
understanding of judicial review. By far, the richest source of evidence is to be 
found in the case law and in reactions to that case law. Overwhelmingly, this is 
where discussion of judicial review is to be found. Of equal importance, the 
case law involves concrete applications of the doctrine. Whereas statements of 
general principle can be interpreted differently-as the example of Federalist 
78 illustrates-the cases involve specific instances of construction. The rest of 
67. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449-50 (1793) (Iredell, J., 
dissenting) (discussed infra note 437 and accompanying text); Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 409 (1792) (discussed infra notes 398-425 and accompanying text); United States v. 
Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 373 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (Iredell, J.) (discussed infra notes 365-
77 and accompanying text); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298-99 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussed infra notes 426-33 and accompanying text). 
68. SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 80. 
69. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 
(1942). 
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this Article examines that case law, focusing on cases where statutes were 
invalidated, and shows both that the body of that case law is dramatically larger 
than previously recognized and that the dominant conception of the scope of 
judicial review is one that previous scholars have missed. 
II. REVOLUTIONARY-ERA CASE LAW 
Since the 1870s, scholars have probed the limited record of revolutionary-
era case law to unearth instances in which courts invalidated statutes. More 
than a century of research has produced seven cases in which there is plausible 
evidence that a party sought invalidation of a statute. Given the state of the 
evidence, it is not certain in how many of these cases a statute was actually 
invalidated. The scholarly conclusions on this score have been dramatically 
different. It has been argued that all of these cases were true judicial review 
cases, and it has also been argued that none of them were. 70 
In this Part, I examine these cases. I conclude that at least four of them 
involved the invalidation of statutes on constitutional grounds. My focus, 
however, is not principally on whether judicial review was ultimately 
exercised, but on interpretive approach. This shift in focus is linked to the 
evidence discussed in this Article of the use of judicial review in the early 
Republic. If judicial review was, as Snowiss has argued, "unused"71 in the 
1790s, then the revolutionary-era cases are of central importance in 
determining the original understanding of judicial review. Given the lack of 
discussion of judicial review in the Constitutional Convention and the failure of 
the constitutional text to provide explicitly for the power of judicial review, the 
early cases have been treated as having great weight because they establish the 
background norms against which the founders acted. In other words, they have 
been seen as the key to the question whether, by 1787, judicial review was so 
well established that it can be fairly read into the Constitution. 
When it is seen, however, that judicial review was frequently exercised in 
the years immediately after the Constitution was drafted, the earlier cases are 
not quite as critical. This practice in the early Republic indicates that, as people 
applied the Constitution and its state analogues, they repeatedly embraced 
judicial review. The fact that the power of judicial review was controversial 
when first asserted in some states before the Constitution was drafted (as 
indeed it was) and the fact that there were only a limited number of exercises of 
the power in the revolutionary era become less salient. Original understanding 
is better evidenced by practice immediately after the Constitution was written 
rather than by practice before the Constitution, when the doctrine of judicial 
review was initially emerging and people were grappling with its implications. 
70. See CLINTON, supra note 27, at 54 (summarizing the conclusions of leading 
commentators). 
71. SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 63. 
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Thus, my principal concern here is with interpretive approach. With one 
exception, all of the cases involved challenges to statutes regulating judicial 
matters-either the extent of the right to trial by jury or the admissibility of 
certain evidence. In considering these challenges, courts repeatedly employed a 
broad conception of judicial review-one not limited to the invalidation of 
clearly unconstitutional statutes. In contrast, in the one case in which the 
challenged statute did not involve judicial matters, the statute was upheld 
because most members of the court adopted a strained (or at least highly 
legalistic) reading of the state constitution. Thus, these early cases reveal two 
different approaches. As will be shown in later Parts, this interpretive pattern-
a broad approach to judicial review when statutes involved judicial matters and 
a constrained conception of judicial review when they did not-became even 
more evident after the Constitution was drafted. 
A. Jury Trial Cases 
Holmes v. Watson (1780), the first judicial review case, and the Ten Pound 
Act Cases (1786-1787) both involved constitutional challenges to statutes 
limiting jury trials. In Holmes, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a 
state statute that authorized the seizure of loyalist property and provided that 
the trial to determine whether seized property was in fact loyalist property 
"should be by a jury of six men."72 Pursuant to that statute, Elisha Watson, a 
major in the patriot militia, seized several hundred yards of silk and other goods 
from John Holmes and Solomon Ketchamere. The jury in the subsequent trial 
found in Watson's favor. Before the state supreme court, the defendants' 
attorney argued "that the jury who tried the said plaint before the said ~ustice 
consisted of six men only contrary to the constitution of New Jersey." 3 The 
relevant section of the state constitution did not, however, specify a requisite 
number of jurors. It simply stated "that the inestimable right of trial by jury 
shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, 
forever."74 Nonetheless, the appellate court ruled in favor of Watson and 
Ketchamere, concluding that "this was not a constitutionaljury."75 
There is no surviving copy of the opinion-it appears the decision was 
delivered orally76-and the principal record of the holding is a brief summary 
in an 1802 New Jersey Supreme Court decision.77 Nonetheless, in construing 
the state constitution's protection of trial by jury and invalidating the statute, 
72. State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802) (citing statute). While there was no 
published opinion in Holmes, the case was discussed in Parkhurst. 
73. Austin Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456, 
458 (1899) (quoting argument). 
74. N.J. CONST. art. XXII (1776). 
75. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
76. See Scott, supra note 73, at 459. 
77. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
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the court necessarily went beyond the text of the constitution. The requirement 
that a jury consist of twelve persons was presumably derived from English 
common law or colonial-era documents. 78 In particular, foundational 
documents for the two parts of New Jersey-the West Jersey Concessions and 
Agreements of 1676 and the East Jersey House of Representatives' 1699 
Declaration of Rights and Privileges-provided that trials shall be by "twelve 
honest men of the neighborhood" and "by the verdict of twelve men," 
respectively. The New Jersey Supreme Court thus apparently construed 
constitutional text in light of background principles, even though the relevant 
constitutional provision did not reference those principles and even though the 
constitution elsewhere explicitly provided that the state legislature could 
modify or overturn prior common law or statutory law.79 Significantly, the 
court was not constitutionalizing prior practice: a colonial statute in place for 
thirty years at the time of Watson provided that in small causes, the jury could 
consist of six individuals. 80 It was, instead, constitutionalizing a particular 
conception of a jury trial. Thus, the very first judicial review case involved 
invalidation of a statute when that result was not clearly mandated by 
constitutional text or by established practice. 
In contrast, New Hampshire's Ten-Pound Act Cases involved a relatively 
straightforward application of constitutional text, although even in this case the 
meaning of the text was not derived simply from the four comers of the 
document. The New Hampshire Bill of Rights, adopted in 1783, provided: 
In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more 
persons except those in which another practice is and has been customary . . . 
the parties have a right to a trial by jury. This method of procedure shall be 
held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas and in cases relatin~ to 
mariners' wages, the legislature shall think it necessary hereafter to alter it. 1 
The prior practice in New Hampshire had been to require juries in cases in 
which more than forty shillings (two pounds) were sought. 82 In 1785, however, 
the state legislature passed the "Ten-Pound Act," providing that actions for debt 
and actions for trespass not involving title to land would be tried before a 
justice of the peace, without a jury, if the damages sought were less than ten 
78. See Scott, supra note 73, at 459. 
79. The relevant part of the state constitution pertaining to the common law and 
previous statutory law provided that they could be altered by new statutory enactments. See 
N.J. CONST. art. XXI (1776) ("That all the laws of this Province ... shall be and remain in 
full force, until altered by the Legislature of this Colony .... "); id. art. XXII ("That the 
common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore 
practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law 
ofthe Legislature .... "). 
80. JULIUS GoEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT-VOLUME I: ANTECEDENTS 
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 124 (1971). 
81. N.H. CONST. art. XX (1783). 
82. Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 34-35 
(2003). 
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pounds. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts indicate that at least two lower 
courts in the state held the statute unconstitutional. The Independent Gazetteer, 
for example, reported, "The general court [i.e., the New Hampshire legislature], 
during their last session, repealed the ten pound act, and thereby justified the 
conduct of the justices of the inferior court, who have uniformly apposed [sic] 
it as unconstitutional and unjust."83 Here, unlike in Holmes, the constitutional 
provision at issue explicitly referred to background practices-"except those in 
which another practice is and has been customary." Given the background 
practices, the courts could mechanically apply the constitution to overturn the 
statute: the statute was unconstitutional because ten pounds was greater than 
two pounds. 
The Rhode Island case of Trevett v. Weeden84 also involved a challenge to 
a statute as at odds with the right to a jury trial, but it differs markedly from the 
previous three cases because, at the time of the case, Rhode Island did not have 
a written constitution so there was no text for the court to construe. In 1786, the 
state legislature had passed statutes imposing a penalty on those who did not 
accept the state's paper money as equivalent to gold or silver and providing that 
actions to recover the penalty should be tried without a jury. When John 
Weeden "refus[ed] to receive the paper bills of [Rhode Island], in payment for 
meat sold in market," John Trevett brought suit to collect the penalty. James 
Varnum, Weeden's attorney, advanced several claims reflecting different 
approaches to judicial review, although the different strands of argument and 
the line of analysis are at points confused. Drawing on Bacon, Coke, and 
Blackstone, Varnum made a traditional argument that the statute should be 
interpreted in a way "consistent with common right or reason."85 More 
importantly, he appealed to both natural law and the "constitution" as the basis 
for invalidating the statute: 
But the Judges, and all others, are bound by the laws of nature in preference to 
83. INDEP. GAZETTEER, July 18, 1787, at l. A similar account appeared the following 
day in the Philadelphia Packet. See PHILA. PACKET, July 19, 1787, at l. Of the historians of 
judicial review, Crosskey is perhaps the most hostile to the claim that judicial review was 
established in this country before the convening of the Constitutional Convention. 
Nonetheless, even he concedes that the Ten-Pound Act Cases involved exercises of judicial 
review power. See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 968-69 (1953). A recent article by Richard Lambert, based 
on his work in New Hampshire archives, indicates that the two cases discussed in New 
Hampshire newspapers were only part of a significantly larger movement. Lambert's article 
indicates that there were at least six, and perhaps as many as eleven, cases in 1786 and 1787 
in which New Hampshire courts found the Ten-Pound Act unconstitutional. See Lambert, 
supra note 19, at 40-50. If the cases Lambert found are judicial review cases, then the 
number of judicial review cases in the revolutionary era would dramatically rise. 
84. There is no published official report of Trevett. The principal historical source 
concerning the case is attorney James Varnum's pamphlet. See James M. Varnum, The Case, 
Trevett v. Weeden, reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, l THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417 (1971). 
85. /d. at 425. 
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any human laws, because they were ordained by God himself anterior to any 
civil or political institutions. They are bound, in like manner, by the principles 
of the constitution in preference to any acts of the General Assembly, because 
they were ordained by the people anterior to and created the powers of the 
General Assembly. 86 
477 
Varnum dismissed the argument that the state did not have a constitution 
("Constitution! We have none: Who dares to say that? None but a British 
emissary, or a traitor to his country."87) and equated the constitution with the 
historic rights of the English people. Thus, he noted that, after receiving the 
colonial charter, the General Assembly in 1663 enacted a statute providing that 
"no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be deprived of his freehold or 
liberty, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled or otherwise destroyed, nor 
shall be passed upon, judged or condemned, but by the lawful judgment of his 
peers, or by the laws of this Colony" and continued: 
[t]his act ... was not creative of a new law, but declaratory of the rights of all 
the people, as derived from the Charter from their progenitors, time out of 
mind. It exhibited the most valuable part of their political constitution, and 
formed a sacred stipulation that it should never be violated. 88 
Most critically, he argued that "[t]he Judiciary have the sole power of judging 
of those laws [passed by the legislature], and are bound to execute them; but 
cannot admit any act of the Legislature as law, which is against the 
constitution. "89 
Varnum's argument was published in pamphlet form and, as a result, may 
well have been the most prominent discussion of judicial review at the time of 
the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention. It is striking for its nontextualism. 
That nontextualism is in part present in appeals to natural law (although these 
are not at the heart of the argument). More basically, Varnum was making an 
argument about "constitution[al]" interpretation without having a written 
constitution to appeal to. To the extent that his argument was based on a written 
document, it was the 1663 Rhode Island statute discussed above-and that 
statute did not specifically guarantee a jury trial. It provided that a freeman 
could suffer legal harms only "by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the 
laws of this Colony," and thus could be read as providing that a duly enacted 
statute could dispense with the individual's right to a jury trial. Varnum 
claimed, "The trial by jury, as hath been fully shewn, is a fundamental, a 
constitutional law."90 In fact, he did not make such a showing-he simply 
asserted the fundamentality of the right. Yet even as his argument is open-
ended and nontextual, it is also limited in focus. Varnum's argument could, in 
theory, have been framed in terms of interference with property rights or 
86. /d. at 424. 
87. /d. at 421. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. at 423. 
90. /d. 
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contractual rights. For example, he asks: "Is it consistent with common right or 
reason, that any man shall be compelled to receive paper, when he hath 
contracted to receive silver? That for bread he shall receive a stone, or for fish a 
serpent?"91 Yet like all but one of the revolutionary-era cases, his argument 
was cast in terms of process (i.e., the right to a jury trial), rather than substance. 
Varnum prevailed, but the grounds of decision were at first unstated. The 
judges simply announced ''that the information was not cognizable before 
them."92 A Providence newspaper reported that, the day after announcing their 
decision, the judges convened to explain the result. The account is brief, 
indicating that two of the judges stated that the act was "unconstitutional" 
without explanation, that one explained it was unconstitutional because 
penalties were to be assessed "[w]ithout trial by jury," that one explained he 
had "voted against taking cognizance," and that one had not explained his 
vote. 93 Thus, the actual decision offers little insight about revolutionary-era 
conceptions of judicial review beyond those reflected in Varnum's brief. 
The aftermath of the case indicates that, at least in Rhode Island in 1786, 
judicial review was still controversial. After the decision was announced, an 
angry state legislature summoned the judges and demanded that they explain 
their actions. The judges' comments are not illuminating; the most detailed 
statement comes from Judge Howell, who declared that the judges had simply 
held the matter not cognizable and refused to explain the judges' rationale. The 
legislature thereafter replaced four of the five judges-retaining only the one 
who, on the day the decision had been explained, offered no basis for his 
vote.94 
The final revolutionary-era case in which a statute was challenged on jury 
trial grounds was Bayard v. Singleton,95 a North Carolina Supreme Court case 
decided shortly before the Constitutional Convention began its work. The state 
statute at issue effectively barred loyalists (and those who had purchased or 
inherited property from them) from legally challenging the state's seizure of 
their property. It required state courts to dismiss any suit in which the 
ownership of property was at stake if the defendant submitted an affidavit that 
he held the property pursuant to a purchase from the state's commissioner of 
forfeited estates.96 Bayard was an action for ejectment in which the defendant 
filed such a motion. The plaintiffs, whose claim traced back to a British loyalist 
whose property had been seized by the state, responded by challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute. The state court clearly sought to avoid 
91. /d. at 425. 
92. /d.at417. 
93. PROVIDENCEGAZEITER&COUNTRY J., Oct. 7, 1786, at 1. 
94. See BILDER, supra note 45, at 190-91; see also GoRDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 459-60 ( 1969). 
95. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 48 (1787). 
96. /d. 
November 2005] JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE MARBURY 479 
confronting the question of whether it had the power to invalidate statutes: it 
initially adjourned the case to the following term and then, upon reconvening, 
urged the parties to settle.97 When this effort failed, however, the court 
observed: 
[N]otwithstanding the great reluctance they might feel against involving 
themselves in a dispute with the Legislature of the State, yet no object of 
concern or disrespect could come in competition or authorize them to dispense 
with the duty they owed the public, in conse~uence of the trust they were 
invested with under the solemnity of their oaths. 8 
The relevant constitutional provision stated "[t]hat in all controversies at 
law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best 
securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable."99 
Implicitly referring to this provision, the court stated, ''That by the constitution 
every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a decision of his property by a trial by 
jury."100 The court then observed that the legislature, being created by the 
constitution, could not alter its terms: "[I]t was clear, that no act [the 
legislature] could pass, could by any means repeal or alter the constitution, 
because if they could do this, they would at the same instant of time, destroy 
their own existence as a Legislature, and dissolve the government thereby 
established."101 The court concluded that the statute at issue was a nullity 
because the court's duty was to follow the law, and the fundamental law of the 
constitution was superior to a statutory enactment: 
[T]he constitution (which the judicial power was bound to take notice of as 
much as of any other law whatever,) standing in full force as the fundamental 
law of the land, notwithstanding the act on which the present motion was 
grounded, the same act must of course, in that instance, stand as abrogated and 
without any effect. 102 
The case then proceeded to trial. At the end of the trial, the justices of the 
court instructed the jury that "[t]he law of England, which we have adopted, 
allows [aliens] to purchase [land], but subjects them to forfeiture 
immediately"103 and that the loyalists from whom the plaintiffs traced their 
claim had no right to the property in question. 104 Thus instructed, the jury 
97. /d. at 43-44. After the court initially postponed resolution of the case, the state 
legislature investigated whether the justices had disregarded one of the legislature's statutes. 
Ultimately, no action was taken against them, although a substantial minority of the 
legislature made it clear that they opposed judicial review. See HAINES, supra note I9, at 
I13. 
98. Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) at 44. 
99. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 (1776). 
100. Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) at 45. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. 
I03. /d. at 47. 
104. /d. 
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found for the defendant. 105 
Like the New Hampshire cases, Bayard involved a straightforward 
application of constitutional text. The constitution guaranteed a jury trial in 
suits involving property. The statute denied any trial in a certain category of 
property cases. Therefore, the statute was unconstitutional. In other words, the 
case is one involving a "clearly unconstitutional" statute. At the same time, the 
court does not suggest that only statutes in that category can be properly found 
unconstitutional. Moreover, the interpretive strategy it outlines-under which 
the constitution is law which the court "was bound to take notice of as much as 
of any other law whatever"106 -by equating constitutional construction with 
statutory construction seems to suggest that the range of strategies available to 
a court in interpreting a statute would also be available to it in interpreting a 
constitution. In other words, the possibility that a constitution could be 
interpreted to regulate situations not clearly falling within its text is left open. 
B. Rutgers v. Waddington 
Rutgers v. Waddington, a 1784 case in the Mayor's Court of New York, 
involved the Trespass Act, a statute that controlled both permissible pleading 
and admissibility of evidence. 107 Rutgers, the plaintiff, was the patriot owner of 
property in New York City, and she brought a trespass action against 
Waddington. Waddington was a British merchant who had occupied her 
property from 1778 to 1783, the period during which the British army 
controlled the city. He had done so during the period from 1778 to 1780 
pursuant to authorization from the British Commissary General, a civilian 
employee of the British Treasury, and from 1780 to 1783 under license from 
the British Commander in Chief, and he had paid rent to the British government 
during his occupancy. The statute at issue had been passed by the New York 
legislature in 1783, and it gave patriots a trespass action against those who had 
occupied their property in New York when the property was subject to British 
control. Critically, the statute provided that defendants could not plead in 
justification a military order permitting their use and that they could not 
introduce such an order in evidence. 
Alexander Hamilton, representing Waddington, advanced two 
constitutional challenges to the statute. First, he contended that "our [New 
York] constitution adopts the common law of which the law of nations is a 
part"1 08 and that the law of nations vested in the conqueror the right to use 
105. /d. at 48. 
I 06. /d. at 45. 
107. Rutgers v. Waddington is not found in any case reporter, but the court's opinion 
has been reprinted in I THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393 (Julius Goebel, Jr. 
ed., 1964) [hereinafter HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS]. 
108. Alexander Hamilton, Brief of Defendant, Rutgers v. Waddington [hereinafter 
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property under his control. 109 The relevant constitutional provision, article 
XXXV of the state constitution, provided 
that such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law of 
England and Great Britain, and of acts of the legislature of the colony of New 
York ... shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations 
and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make 
. h 110 concemmg t e same. 
Hamilton's interpretation reflected the premise that the phrase "common law" 
was to be read broadly enough to incorporate the law of nations. In developing 
this point in his brief, Hamilton cited English authorities who had adopted 
positions consistent with the law of nations in cases involving capture of 
property, and he then concluded that "the common law ... adopts the law of 
nations."111 His interpretation reflects, as well, the premise that the Trespass 
Act did not fit within the category, recognized in article XXXV, of the 
"alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to 
time, make concerning the same [i.e., the common law]." This premise, it 
should be added, is a necessary assumption, but was not made in Hamilton's 
brief. 
Second, Hamilton argued at greater length that application of the Trespass 
Act to bar Waddington's assertion of the authorization he had received from 
British officials would be a "violation of the Treat6 of peace," the Treaty of 
Paris that had concluded the Revolutionary War. 1 2 According to Hamilton, 
"Our [New York's] Sovereignty and Independence began by a FOEDRAL ACT," 
the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence was the 
fundamental document, and it reserved the treaty-making power to the United 
States as a whole: "BY THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE which is the 
fundamental constitution of every state, the UNITED STATES assert their power 
to levy war conclude peace and contract alliances .... " 113 The state 
government was called into being by the Declaration of Independence and that 
government had endorsed it: "[The Declaration of Independence] is acceded to 
by THE NEW YORK CONVENTION who do not fretend to authenticate the act, 
but only to give their approbation to it .... " 11 The Articles of Confederation 
abridged the Union's powers, but left it with "the full and exclusive powers of 
WAR PEACE & TREATY."115 
Having developed the point that the union possessed the treaty-making 
power, Hamilton argued that a treaty was "a law Paramount to that of any 
Hamilton Brief], reprinted in HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 368. 
109. !d. at 373. 
110. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV. 
Ill. Hamilton Brief, supra note 108, at 369. 
112. !d. at 373. 
113. /d. at 374. 
114. /d. 
115. !d. at 375. 
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particular state."116 His position here rested on a syllogism: 
Congress have the exclusive right of war & peace 
Congress have made a Treaty of peace pursuant to their power 
A breach of the treat1 is a violation of their constitution authority & a breach 
of the Confederation. 17 
He dismissed the counterargument that the New York legislature, having 
passed an act approving of the Declaration of Independence, could pass another 
inconsistent with it. "Foederal authority" was the product of "the original 
compact."118 "It is absurd to say, One of the parties to a contract may at 
pleasure alter it without the consent of the others .... " 119 
In addition to developing the claim that the Treaty was superior to a state 
statute, Hamilton had two further problems. The ftrst was that the Treaty did 
not explicitly protect individuals such as Waddington; the relevant treaty 
provision only explicitly granted a limited amnesty: "Those injuries only are 
forgiven which are done in relation to the War."120 Hamilton contended, 
however, that the Treaty should be read to implicitly cover Waddington: "The 
relationship to the war consists in the capture of the City .... " 121 Pursuant to 
that capture, the Commander in Chief had rented Rutgers's property to 
Waddington. Even though Waddington had not committed the act of war that 
had harmed Rutgers, he held the property from the person who had, and thus, 
Hamilton argued, the immunity of the Commander in Chief had to be extended 
to him. 122 
The second constitutional argument Hamilton advanced concerned the law 
that the court was to apply. In other words, even if the Treaty were superior law 
to the Trespass Act, were state court judges empowered to disregard the 
Trespass Act, the state statute? Hamilton argued here that, because Congress's 
judicial powers were limited to prize causes, state judges were of necessity 
judges of the United States in other matters, "[a]nd they must take notice of the 
law of Congress as a part of the law of the land."123 The state legislature could 
not enact controlling law in areas which "the constitution" assigns to the 
national government, such as the treatment of "foreigners."124 The tension 
between national and state legislation had to be resolved by the court in favor 
of the nation: "'When two laws clash that which relates to the most important 
concerns ought to prevail."'125 
116. /d. at 377. 
117. /d. 
118. /d. at 379. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. at 376. 
121. /d. 
122. ld. at 376-77. 
123. /d. at 380. 
124. /d. 
125. /d. at 381 (quoting Cicero). Hamilton's brief concluded by advancing a 
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Obviously, Hamilton's reasoning is in a brief, rather than a judicial 
opinion, and thus represents advocacy rather than a personal (or official) 
statement of the law. Hamilton's argument merits close analysis, however, 
because it represents the most sustained analysis of judicial review in any 
revolutionary-era court document and because, as the author of Federalist 78, 
he played a critical role in articulating the conception and defense of judicial 
review. Strikingly, Hamilton's contention about the scope of national powers is 
structural rather than textual. While Hamilton appeals to the Declaration of 
Independence as the "fundamental constitution of every state," the Declaration 
of Independence does not present itself as a constitution. Moreover, the text of 
the Declaration of Independence does not assign the war-making or treaty-
making power to the nation. It speaks in plural terms: 
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND 
INDEPENDENT STATES ... and that as Free and Independent States, they have 
full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish 
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may 
f . h d 126 o ng t o. 
The text, then, suggests that ultimate responsibility for treaty-making rests with 
the states. 
Hamilton's arguments about the scope of the union's power and about its 
supremacy are not, however, text-based-he appeals to no specific provision of 
the document. Rather, they primarily reflect analysis of the necessary incidents 
of nationhood. He asserts, "Our EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY is only known in the 
UNION. FOREIGN NATIONS only recognize it in the UNION."127 After observing 
that "the first act of our government adopts [the Declaration of Independence] 
as a fundamental law," he concludes this line of analysis: "THESE REFLECTIONS 
teach us to respect the sovereignty of the Union and to consider its 
constitutional powers as not controulable by any state!"128 His reasoning, thus, 
is based on "reflections" about sovereignty. 
Hamilton's analysis of the specific conflict between the Treaty and the 
Trespass Act is similar to his reasoning about the supremacy of natural law in 
that it relies on reasoning from general principles. There was no direct conflict 
between the explicit terms of the statute and the treaty-the former governed 
private property disputes while the latter barred liability for acts of war-and 
Hamilton acknowledges this when he notes that an "objection" to which his 
argument must respond is that "[t]hose injuries only are forgiven which are 
construction argument. His claim was that, while the text of the Trespass Act did not exempt 
"foreigners" from its coverage, the exemption should be read into the statute: "We must 
suppose the Legislature wise and honest and ask ourselves what would be their intention in 
the present case being fully apprised of the merits." /d. at 382. As a result, the statute should 
be read in a way that would make it consistent with the law of nations. /d. at 388. 
126. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
127. Hamilton Brief, supra note 108, at 374. 
128. /d. 
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done in relation to the War."129 He argues, however, that the phrase "in relation 
to the War" should be read broadly. The injuries that Waddington inflicted on 
Rutgers are "in relation to the war" because Waddington was licensed to use 
Rutgers's property by the British authorities who had captured New York 
CityY0 When the rights of a foreign citizen are implicated, the Treaty's 
guarantees must be read generously: "Our EXTERNAL sovereignty existing in 
the Union the property of all the citizens in regard to foreign states belongs to 
the United States."131 Hamilton's approach here sharply differs from the 
"clearly unconstitutional" test; he urges that a statute is unconstitutional even 
though, as his brief makes clear, it is consistent with the explicit terms of the 
Treaty. 132 
Chief Judge (and Mayor) Duane's opinion for the Mayor's Court was, like 
Varnum's argument in Trevett, contemporaneously published in pamphlet 
form, and thus was one of the most prominent revolutionary-era discussions of 
judicial review. The decision is a complicated one, as the court carefully 
avoided exercising the power of judicial review. Even so, it largely followed 
Hamilton's reasoning and, in large part, ruled in favor of his client. 
In deciding the case, the Mayor's Court reached a result based on the law 
of nations. Applying that law, the court held that the British Commander in 
Chief had authority to rent properties under his control: the British "had a right 
to raise contributions; they had a force to collect them, which could not be 
resisted." 133 Thus, the defendant, Hamilton's client, did not owe rent to the 
plaintiff for 1780 to 1783, the period during which his lease had been apBroved 
by the Commander in Chief; this license bore "a relation to the war." 34 But 
the license from the Commissary General was a "nullity."135 According to the 
pleadings, the Commissary General held "the said brew-house and malt-
house ... for use of the [British] army."136 Thus, under the law of nations, 
Waddington owed rent for the earlier period. 
The result under the law of nations having been established, the critical 
question became whether the law of nations should control. Duane here 
explicitly follows Hamilton's argument. He invokes the state constitution: 
By our excellent constitution, the common law is declared to be part of the law 
129. /d. at 376. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
132. The plaintiffs briefs have not been preserved. The opinion for the court, 
however, indicates that the plaintiffs attorney took the position that the legislature had an 
"uncontroulable power" and that "the courts of justice, in no case ought to exe[r]cise a 
discretion in the construction of a statute." See Rutgers v. Waddington, reprinted in I 
HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 414 (alteration in original). 
133. !d. at 399. 
134. /d. 
135. !d. at 398. 
136. /d. (quoting the Commissary General's pleadings). 
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of the land; and the jus gentium is a branch of the common law. In republica 
maxime conservandi sut jura belli, is an ancient ada~e. The authorities cited 
on this point for the Defendant are full and conclusive. 37 
485 
Thus, contrary to plaintiffs claim, New York state is "bound by the customary 
and voluntary law of nations."138 Like Hamilton, Duane bolsters this 
conclusion by casting the state in a subordinate role in the federal union. The 
court observes that "[a]s a nation [the states] must be governed by one common 
law of nations; for on any other principles how can they act with regard to 
foreign powers; and how shall foreign powers act towards them?"139 It 
concludes: 
[T]o abrogate or alter any one of the known laws or usages of nations, by the 
authority of a single state, must be contrary to the very nature of the 
confederacy, and the evident intention of the articles, by which it is 
established, as well as dangerous to the union itself. 140 
Here, then, the court is applying the law of nations to the state for structural 
reasons, rather than construing a particular constitutional text: that a state 
cannot depart from the law of nations is in the "nature" of the union itself and 
the "evident intention" of the Articles of Confederation. 
The court then advances a related argument that is grounded in the state 
constitution and the Declaration of Independence but that understands these 
documents capaciously: 
Our union, as has been properly observed, is known and legalized in our 
[state] constitution; and adopted as a fundamental law in the first act of our 
legislature. The foederal compact hath vested Congress with full and exclusive 
powers to make peace and war. This treaty they have made and ratified, and 
rendered its obligation perpetual. And we are clearly of opinion, that no state 
in this union can alter or abridge, in a single point, the foederal articles or the 
141 treaty .... 
The Treaty, this argument suggests, is superior to a state statute-no state "can 
alter or abridge" the Treaty. While the Treaty did not explicitly absolve private 
actors such as Waddington from liability, the court again follows Hamilton in 
finding such a bar on liability as implicit in the Treaty. Relying on civil law 
scholars, the court concludes that the law of nations dictates "that every treaty 
of peace implies an amnesty and oblivion of damages and injuries in the 
war."142 That the amnesty is merely implicit is thus acknowledged. 
The summary thus far represents the bulk of Chief Judge Duane's opinion. 
This part of the opinion in a fairly explicit way advances the argument that state 
statutes must yield to the law of nations. Moreover, the court repeatedly adopts 
137. /d. at402. 
138. /d. 
139. /d. at 405. 
140. /d. at 406. 
141. /d. at 413. 
142. Id. at411. 
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expansive understandings of the limits on state legislative authority. It 
construes the state constitution's provision adopting the common law as 
making the common law superior to statutory law, when the statute could have 
been construed as providing that common law would govern until altered by 
statute. It argues on structural grounds that the law of nations binds the state. It 
decides that the Treaty of Paris bars liability of private actors, even though 
there was no provision in the Treaty that established such a bar. Thus, the bulk 
of the opinion reflects the view that fundamental law is superior to statutory 
law, and fundamental law is to be broadly understood. 
At the very end of the opinion, the court turned to the question of judicial 
review. Chief Judge Duane observed, "[T]he uncontroulable power of the 
legislature, and the sanctity of its laws have been earnestly pressed by counsel 
for the Plaintiff,"143 and then stated: 
The supremacy of the Legislature need not be called into question; if they 
think fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which can controul them. 
When the main object of such a law is clearly expressed, and the intention 
manifest, the Judges are not at liberty, altho' it appears to them to be 
unreasonable, to reject it: for this were to set thejudicial above the legislative, 
which would be subversive of all govemment. 14 
This is the critical part of the opinion with respect to whether a court can 
invalidate a statute; Duane does not elsewhere justify or clarify the principle 
enunciated in the first sentence. While this paragraph seems to be a 
straightforward recognition of legislative supremacy-"no power can controul" 
the legislature-on close reading its actual import is less clear. Having just 
noted the plaintiffs argument concerning "the uncontroulable power of the 
legislature, and the sanctity of its laws," Duane only embraces the first part of 
that position. This hesitation arguably implies rejection of the notion that 
statutes are sacred-a rejection in line with the earlier statements in the opinion 
that the legislature is bound by the law of nations. In this light, the statement 
that "there is no power which can controul them" becomes not a statement of 
legislative supremacy, but a statement of political reality. The following 
sentence in the paragraph, then, can be read, not as a rejection of judicial 
review per se, but as a rejection of it in a limited class of cases: judges cannot 
"reject" a clearly expressed statute simply because it is "unreasonable." The 
question whether it can be rejected on other grounds is not addressed. 
In the remaining pages of the opinion, Duane concludes that the Trespass 
Act should not be read to produce a result at odds with the law of nations. He 
quickly advances a series of canons of statutory construction as support for the 
conclusion that "[t]he repeal of the law of nations, or any interference with it, 
could not have been in contemplation, in our opinion, when the Legislature 
passed this statute; and we think ourselves bound to exempt that law from its 
143. /d. at 414. 
144. /d. at 415. 
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operation."145 Thus, in accordance with the law of nations, Rutgers secured 
damages for the years 1777 to 1780 (when Waddington's license was from the 
Commissary General), while Waddington escaped liability for the years 1780 
to 1783 (the years when his license was from the Commander in Chief). 
Critics of the opinion asserted that "the Mayor's court have assumed and 
exercised a power to set aside an act of the state." 146 Similarly, the New York 
Assembly passed a resolution attacking the decision and stating, "[I]f a Court 
instituted for the benefit and government of a corporation may take upon them 
to dispense with, an act in direct violation of a plain and known law of the state, 
all other Courts either superior or inferior may do the like."147 Nonetheless, it is 
clear from the way in which Duane framed his opinion that he did not explicitly 
exercise that power. The opinion does reflect, however, both an expansive and 
structural approach to the interpretation of fundamental law and the view that 
statutes are subordinate to that law, even when that law is broadly interpreted. 
Moreover, even if it did not candidly embrace the power of judicial review, the 
court "had in effect held nugatory" the statute, 148 and it had done so because of 
the expansive reading that it had given the fundamental law. 
C. Symsbury Case 
In the Symsbury Case, 149 the Litchfield County Superior Court in 
Connecticut refused to give effect to an act of the state assembly that purported 
to resolve a land dispute. 
In 1670, the Governor of Connecticut granted to certain individuals land 
that would later became the town of Symsbury. In 1686, the Connecticut 
General Assembly granted to the proprietors of the towns of Hartford and 
Windsor the lands immediately to the west of Symsbury. In 1727, the 
proprietors of Hartford and Windsor petitioned the General Assembly for a 
survey of the boundaries of Symsbury. The General Assembly granted the 
petition, authorized a survey, and then legislatively adopted the surveyors' 
report, which was favorable to the Hartford and Windsor proprietors. 150 
In the Symsbury Case, proprietors of the Township of Symsbury brought 
an action of disseisin against Thomas Bidwell, a person whose property claims 
traced back to the grant to the proprietors of Hartford and Windsor. The central 
145. /d. at 417. For example, he notes that the law of nations is not mentioned in the 
statute, that it is a subject of too much significance "to have been intended to be struck at in 
silence," and that repeals by implication are disfavored. See id. 
146. Open Letter from Melancton Smith and Others (Nov. 4, 1784 ), reprinted in 1 
HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 313. 
147. New York Assembly Resolution, N.Y. ASSEMBLY J., Oct. 4-Nov. 29, 1784, 
reprinted in HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 312. 
148. GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 137; see also Nelson, supra note 19, at 1167. 
149. 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785). 
150. /d. at 445. 
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question in the case was whether the legislative act affirming the surveyors' 
report was binding. 
Examining the original Symsbury grant, the court determined that it 
encompassed the land the plaintiffs claimed. Having made this determination, 
the court observed, ''The title is, therefore, in the plaintiffs, if they have not 
been divested by some act subsequent to the original grant."151 If the act of the 
assembly adopting the surveyors' report were valid, the property would belong 
to the defendants, but the court concluded that the act was legally without 
consequence: 
The act of the General Assembly ... operated to restrict and limit the western 
extent of the jurisdiction of the town of Symsbury, but could not legally 
operate to curtail the land before granted to the proprietors of the town of 
Symsbury, without their consent; and the grant to Symsbury being prior to the 
grant made to the towns of Hartford and Windsor, under which the defendant 
claims, we are of opinion the title of the lands demanded is in the plaintiffs. 152 
The court did not amplify its reasoning beyond this simple statement. Thus, 
the Symsbury Case neither offers an elaborate theoretical basis for why the 
court decided to exercise the power of judicial review nor provides a defense of 
judicial review itself. At the same time, the import of the decision is clear: the 
holding meant that the legislature could not resolve a boundary dispute between 
rival claimants, as the legislature had sought to do. In other words, although the 
legislature had concluded that the lands at issue in the case were not within the 
original Symsbury grant, the court reached a different result and held that the 
legislative determination was without legal consequence. Thus, the case 
implicitly reflects the view that dispute resolution concerning competing claims 
to property was a matter for the courts, not the legislature. 
The opinion concludes, "The same point was determined by this court the 
same way the last year, and on writ of error to the supreme court of errors, the 
judgment was affirmed; which we conceive hath settled the law in this case."153 
Thus, the decision suggests that there was another early judicial review case, in 
addition to the Symsbury Case, in which a statute was held without legal 
consequence (presumably the same statute as was at issue in the Symsbury 
Case). The reporter then reproduces the dissent of Judge Huntington in that 
earlier case. Significantly, even Huntington would not have given the assembly 
the power to resolve property disputes between rival claimants: 
I think it ought to be admitted in the case before us, that the proprietors be of 
Symsbury could not have their grant taken from them, or curtailed, even by 
the General Assembly, without their consent; and when the survey was made 
by Kimberly, etc. and approved by the Assembly, the proprietors had their 
election, either to rely upon the construction of the words of the patent for 
their title, or to accept of the location, and thereby reduce it to a legal and 
151. /d. at446. 
152. /d. at 447. 
153. /d. 
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practical certainty; they wisely chose the latter, it being material in their 
favor .... 154 
489 
For Judge Huntington, the critical factor was that the parties had accepted the 
survey approved by the assembly. Granted land could not be taken away "even 
by the General Assembly." 
The Symsbury Case (as well as the unnamed decision mentioned in the 
opinion) reflects a broad conception of judicial review. The colonial assembly 
had been engaged in resolution of individual claims-determining boundary 
lines in a case of conflict. While under modem separation of powers doctrine 
such a legislative act would be clearly unconstitutional, it was standard practice 
in the colonial era for legislatures to engage repeatedly in precisely this form of 
dispute resolution. 155 Reflecting emerging notions of separation of powers, the 
court in the Symsbury Case was applying a new doctrine as it denied the 
assembly this traditional function. Equally significant, the court did not invoke 
a constitutional provision to justify its result. 156 The decision is thus one in 
which the court was employing an expansive approach to judicial review in 
order to protect a conception of the judicial role that broke from prior practice. 
D. Case of the Prisoners 
Only one revolutionary-era case, Virginia's Case of the Prisoners, 157 
involved a challenge to a statute that did not purport to regulate matters within 
the province of the judiciary (such as the right to a jury trial or what arguments 
could be heard in court). That case reveals a range of approaches to 
constitutional interpretation. 
The petitioners were three loyalists convicted of treason. The House of 
Delegates had voted to pardon them; the Senate had refused its concurrence. 
The question presented was whether the House's pardon was effective. The 
state's Treason Act provided: 
154. Governor Huntington's Argument in the Symsbury Case, I Kiray 448, 452 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1785) (quoting Huntington, J., dissent in unpublished decision). 
155. For case studies of direct dispute resolution exercised by legislatures, see, for 
example, Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in 
the Early American Tradition, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1495-1503 (1998); Lawrie, supra 
note 19, at 323-25. 
156. The Connecticut Royal Charter of 1662 contains no provision that would mandate 
the result in Symsbury. That Charter was in effect at the time that the case was decided and, 
indeed, Connecticut was not to adopt a new constitution until1818. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, 
THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 4 (200 I). 
157. The case was reported in 1827 as Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 
(1782). I have previously written about the case, using the papers of the participants, which 
indicate that the published opinion is both incomplete and, at numerous points, erroneous. 
See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 
143 U. PA. L. REv. 491 (1994). The discussion here draws on my earlier analysis. 
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[T]he govemour . . . shall in no wise have or exercise a right of granting 
pardon to any person or persons convicted in manner aforesaid [of treason], 
but may suspend the execution until the meeting of the general assembly, who 
shall determine whether suchg~>erson or persons are proper objects of mercy or 
not, and order accordingly. 15 
Thus, the statute provided that pardons needed the assent of the General 
Assembly-both the House of Delegates and the Senate. The relevant clause in 
the state constitution stated: 
[The governor] shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have the power 
of granting reprieves or pardons, except where the prosecution shall have been 
carried on by the House of Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly 
direct; in which case, no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of 
the House of Delegates. 159 
Andrew Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, argued that this clause meant 
that if the House sought to pardon, then that pardon was effective. As a result, 
the Treason Act "was contrary to the plain declaration of the constitution; and 
therefore void."160 He stressed that text, rather than original intent, should be 
the basis of constitutional interpretation: "[T]he words of the constitution, and 
not conjectures drawn from the supposed meanings of the framers of it, should 
give the rule." 161 At the same time, he proposed a rule of interpretation if the 
court should find the statute ambiguous: "[T]he construction ought, in favour of 
life, to incline to the side of mercy." 162 
Edmund Randolph, the state attorney general, argued that the pardon was 
insufficient. He accepted the legitimacy of judicial review-a striking 
concession given the novelty of the practice and the fact that he was defending 
the statute. He declared that a constitution is a "touchstone" that allows the 
determination of "how far the people, the fountain of power, have chosen to 
deposit it in their legislative servants."163 At the same time, he made clear that 
only where there was irreconcilable conflict between a statute and the 
constitution should a statute be found unconstitutional: "For if [the 
constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the Senate, its words must be free 
from ambiguity and decided, or cannot have the supremacy."164 He then 
advanced saving constructions of the constitution. First, he suggested that the 
clause could be read as if the phrase "or the law shall otherwise particularly 
158. An Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, 1776 Va. Acts. Ch. III, reprinted in 9 
WILLIAMWALKERHENING, THESTATUTESATLARGE 168 (1821). 
159. VA. CONST. § IX (1776), reprinted in 9 WILLIAM WALKER HENING, THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE 115-16 (1821). 
160. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7. 
161. /d. 
162. /d. 
163. Edmund Randolph, Rough Draft of Argument in Respondent v. Lamb (Case of 
the Prisoners), at 11 (original in 91 James Madison Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.) (copy on file with author). 
164. /d. at 6. 
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direct" were put in a "parenthesis." Thus, the House of Delegates alone had the 
power to pardon in cases which it had prosecuted. In all other instances, the 
legislature as a whole could determine where to place the pardoning power. 
Alternately, the clause could be read to provide that the House of Delegates had 
to approve of a legislative pardon for it to be effective, but that concurrence by 
the Senate could be statutorily mandated. In a subsequent letter to Madison, 
Randolph highlighted how far his argument had departed from the plain 
language of the constitutional text: "I doubt not, that to any but lawyers the 
construction, by which the two [statute and constitutional provisions] were 
reconcile[ d.] would appear unintelligible."165 
Ronald and Randolph were not the only attorneys to argue the case. The 
presiding judge on the · court of appeals, Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, 
"expressed a Wish that the Gentlemen of the Bar, tho' not engaged as Counsel, 
would generally deliver their Sentiments upon the Questions [before the 
court] .... " 166 Three lawyers answered the invitation. While there is no 
surviving record of what two of the lawyers said, there is a record for the third, 
St. George Tucker. Tucker's argument is particularly worthy of scrutiny 
because of his subsequent eminence as a leading legal thinker. In addition to 
serving as a law professor at the College of William and Mary and as a federal 
judge, Tucker became the author of a version of Blackstone's Commentaries 
that, in its appendices, extensively analyzed United States constitutional law; 
because of that treatise, he was "arguabl-1' the most important legal scholar of 
the first half ofthe nineteenth century."16 
Tucker's initial formulation of the legitimacy of judicial review and its 
appropriate scope appears to echo Randolph's argument: "[The constitution] is 
the touchstone by which every Act of the legislature is to be tried. if [sic] any 
Act thereof shall be found absolutely [and] irreconcilably contradictory to the 
Constitution, it cannot admit of a Doubt that such act is absolutely null and 
void." 168 He continued, however: 
I [am not] competent to decide so nice a point as that which this Question [of 
the statute's constitutionality] includes. Yet the reasons offered, as I am 
informed, by an honorourable member of the G.C. [General Convention] that 
it was the Intention of the Constitution to have as few Obstacles as possible in 
the way to mercy-and some other parts of the constitution by which it 
165. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), reprinted in 5 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 28, at 262-63. While Randolph was discussing the court's 
decision, the court followed his reading. 
166. Edmund Pendleton, Pendleton's Account of "The Case of the Prisoners," in 2 
THE LEITERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 417 (David John Mays ed., 
1967). 
167. Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Education, 31 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 527, 540 ( 1990). 
168. St. George Tucker, Notes of Oral Argument in the Case of the Prisoners, at 9 
(original in Papers of St. George Tucker, Manuscripts Department, Earl Gregg Swem 
Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia) (copy on file with author). 
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appears that particular exclusive privileges have been reserved to the house of 
Delegates have induced me to incline to the Opinion that the spirit of our 
Constitution declares that the power of pardoning in all cases where it is not 
given to the Executive is vested in the House of Delegates alone. 169 
This passage reveals that Tucker's approach to judicial review in fact 
significantly differed from Randolph's despite the similarity in formulation: in 
holding the statute unconstitutional, Tucker looked beyond the text of the 
constitution to its "spirit." The statute is unconstitutional, in other words, 
because it is inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution, not because it is at 
odds with its text. It is also worth noting that Tucker relies on framers' intent in 
a very literal way: he dis:usses with a framer what he intended. This is not a 
Scaliaesque reliance on common usage of terms to determine what the 
constitution meant; it is reliance on subjective and not generally available 
understandings. 
Tucker then elaborated on why the statute was unconstitutional: "[The 
statute] not only gives powers where the Constitution had tacitly denied them, 
but renders that [the pardoning power of the House of Delegates] incom~leat 
and inadequate which the Constitution had declared fully sufficient."17 As 
before, it is not an express inconsistency between the statute and the 
constitution that makes the former unconstitutional. Rather, it is the fact that the 
constitution "tacitly" denied the pardoning power to the Senate. 
Tucker's conclusion particularly merits highlighting. "Here then I 
apprehend," Tucker asserted, "we may trace an absolute Contradiction-For 
the Law declared that to be insufficient which the Constitution had before 
declared to be fully sufficient, competent and compleat."171 This clarifies 
Tucker's earlier assertion that "if any Act thereof shall be found absolutely and 
irreconcilably contradictory to the Constitution, it cannot admit of a Doubt that 
such act is absolutely null and void."172 An "absolute contradiction" is present 
even when there is no express conflict between statute and constitution. The 
reason why this merits highlighting is that the central evidence that Thayer 
advances for his thesis is the repeated statement by courts that statutes should 
be struck only when they are irreconcilably in conflict with the constitution. 
But for Tucker, at least, irreconcilable opposition did not mean what Thayer 
takes it to mean. For Tucker (although not for Randolph), a statute could be 
unconstitutional because it was at odds with the spirit of the constitution. 
Most of the judges' opinions (to the extent that they have been preserved) 
fail to illuminate the question of how courts are to interpret constitutions. 173 
Two judges-James Mercer and Bartholomew Dandridge-ruled in favor of 
169. /d. at 11. 
170. /d. at 12. 
171. /d. 
172. !d. at 9. 
173. See Pendleton, supra note 166, at 426-27 (summarizing the views of each judge). 
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the prisoners. Mercer found the statute unconstitutional (although no surviving 
record indicates his reasoning). Dandridge did not address the issue of judicial 
review, finding (in accordance with an argument advanced by Ronald) that the 
constitution and the Treason Act set up alternate available mechanisms for 
pardoning and that the action by the House of Delegates was effective because 
it was consistent with the pardoning procedure established by the constitution. 
Of the six judges who ruled against the prisoner, two--Judge Cary and Chief 
Justice Carrington-upheld the validity of the Treason Act and did not discuss 
the question of judicial review at all, while a third-Chancellor Blair-reserved 
the question whether judicial review was legitimate without indicating how he 
would resolve it. Justice Lyons, in contrast, declared that he was "(a]gainst the 
Power of the Court to declare an Act of the Legislature void .... " 174 
The records of the opinions noted above are slight, essentially limited to 
stating the result. The only opinions that are at all helpful on the question of 
constitutional interpretation are those of the two leaders of the bench-
Chancellor George Wythe and Chancellor Edmund Pendleton-both of whom 
ruled against the prisoners. 
Wythe announced his unequivocal support for judicial review, stating that 
an "Anti-constitutional Act of the Legislature would be void; and if so, that this 
Court must in Judgment declare it so."175 Because the Case of the Prisoners is 
the one revolutionary-era judicial review case not involving a statute that 
affected the province of the judiciary, Wythe's opinion is particularly 
significant because it indicates that the courts can review statutes for separation 
of powers violations more generally. Thus, having observed the importance of 
"the departments [being] kept within their own spheres,"176 he celebrated the 
role of the judiciary in achieving that end: 
[W]hen those, who hold the purse and the sword, differing as to the powers 
which each may exercise, the tribunals, who hold neither, are called upon to 
declare the law impartially between them. For thus the pretensions of each 
party are fairly examined, their respective flowers ascertained, and the 
boundaries of authority peaceably established. 1 
Judicial review insured that the legislature did not exceed its constitutionally 
assigned powers: 
I have heard of an english chancellor who said, and it was nobly said, that it 
was his duty to protect the rights of the subject, against the encroachments of 
the crown; and that he would do it, at every hazard. But if it was his duty to 
protect a solitary individual against the rapacity of the sovereign, surely, it is 
equally mine, to protect one branch of the legislature, and, consequently, the 
whole community, against the usurpations of the other: and, whenever the 
174. /d. at 426. 
175. /d. 
176. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (1782). 
177. /d. 
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proper occasion occurs, I shall feel the duty; and, fearlessly, perform it. 178 
Having made clear that judicial review could properly operate in this context, 
Wythe then rapidly concluded by embracing the alternative readings of the 
constitution advanced by Randolph. Wythe explained, ''This mode of 
considering the subject, obviates the objection made by the prisoners' counsel, 
relative to the constitutionality of the law concerning treason; for, according to 
the interpretation just discussed, there is nothing unconstitutional in it." 179 
Chancellor Pendleton reserved the issue whether a court could exercise 
judicial review. He observed that the British practice was unclear and noted 
that Coke had made conflicting statements at different times, at one time 
"asserting the omnipotence of Parliament" and "giving Courts power of 
declaring Acts of Parliament void" at another. 180 He added, however, that 
Virginia's situation differed from any European precedent because of the 
presence of a written constitution: 
We ... have happily in our hands the certain record of our Constitution 
containing the Original Social Compact, wherein the people have made their 
Government to consist of three great branches, the Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary, allotting to each, its proper powers, and declaring that they shall be 
kept separate and distinct, neither exercising those which belong to another. 
Like all other declared Powers each has its limits, the Legislative as well as 
the others, which if they Pass, it would seem their Act would be void, as well 
as that of an Attorney would be, which was not Warranted by his 
appointment. 181 
According to Pendleton, then, it appeared that the constitution fixed limits on 
the legislature's actions-if the legislature transgressed its limits, "it would 
seem their act would be void." At the same time, Pendleton refrained from 
stating definitively that the legislature operated subject to limits. The critical 
word is "seem." 
Having suggested that the legislature operated subject to limits, Pendleton 
stated that he would not resolve in this case whether a court could enforce those 
limits through the exercise of judicial review: 
But how far this Court in which it has been properly said the Judiciary Powers 
of the State are concentrated, can go in declaring an Act of the Legislature 
void, because it is repugnant to the Constitution, without exercising the Power 
of Legislation, from which they are restrained by the same Constitution? is a 
deep, important, and, I will add, an awful question; from which, however, I 
will not shrink, if ever it shall become my duty to decide it: at present I am 
happy in having no occasion to make the decision .... 182 
Thayer highlights this passage as "foreshadow[ing] the rule that only clearly 
178. /d. at 8. 
179. /d.at13. 
180. Pendleton, supra note 166, at 422. 
181. /d. 
182. /d. 
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unconstitutional statutes should be invalidated." 183 It is, however, not a 
statement of how courts should interpret the constitution. Pendleton notes that 
the question of the legitimacy of judicial review is an "awful question" and that 
judicial review may be illegitimate because it would involve judicial 
legislation. Pendleton admittedly avoids answering the question, but the 
passage does not resolve what interpretive strategy a court should employ if in 
fact the exercise of judicial review is appropriate. 
In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute, Pendleton observed that it 
had been enacted while he was Speaker of the House. While its 
constitutionality was at that time "[ w ]armly" debated, he had believed it 
constitutional and stated, "I have found no reason to alter [that opinion]."184 
The question of constitutionality, he said, "should be decided according to the 
spirit, and not by the words of the constitution." 185 For this reason, the 
Chancellor rejected one of the readings proffered by Randolph-that the 
constitution could be read to give the legislature the power to assign to the 
Senate alone the pardoning power in all cases which did not involve 
impeachments. Because it would sharply diminish the House's role in 
pardoning, this reading "does not reach my Idea of the Spirit of the 
constitution."186 But Pendleton embraced the other reading advanced by 
Randolph. The language in the constitution that non-gubernatorial pardons 
could not be issued "but by resolve of the House of Delegates" 187 meant that 
these pardons could not be granted "'without the Consent,' of the House of 
Delegates."188 The Treason Act was thus constitutional because it made 
approval by the House of Delegates a necessary (although not sufficient) 
condition for a pardon. Randolph's second reading was thus "congenial to the 
spirit, and not inconsistent with the letter, of the constitution."189 
Thayer's reading of the Pendleton opinion was based on a version 
published almost half a century after the Case of the Prisoners, and that version 
does not reflect much of what was in Pendleton's unpublished notes of his 
opinion. When the opinion is viewed in full, it becomes clear that Pendleton 
was not adopting the position that courts should defer to plausible legislative 
judgments concerning constitutionality. Instead, Pendleton as a judge reaches 
precisely the same conclusion that he did as Speaker: the statute is 
constitutional. Also, significantly, his analysis of constitutionality is not based 
simply on text-the constitutionality of the statute "should be decided 
183. Thayer, supra note 30, at 140. 
184. Pendleton, supra note 166, at 425, 426. 
185. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 (1782). 
186. Pendleton, supra note 166, at 424. 
187. /d. at417. 
188. /d. at 425. 
189. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 19. 
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according to the spirit, and not by the words of the constitution."190 Randolph's 
first argument failed not because it could not be squared with the text, but 
because it was at odds with the constitution's spirit. The other approach was 
adopted because it accorded with the constitution's spirit. Pendleton's 
formulation here is worth noting-the reading is "congenial to the spirit, and 
not inconsistent with the letter, of the constitution." The use of the phrase "not 
inconsistent," as opposed to the word "consistent," suggests that Pendleton did 
not see this as the best reading of the constitution from a purely textualist 
perspective. But the constitution is to be understood in light of its spirit, and the 
spirit is a structural concern-the House is not to be cut out of the exercise of 
the pardoning power. 
E. Conclusion: Different Interpretive Approaches for Different Statutes 
While the revolutionary-era judicial review case law is limited, a survey of 
that case law reveals a range of interpretive approaches. Significantly, a 
number of these cases reflect a broad conception of judicial review when the 
challenged statutes affected the jury trial right or judicial matters, whereas the 
one challenged statute that did not fall into these categories was upheld, despite 
a strong tension between the statute and the relevant constitutional provisions. 
Some challenged statutes were struck down because they were at odds in a 
straightforward way with constitutional text. The statutes challenged in New 
Hampshire's Ten Pound Act Cases and North Carolina's Bayard v. Singleton 
fall into this category. Andrew Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, made 
such an argument in the Case of the Prisoners. 
In other cases, attorneys and judges employed modes of constitutional 
analysis that went beyond text and typically drew on structural concerns. The 
court in Holmes appears to have done this, although the opinion has not 
survived. Alexander Hamilton made structural arguments with great 
sophistication in Rutgers; Chief Judge Duane followed those arguments, 
although he did not actually hold the statute unconstitutional. In the Case of the 
Prisoners, St. George Tucker, Edmund Randolph, and Chancellor Pendleton all 
took the position that the constitution should be interpreted in accordance with 
its "spirit." (It should be added that, in determining the spirit, Tucker looked to 
the subjective understanding of a framer as an interpretive guide.) This led 
them, however, to reach different results. To preserve the statute, Randolph 
advanced what he, at least privately, appears to have viewed as a saving 
construction of the constitution. Tucker found the statute unconstitutional. 
Pendleton found one reading advanced by Randolph at odds with the 
constitution's spirit and rejected it but found another congenial with that spirit 
and embraced it. In the Symsbury Case (and the unnamed case that the court 
cited therein), Connecticut statutes in which the colonial legislature had 
190. /d. 
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resolved private disputes were invalidated, apparently because the court 
deemed this a judicial function. 
Finally, in Trevett, attorney James Varnum (and apparently the court) 
evaluated a statute for its consistency with traditionally protected rights. At the 
same time, however, this was not a case involving constitutional interpretation, 
since Rhode Island did not have a constitution. 
With the exception of the Case of the Prisoners, all of these cases involved 
statutes that affected judicial matters (such as matters of pleading or evidence) 
or the right to a jury trial. It should be added that none of the courts or 
advocates discussed above stated that the power of judicial review was limited 
to these areas, and in the Case of the Prisoners, both Tucker and Judge Mercer 
thought that the Treason Act was unconstitutional. At the same time, while the 
body of evidence is limited, it suggests the presence of different interpretive 
approaches depending on the type of statute at stake. 
In this Part, I conclude that in seven cases-the two New Hampshire Ten 
Pound Act Cases, Bayard, Holmes, Trevett, the Symsbury Case, and the 
unnamed case it cites-judicial review was exercised to prevent application of 
the statute. Of these seven, three-Bayard and the two New Hampshire cases-
featured situations in which the statute and constitutional text were clearly at 
odds, but, in the other four cases, they were not. Thus, in four of the seven 
cases, the conception of judicial review was apparently an expansive one, given 
the result. By contrast, in the Case of the Prisoners, a problematic statute 
involving the pardon power was upheld, despite its being outside the province 
of the judiciary. 
It should be added that a number of these cases involved issues of great 
political sensitivity. Trevett involved legislation that benefited debtors at the 
expense of creditors. Rutgers, Bayard, and Holmes all involved anti-loyalist 
legislation. The Case of the Prisoners involved an attempt to pardon loyalists. 
One might argue that judicial review thus emerges, in part, to protect groups 
disadvantaged in the political process: the loyalists and creditors. At the same 
time, such a concern is not apparent on the face of the opinions, and in two of 
the five cases, the statute was not overturned. The more salient point is one also 
evidenced in the case law discussed in the next Part: courts exercised judicial 
review when legislation affected matters falling within the province of the 
judiciary-affecting either courts or juries-and did so even in cases where the 
legislation was not clearly unconstitutional. 
III. STATE COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
This Part focuses on the twenty-one cases decided in the years between the 
convening of the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the issuance of 
the decision in Marbury, in which at least one judge pronounced a statute 
unconstitutional. In seventeen of these cases, the statute was found invalid. The 
Part separates the case law into three categories. 
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The first Part looks at cases involving claims that did not implicate the 
province of the judiciary, such as challenges on Contract Clause grounds or on 
the grounds that a statute improperly delegated authority. Two involved 
challenges brought under the Federal Constitution. In these cases, a state court 
struck down a state statute on Contract Clause grounds; although the evidence 
is limited, it appears that the challenged statutes were clearly unconstitutional. 
In a third case, while the statute was upheld, one judge in dissent would have 
invalidated it as violative of the state constitution's law of the land clause-
despite the fact that, as the majority holding indicates, there were strong 
arguments supporting the statute. The other cases analyzed in this Part are 
discussed to illustrate the interpretive stances adopted by the courts; these 
involve unsuccessful challenges to statutes, and they reflect a stance of judicial 
deference. 
The next Part looks at five cases involving claims that a statute denied the 
right to a jury trial. There are three cases in which the courts held the statute 
unconstitutional. In one of these three, there was a colorable claim in support of 
the statute. In two other cases, the statute was upheld, but one judge concluded 
that it was unconstitutional, even though there was a colorable argument in 
support of the statute. 
Finally, the Part concludes by looking at cases in which courts examined 
statutes that affected courts directly, such as by altering their jurisdiction or by 
ousting court officers, or indirectly, by resolving specific disputes. In twelve 
instances, the statute was found unconstitutional. (One of these instances 
involved an advisory opinion, rather than a litigated case.) In two others, while 
the statute was pronounced valid, one judge believed it unconstitutional. I argue 
that none of these statutes was clearly unconstitutional. 
A. Challenges Not Implicating Judicial Powers or the Right to a Jury Trial 
This Part begins by looking at four cases in which a challenged statute was 
upheld. (In one, there was a dissent indicating that the statute was 
unconstitutional.) While this Article is principally concerned with cases in 
which statutes were invalidated, these cases merit mention because they 
indicate judicial reluctance to overturn statutes on state constitutional grounds 
when the statutes did not implicate judicial powers or the right to a jury trial. 
Of these four cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in 
Respublica v. Duquet191 is the only one to discuss the standard to be applied in 
reviewing a statute's constitutionality. A Philadelphia municipal ordinance 
made it a criminal offense to build a wooden house in a certain part of the city. 
After the ordinance's passage, Philip Urban Duquet "did cause to be made, 
built and erected a certain other wooden mansion house" and was indicted in 
191. 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799). 
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municipal court. 192 After the case was removed to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, Duquet defended himself against the charge by arguing that the state 
statute that authorized the municipal ordinance was unconstitutional. The 
statute in question had delegated to Philadelphia the power to pass ordinances 
"as [the municipal government] may judge pro~er" barring the construction of 
wooden houses near the Delaware River. 19 Duquet contended that the 
delegation to a municipality of the power to enact a criminal ordinance and to 
prosecute alleged wrongdoers in municipal court violated the constitutional 
provision authorizing indictments for acts "against the peace and dignity of the 
commonwealth."194 "All public prosecutions must emanate from the sovereign 
people," he argued. "[T]he attorney general acts as a great state officer against 
general public offenders."195 
The attorney general responded that the defendant had to bear a high 
burden in order to challenge a statute successfully and that he had failed to 
meet it: 
From whence is it to be inferred, that this law is unconstitutional? Whence 
arise the doubts, that the legislature have exceeded their authority? The 
defendant in order to succeed, must make out a clear case; on him lies the 
onus probandi; every legal <Presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of 
the acts of the legislature. 19 
The bench interrupted the argument to indicate its full agreement with this 
contention. The report observes, "Per cur. The law clearl~ is so; we must be 
satisfied beyond doubt, before we can declare a law void."1 7 
In its opinion, the Court disposed of the argument that the statute was 
unconstitutional without analysis; it simply asserted that unconstitutionality 
"must be evident" before a statute can be pronounced invalid: 
As to the constitutionality of these laws, a breach of the constitution by the 
legislature, and the clashing of the law with the constitution, must be evident 
indeed, before we should think ourselves at liberty to declare a law void and a 
nullity on that account yet if a violation of the constitution should in any case 
be made by an act of the legislature, and that violation should unequivocally 
appear to us, we should think it our duty not to shrink from the task of saying 
such law is void. We however see no such violation in the present case, and 
therefore give judgment for the commonwealth. 198 
With respect to the obligation of contracts, the 1801 Kentucky decision 
Stidger v. Rogers199 appears to reflect a similar reluctance to find a statute 
192. /d. (quoting Pennsylvania law enacted on Apr. 18, 1795). 
193. /d. at 498 (quoting statute and 3 Dall. St. Laws 771 (Pa. 1795)). 
194. /d. at495 (quotingPA.CONST. art. V, § 12 (1796)). 
195. /d. 
196. /d. at 498. 
197. /d. 
198. /d. at 501. 
199. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801). 
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unconstitutional. As will be discussed below, the court there found 
unconstitutional a state statute that violated the right to a jury trial. After 
discussing the jury trial right, the court added, "It may not be amiss also to 
mention, that this act seems to be unconstitutional; because, by giving fifteen 
per cent. damages, it impaired the contract, expressed or implied, which was 
entered into by Stidger and Morton .... "200 Even though the act, then, created 
a damage remedy beyond that established by the contract, the court did not find 
it an unconstitutional interference with the obligation of contract. Having 
invalidated the statute on other grounds, the court simply noted an additional 
potential constitutional problem. 
Ham v. M'Clawi01 suggests a different-and more strongly counter-
majoritarian-conception of the judicial role, although the court did not hold 
the statute at issue unconstitutional. The M'Claws were slave owners who had 
lived in Honduras. Before moving to South Carolina, they inquired about the 
state's laws and learned that no law barred them from bringing slaves into the 
state. While they were aboard a ship traveling from Honduras to South 
Carolina, the legislature enacted a new statute barring non-United States 
citizens from bringing slaves into South Carolina and providing that any slaves 
brought into the state in violation of the statute would become the property of 
the individual who informed on the slave owner. Ham, a revenue officer, sued 
under the statute. The M'Claws argued that the statute should not be given 
effect because "statutes made against common right and reason, are void."202 
They argued, in the alternative, that the statute should be given an 
"equitable ... construction."203 
The court observed: 
It is clear, that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of 
common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void, as far as 
they are calculated to operate against those principles. In the present instance, 
we have an act before us, which, were the strict letter of it applied to the 
present claimants, would be evidently against common reason.204 
Then, however, rather than holding the statute unconstitutional "as applied to 
the present claimants," the court construed the statute so as not to cover the 
M'Claws: 
[W]e would not do the legislature who passed this act, so much injustice, as to 
sit here and say that it was their intention to make a forfeiture of property 
brought in here as this was. We are, therefore, bound to give such a 
construction to this [act], as will be consistent with justice, and the dictates of 
200. /d. (emphasis added). 
201. l S.C.L. (I Bay) 93 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1789). 
202. /d. at 96 (citing Lord Coke's decision in Bonham's Case). 
203. /d. at 97. The state's attorney general, representing Ham, did not address the 
M'Claws' constitutional argument. 
204. /d. at 98 (emphasis in original). 
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natural reason, though contrary to the strict letter of the law .... 205 
At one level, Ham is notable for the court's invocation of natural law (a 
natural law concerned with the property rights of the slave owner, not the 
liberty interest of the person held in bondage). In Trevett, Varnum had also 
appealed to natural law, but that was in a situation in which there was no state 
constitution to which to appeal, and the jury trial right affected by the statute 
was a right that had a traditional grounding.206 Here, in contrast, even with a 
constitution in place, the court is suggesting that there can be judicial review of 
statutes based simply on the equities of the situation (as seen by the court). 
Moreover, it is suggesting that a generally constitutional statute can be invalid 
in a particular application. At the same time, however, the appeal to common 
right and reason is dicta. The court's holding is based on its construction of the 
legislative intent, and its treatment of legislative intent is traditional: there was 
substantial precedent for construing a statute so as not to cover an unusual fact 
pattern when the court believed that application would produce inequitable 
results. 207 
Judge Waties, one of the three judges who decided Ham, again used natural 
law as a basis for judicial review in the 1796 case Lindsay v. Commissioners.208 
In that case, however, natural law concerns informed the interpretation of 
constitutional text, rather than serving as an independent constraint on 
legislation, and no other judge signed on to W aties' s opinion. At issue in 
Lindsay was a South Carolina statute empowering commissioners to lay out a 
road in Charlestown and determine compensation. When the commissioners, in 
accordance with traditional practice, awarded no compensation for unimproved 
lands taken for the road, property owners challenged the authorizing statute on 
the grounds that it violated the jury trial and the "law of the land" provisions of 
the state constitution.2°9 The next Part will discuss the jury trial claim. Waties 
was the only judge to find the law of the land claim meritorious. His analysis 
looked not simply to the words of the clause, but to the clause's purpose: "If the 
lex terrae meant any law which the legislature might pass, then the legislature 
would be authorized by the constitution, to destroy the right, which the 
constitution had expressly declared, should for ever be inviolably preserved. 
This is too absurd a construction to be the true one.'.21o He therefore 
205. /d. 
206. See notes 84-94 and accompanying text (discussing Trevett v. Weeden). 
207. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REv. 885, 894-902 (1985) (discussing this precedent). 
208. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (Ct. App. 1796). 
209. /d. at 40; see S.C. CONST. art. 9, § 2 (1790) ("No freemen of this State shall be 
taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or 
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the 
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land .... "); id. at art. 9, § 6 ("The trial by jury ... 
shall be forever inviolably preserved."). 
210. Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 59. 
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determined that "law of the land" meant "ancient common law of the land."211 
Compensation was, in turn, part of the ancient common law of the land because 
Blackstone had recognized the compensation requirement and because "the 
principle of indemnification is deeply founded in natural justice."212 Justices 
Grirnke and Bay, who found the state's arguments compelling, contended that 
the "law of the land" clause was 
not declaratory of any new law, but confirmed all the ancient rights and 
principles, which had been in use in the state, with the additional security, that 
no bills of attainder, nor ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts, should ever be passed in the state. 213 
While this interpretation seemed to mirror Waties's reading, it actually differed 
sharply. Rather than simply protecting individual rights, for Grirnke and Bay, 
the clause also recognized the state's rights and privileges. They observed that 
"the authority of the state, as laid down by eminent civilians and jurists, to 
appropriate a portion of the soil of every country for public roads and 
highways, was one of the original rights of sovereignty ... [and] all private 
rights were held and enjoyed, subject to this condition."214 Thus, the law of the 
land provision protected the state's right to seize private proFsrty without 
compensation, not the individual's right to obtain compensation.2 5 
Of the state court cases in the early Republic, I have found only two in 
which a statute was denied effect even though it did not involve a jury trial 
right or a judicial matter. Neither was officially reported, and both involved 
Rhode Island courts finding that a state statute favoring debtors violated the 
Federal Constitution's Contract Clause. In 1791, the Providence Gazette 
reported: 
An Action at a Special Court having been commenced in the County of Bristol 
against the Sheriff of the County of Providence, for having received the Paper 
Money of this State at the Rate of Fifteen for One, agreeably to an Act passed 
before the Adoption of the National Constitution, called the SUBSTITUTE ACT, 
wherein Judgment was given by the unanimous Opinion of the Court against 
the Sheriff, on the principle:i that, by the Adoption of the Constitution that Act 
was virtually repealed . ... 16 
In the same year, the Court of Common Pleas in Washington County also held 
a state statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the terms of debt repayment 
could not be altered by statute.217 Although the evidentiary record is thin, it 
211. /d. 
212. /d. at 61. 
213. /d. at 57. 
214. /d. at 56. 
215. The fourth justice, Burke, held that the statute violated the right to a jury trial and 
did not reach the "law of the land" question. See id. at 58. Since the court was equally 
divided, the plaintiffs failed to obtain compensation. See id. at 62. 
216. PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, July 9, 1791, at 1. 
217. See Warren, supra note 19, at 24-25. The Providence Gazette reported: "The 
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appears that the decisions were consistent with the concededly unconstitutional 
rule. In marked contrast to its actions after Trevett, the same state legislature 
took no action in response to the Bristol County decision. The House refused to 
receive a petition calling on it to challenge the court's action. The Gazette 
reported, "[l]t must be inferred as the Sense of the Legislature, that the Act 
before mentioned was superseded by the Adoption of the Constitution, and that 
it has thereby become null and void . .. .'.218 
The lack of legislative action is significant. Whereas the decision in the 
revolutionary-era case of Trevett produced a sharp outcry, these two state cases 
from the early Republic did not, suggesting that judicial review had become 
accepted in the state where it had been most controversial.219 These two Rhode 
Island state cases are the only state cases from the early Republic in which a 
statute that did not involve a matter in the province of the judiciary was struck 
down. As noted, the statutes were struck down on federal constitutional 
grounds. 
B. Right to a Jury Trial 
There were seven cases from this period in which at least one judge found 
that a statute violated the right to a jury trial, and in five of these cases the court 
ruled the statute unconstitutional. 
Kentucky courts struck down statutes three times, and in each instance the 
decision can be seen as an application of the concededly unconstitutional rule. 
The state's 1799 constitution provided "[t]hat trial by jury should be as 
heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary to 
that constitution should be void."22° First, in Stidger v. Rogers,221 the state's 
supreme court in 1801 found "evidently unconstitutional" a statute enacted 
shortly after the adoption of the constitution. The court observed that "the act in 
question was a violation of this clause of the constitution [the jury trial clause], 
by empowering a court to ascertain the value of property, in a case which, prior 
to the formation of that constitution, could, in a court of law, only have been 
ascertained by a jury. "222 
Court of Common Pleas in the County of Washington at a late Term, gave their unanimous 
judgment that nothing but silver or gold is a tender to discharge execution." PROVIDENCE 
GAZETIE, June 25, 1791, at 1. 
218. PROVIDENCEGAZETIE, July 9, 1791, at 1 (emphasis in original). 
219. The response to the circuit court's decision in Dickason & Champion v. Casey, 
see infra notes 320-26 and accompanying text, provides further support for the proposition 
that judicial review-at least under the Federal Constitution-was winning acceptance in 
Rhode Island. 
220. KY. CONST. of 1792, § 7. 
221. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801). 
222. /d. 
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Second, in Enderman v. Ashby,223 another 1801 case, the court faced a 
challenge to a statute that barred slaves from engaging in financial transactions 
"without the consent of their owners."224 The act provided that the owners 
could recover from the individuals who entered into the transactions with the 
slaves "four times the value of any commodity thus transferred, by the 
judgment of a justice of the peace, if the sum should be under five pounds." 
The court concluded that this provision "does deprive the party of the trial by 
jury, in a case which, before that time, he was entitled to by law; and 
consequently, that this clause of the act is contrary to the constitution which 
was then, and is now, in force."225 
Third, in Gullion v. Bow/mare's Administrators,226 also decided in 1801, 
the state's court of appeals followed a similar approach in invalidating a statute 
that directed an appellate court to enter a judgment against a surety in a 
supersedeas bond. The court observed that the relevant statutory section "is 
clearly unconstitutional, inasmuch as thereby the right of trial by jury is taken 
away in such cases from the surety, which, prior to the date of the constitution, 
had long been enjoyed."227 
In contrast, the fourth case in which a statute was pronounced 
unconstitutional did not involve a clear application of constitutional text. The 
1792 South Carolina case Bowman v. Middleton228 involved a contested title to 
land. Bowman and his fellow plaintiffs relied in part on a colonial statute from 
1712 that had sought to resolve a then-existing controversy about the land's 
ownership by confirming title in one of the three groups that claimed it at that 
time. Middleton countered that "no title could be transferred by this act. That it 
was against common right and reason, as well as against Magna Charta; 
therefore, ipso facto, void."229 His precise grounds for objection are not clear. 
He stated that the act 
wrought a two-fold injury; by depriving [the other claimants at the time of the 
223. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 53 (1801). 
224. /d. 
225. /d. The court concluded, however, that the damage award was proper pursuant to 
another clause of the statute in question, and that that clause was constitutional. See id. 
In the years before Marbury, the Kentucky Court of Appeals confronted one other 
challenge based on an asserted violation of the right to a jury trial. In Caldwell v. 
Commonwealth, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 129 (1802), the court rejected a claim that the right to a jury 
trial had been violated, and its approach was identical to that in Enderman and Stidger. The 
act authorized the state attorney general "to obtain judgments, by way of motion, against all 
public debtors and officers of every denomination indebted to the public." /d. at 129-30. The 
court rejected this challenge because the judgment mechanism at issue had been "in force 
when the constitution was framed." /d. at 129. As discussed infra Part III.C, the statute was 
found unconstitutional on other grounds. 
226. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 76 (1801). 
227. /d. 
228. 1 S.C.L. (l Bay) 252 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1792). 
229. /d. at 254. 
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act] of their freeholds, without a trial by jury .... [l]n no case, could the 
legislature of the country interfere with private property, by taking it from one 
man and giving it to another, to the prejudice of either party, or that of third 
persons, who might be interested in the event. 230 
505 
Middleton appears to be asserting that the statute violated the right to a jury 
trial. He also appears to be asserting that the statute violated broader principles 
that were not explicitly made part of the constitutional text: the statute is 
"against common right and reason, as well as against Magna Charta; therefore, 
ipso facto, void. "231 
The court's decision was brief. Justices Grimke and Bay, the only members 
of the court participating in the case, held that 
the plaintiffs could claim no title under the act in question, as it was against 
common right, as well as against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of 
one man, and vest it in another; and that too, to the prejudice of third persons, 
without any compensation, or even a trial by the jury of the country to 
determine the right in question. That the act was therefore, ipso facto, void.232 
The invocation of Magna Charta and common right resembles the interpretation 
of the law of the land provision that Justice Waties was to make in Lindsay, but 
the court in Bowman did not seek to ground this element of its holding in a 
constitutional text. This part of the holding that the statute is unconstitutional, 
then, is not based on constitutional text. More concretely, the court seems to be 
relying on the state constitution's jury trial clause. There was, however, a 
complication here, although it is not noted by the court. The relevant provision 
of the South Carolina Constitution-"[t]he trial by jury, as heretofore used in 
this State ... shall be forever inviolably preserved"233 -resembles the 
provision of the Kentucky Constitution discussed above and, like it, is at least 
arguably backward looking. Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in applying 
that clause, looked to practices prior to the adoption of the constitution. If a 
statute was consistent with the pre-constitutional practice, it was upheld; if it 
was not, it was invalidated. A similar approach here should have caused the 
statute to be upheld-rather than departing from the background practice, the 
statute was evidence of the background practice. 
Indeed, legislative resolution of private disputes was common during the 
colonial era, 234 and the practice did not stop with Independence: a number of 
the statutes discussed in the next Part were post-Independence statutes that 
sought to resolve disputes between private parties. In this context, the right to a 
jury trial could be understood as a check on the judiciary, rather than as a check 
on the legislature. At the very least, then, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
230. /d. 
231. /d. It should be noted that the state constitution did not feature a takings clause, so 
one potential source of appeal was not available to Middleton. 
232. /d. 
233. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 6. 
234. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Symsbury Case). 
506 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:455 
was not following the concededly unconstitutional approach in Bowman, since 
the statute was certainly defensible. To the extent that the court was 
interpreting the jury trial provision, it was giving it a substantive definition of 
greater breadth than the text itself necessarily mandated. 
The decision by the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas and General 
Sessions of the Peace in Zylstra v. Charleston235 reflects a similar approach to 
the state constitution's jury trial provision. Zylstra had been convicted in the 
Charleston Court of Wardens of illegally operating a tallow chandler's shop 
within the city and was fined I 00 pounds. Among his contentions on appeal 
was the claim that, under the state constitution, a jury trial was required before 
a penalty of more than twenty pounds could be imposed. 
The four judges ruled in Zylstra's favor. While Judge Grimke's decision 
was based on statutory construction, the other three exercised the power of 
judicial review. Judge Burke found "utterly void" the municipal ordinance that 
vested in the Court of Wardens the power to convict Zylstra without a jury: 
[F]or the Court of Wardens to hear and determine such a cause, without the 
intervention of a jury, was what no Court in the state durst presume; it being 
repugnant to the genius and spirit of our laws, all of which recognise jury trial, 
which is also guarantied to us expressly by our constitution.236 
While Judge Burke's opinion treats the case as straightforward, Judge Waties's 
opinion reveals its complexity in light of the backward-looking focus of South 
Carolina's jury trial provision. First, the Charleston Court of Wardens predated 
the state constitution and, as W aties' s opinion suggests, the court had imposed 
penalties without the use of juries.237 The constitutional text-"the trial by 
jury, as heretofore used in this State . . . shall be forever inviolably 
preservetf'238 -would seem to indicate that prior practices were 
constitutionally valid, which would suggest that the Court of Wardens, after the 
constitution, could proceed without juries in precisely the same way as it had 
before the constitution. Second, the state statute that arguably authorized the 
municipal ordinance pursuant to which the penalties against Zylstra had been 
imposed also allowed the Court of Wardens to "exercise the same powers ... 
as the Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas or Admiralty"239 -courts that did 
not use juries. Again, then, there was precedent for nonjury trials, and the state 
statute simply extended the practice to a new court.240 
Waties, however, rejected arguments that practice predating the 
constitution validated the Charleston Court of Wardens' action, and Judge Bay 
235. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794). 
236. /d. 
237. See id. at 390. 
238. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 6. 
239. Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 394. 
240. The state statute, however, only authorized the Charleston Court of Wardens to 
hear cases with a value of less than twenty pounds, so in this regard, the court, in imposing a 
fine of 100 pounds against Zylstra, had exceeded its statutory authorization. See id. 
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followed suit.241 "[T]he trial by jury is a common law right," Waties wrote, 
"not the creature of the constitution, but originating in time immemorial .... 
This right, then, is as much out of the reach of any law, as the property of the 
citizen . . .. "242 The contours of the jury trial right under the state constitution 
thus reflected English common law practice. The fact that the South Carolina 
legislature, prior to the adoption of the state constitution, had departed from this 
common law traditiOti was irrelevant. Burke had deemed unconstitutional a 
municipal ordinance consistent with practice before the constitution. W aties 
and Bay considered unconstitutional both that ordinance and the state statute 
pursuant to which the ordinance was adopted. The scope of the jury trial 
recognized by Waties, Bay, and Burke reflected a substantive conception of the 
jury trial right that reflected English common law tradition, rather than state 
practice, and was thus broader than the constitutional text mandated. 
The facts of Lindsay v. Commissioners,243 one of the two cases in which 
one judge, but not a majority, found a violation of the right to a jury trial, have 
already been discussed. A South Carolina statute empowered road 
commissioners to lay out a road in Charleston and to award such compensation 
as they deemed appropriate. Property owners whose unimproved land had been 
taken without compensation challenged the statute as violative of the law of the 
land and jury trial provisions of the state constitution. The state attorney 
general responded to the jury trial claim by asserting that the state had a 
sovereign power to seize property for roads and determine without a jury trial 
whether compensation was due and by arguing that jury trials would create 
unacceptable administrative inconvenience: 
[E]ither the state must possess this high power and authority, as one of the 
essential prerogatives of sovereignty, or every inconsiderable freeholder in the 
country could, when interest or caprice urged him to it, thwart and counteract 
the public in the exercise of this all important authority for the interest of the 
. 244 
commumty. 
He appealed, in addition, to background practice, arguing that none of the 
South Carolina road statutes, dating back to 1686, had provided a jury trial for 
property owners whose land had been taken.245 
The two justices who ruled in favor of the state-Grimke and Bay-did not 
even note the jury trial claim. The same is true of Justice W aties, one of the two 
justices to favor the property owners. But Justice Burke, the other justice to 
favor the property owners, appears to have seen a violation of the right to a jury 
trial. He stated that he "was of opinion that there should be a fair compensation 
241. See id. at 398 (indicating that Judge Bay, who spoke after Judge Waties, 
"declared himself of the same opinion"). 
242. !d. at 394. 
243. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (Ct. App. 1796). 
244. /d. at 44-45. 
245. /d. at 47-50. 
508 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:455 
made to the private individual, for the loss he might sustain by it [road-
building], to be ascertained by a jury of the country."246 Burke provided no 
basis for this conclusion, but he was not applying the concededly 
unconstitutional rule. As observed, the South Carolina Constitution's jury trial 
right could plausibly be read to ensure only that jury trials would be available 
in situations in which they had been available prior to the constitution. Burke 
was reading the clause more broadly than this, finding in it some substantive 
meaning not based on practice. 
Finally, State v. ----, a 1794 North Carolina Superior Court case, concerned 
a state statute that authorized the entry of default judgments against receivers of 
public money on the motion of the state attorney general. Judge Williams 
pronounced the statute unconstitutional as violating the law of the land and jury 
trial provisions of the state constitution. 247 On rehearing, two judges of the 
court reversed the decision, without explanation.248 Judge Williams's opinion 
reveals that he had a substantive conception of the jury trial right that was not 
simply determined by past practice and that was not satisfied by the formal 
involvement of the jury in decisionmaking. The state attorney general offered 
examples of state statutes that permitted entry of a judgment "though [the 
defendant] has no actual notice of [the] proceeding, and of course no 
opportunity to plead in his defence a matter to be submitted to a Jury."249 
Williams, however, found the statute inconsistent with the jury trial provision 
of the state constitution because the jury's role under the statute was purely a 
nominal one: 
[T]hough a jury may be sworn, what will it be upon? It will be upon a default 
taken against the party who does not appear and plead, because he has no 
knowledge that any proceedings are intended to be had against him: and so in 
truth it is not a trial by jury according to the ancient mode .... [I]n reality the 
jury have nothing to determine on-it is a mere form for the sake of which 
they are to be impaneled-such a trial is a mere farce. 250 
C. Statutes Affecting Courts 
This Part looks at fifteen cases in which at least one judge found 
unconstitutional a statute that implicated judicial matters; in thirteen of these 
the statute was in fact found invalid. 251 There were plausible arguments on 
246. /d. at 58 (emphasis in original). 
247. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (1794). The jury trial provision of the state constitution 
provided: "That in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by 
jury, is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and 
inviolable." N.C. CONST. art. XIV (1776). 
248. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 40. 
249. /d. at 35. 
250. /d. at 29. 
251. In one of the thirteen cases, Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (Ct. Com. 
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behalf of all these statutes. 
As in the Symsbury Case, discussed in Part II.C, most of the cases in this 
category involved statutes that were, in effect, judicial decisions. In nine cases, 
the overturned statute had attempted to resolve a dispute in favor of one of the 
parties or directed a new trial. One of these cases-the South Carolina decision 
in Bowman v. Middleton-has already been discussed. The court there found 
unconstitutional a 1712 statute declaring that a particular individual owned 
contested property, observing that 
the plaintiffs could claim no title under the act in question, as it was against 
common right, as well as against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of 
one man, and vest it in another; and that too, to the prejudice of third persons, 
without any compensation, or even a trial by the jury of the country2 to 
determine the right in question. That the act was therefore, ipso facto, void. 52 
In Taylor v. Reading, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed a statute as 
it "passed ... upon the petition of the defendants, declaring that in certain cases 
payments made in continental money should be credited as specie .... "253 The 
court held the statute "to be an ex post facto law, and as such unconstitutional, 
and in that case inoperative."254 The New Jersey Constitution did not have an 
ex post facto clause, which suggests that the court was relying on the Federal 
Constitution's clause. The rejected statute was not clearly unconstitutional: in 
Calder v. Bul/,255 the Supreme Court held unanimously that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause did not apply to civil statutes. 
In Austin v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania,256 the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania was presented with a suit involving title to land, with 
each party claiming to have acquired the property from the state. In 1784, the 
state legislature had attempted to resolve the controversy by vesting title in 
Austin; the following year, the legislature pronounced its prior action 
unconstitutional and repealed the statute. 257 When the court considered the case 
in 1793, it ruled in favor of the university, noting (without specifying the 
grounds) that the 1784 statute was "unconstitutional."258 
In Gilman v. McClary,259 the New Hampshire legislature had sought to 
Pl. 1794), two of the four judges found a statute unconstitutional because it permitted a 
legislative body to exercise judicial powers. The other two judges concurred in the judgment, 
but did not reach this issue. See supra notes 235-42 and infra notes 280-83. 
252. Bowman, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 254-55. 
253. State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802). Taylor was not separately reported, 
but was briefly summarized in Parkhurst. /d. 
254. /d. 
255. 3 U.S. (3 Da11.) 386 (1798). 
256. 1 Yeates 260 (Pa. 1793). 
257. /d. 
258. /d. at 261. 
259. Gilman is not a reported case, but Professor Walter Dodd co11ected and published 
the relevant legislative and judicial documents along with an explanatory note. See Walter 
Dodd, Gilman v. McClary: A New Hampshire Case of 1791, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 348 (1907). 
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overturn a trial court decision. In a suit for money, the New Hampshire Court 
for Rockingham County ruled in favor of plaintiff Nathaniel Gilman. Elizabeth 
McClary then appealed to the legislature, which enacted a statute "to restore 
Elisabeth McClarey [sic] to her Law."260 McClary returned to court to effect 
the statute. The court ruled: 
[l]f the act virtually or really reverses the judgment of this Court it is 
repugnant to the bill of rights and constitution of this State and if the Act does 
not reverse the said judgment the Court cannot render another judgment in the 
same case upon appeal while the first judgment remains in full force .... It is 
therefore considered by the Court that the said Act is ineffectual and 
inadmissible and that the said action be dismissed.261 
Similarly, in five other unpublished cases from the 1790s, New Hampshire 
courts declared void state statutes ordering new trials. 262 
Like the Symsbury Case, these decisions reflect an evolving notion of 
separation of powers under which resolution of controversies between 
particular parties was a matter for the judiciary alone. At the same time, the 
four state constitutions involved in these cases did not provide a clear textual 
basis for assigning such decisionmaking to the judiciary alone. Nonetheless, in 
each case the statute was pronounced unconstitutional. 
In a brief, c~tic opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Caldwell v. 
Commonwealth26 held that part of a state statute that subjected court clerks 
who were delinquent in paying the money they received to the state "to such 
fines, penalties, interest, and damages as are imposed by law on delinquent 
sheriffs, is unconstitutional."264 The statute was unconstitutional because the 
statute imposing the payment obligations on clerks had not imposed such 
sanctions for nonperformance.265 The court did not cite any constitutional 
provision as the basis for its holding, indicating that this is another decision in 
which a court, in a case involving what could be considered the province of the 
judiciary, invalidated a statute without relying on constitutional text. 
260. N.H. SENATEJ., Jan. 25, 1791, quoted in Dodd, supra note 259, at 349. 
261. Gilman v. McClary, Manuscript Record of the Superior Court for the County of 
Rockingham ( 1791 ), reprinted in Dodd, supra note 259, at 350. 
262. Three of these opinions-Chickering v. Clark ( 1797), Butterfield v. Morgan 
(1797), and Jenness v. Seavey (1799)-have not been preserved but are briefly referred to in 
Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 216-17 (1818). In a study of separation of powers in early 
New Hampshire, Timothy Lawrie discusses two additional cases other than those cited in 
Merrill. One is Jenness v. Seavey, a 1792 case in which the Rockingham Superior Court held 
unconstitutional a statute ordering a new trial after the initial set of judicial proceedings had 
concluded in Seavey's favor. (The 1799 case Jenness v. Seavey, mentioned in Merrill, 
involved a second statute ordering a new trial and a second decision holding the statute 
unconstitutional.) The second is a case in which the court of common pleas refused to 
enforce a statute granting a convicted pig thief a new trial. See Lawrie, supra note 19, at 323-
25. 
263. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 129 (1802). 
264. /d. at 130. 
265. /d. at 129. 
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Two other cases involved removal of officers. In both instances, the 
members of the court disagreed (or at least appear to have disagreed) about the 
constitutionality of the statute. The New Jersey case of State v. Parkhursr66 
was a contest between two men who claimed the position of court clerk. Aaron 
Ogden had held the position initially, after receiving his commission in 1800. 
He had then been elected to the United States Senate, without resigning his 
position as clerk. In 1801, the legislature passed a statute that provided that 
when an individual holding a state office took a seat in the United States Senate 
or House of Representatives, he would be deemed to have vacated his state 
office, and Parkhurst was appointed to succeed Ogden. 267 Ogden asserted that 
the 1801 statute was an ex post facto law.268 In the state supreme court, Justice 
Kirkpatrick asserted that the court had the power to review the constitutionality 
of statutes,269 but that there was no need to resolve whether the 1801 statute 
was unconstitutional. He held that "[c]ertain offices are in their own nature 
incompatible and inconsistent, and cannot be exercised by the same person at 
the same time.'mo Thus, Ogden's acceptance of his position in the Senate 
automatically effected his resignation from his clerkship, and there was no need 
to consider the constitutionality of the statute, since it had no effect.271 
Kirkpatrick's two fellow state supreme court justices disagreed with him 
and ruled in Ogden's favor.272 Since only Kirkpatrick's opinion has survived, it 
is impossible to say with certainty what grounds the justices relied on in ruling 
for Ogden. It would appear, however, that they could only have ruled in favor 
of the senator if they had found the statute of 1801 unconstitutional. Moreover, 
since the ground on which the statute was asserted to be unconstitutional was 
that it was an ex post facto law, they presumably invalidated it on that ground. 
If this is the case, the state supreme court would have, as it had earlier in 
Taylor, invalidated a statute on ex post facto grounds, presumably in reliance 
on the Federal Constitution. Here, however, the ruling of unconstitutionality 
(assuming there was such a ruling) did not stand, since the court of errors 
reversed the state supreme court, although once again the opinion has not been 
preserved. 273 Nonetheless, the case provides some additional evidence of 
judges (i.e., the majority of the state supreme court) holding a statute 
unconstitutional that, Calder suggests, could plausibly have been upheld. 
266. 9 N.J.L. 427 (1802). 
267. /d. at 435. 
268. See id. at 445-46. The surviving opinion from the case-Justice Kirkpatrick's 
opinion in the New Jersey Supreme Court--does not explicitly state that Ogden raised this 
argument, but it is implicit in Justice Kirkpatrick's analysis that Ogden made such a claim. 
269. See id. at 443-45. 
270. !d. at 445. 
271. /d. at 445-46. 
272. See id. at 434 (introductory note to case). 
273. See id. (letter from Chief Justice Kirkpatrick). 
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The facts of the North Carolina case State v. ----274 have already been 
noted. Judge Williams would have invalidated as violative of the law of the 
land provision of the state constitution (as well as the jury trial provision) a 
statute that permitted the state attorney general to secure default judgments 
against receivers of public money, even if the receivers had not received notice 
of the suit against them. Williams read the phrase "law of the land" 
expansively, as meaning "according to the course of the common law; which 
always required the party to be cited, and to have a day in Court upon which he 
might appear and defend himself. "275 
In other words, the common law established the law of the land, and the 
legislature could not overturn it. 276 The state attorney general countered that 
"law of the land" meant "the whole body of law, composed partly of the 
common law, partly of customs, partly of the acts of the British Parliament 
received and enforced here, and partly of the acts passed by our Legislature"277 
and that the legislature had the power to displace any of the other sources of 
authority.278 Although they did not explain their reasoning, Judges Ashe and 
Macay presumably accepted the attorney general's argument, since they voted 
in favor of the state.279 
The facts in Zylstra v. Charleston280 and the jury trial issues raised by the 
case have already been discussed.281 Zylstra was convicted by the Charleston 
Court of Wardens for illegally keeping a tallow chandler's shop within the city 
limits. In addition to concluding that the state statute and relevant municipal 
ordinance were unconstitutional because they violated the right to a jury trial, 
two of the judges-Bay and Waties-also voted in favor of overturning the 
conviction on the grounds that members of the city council, the legislative 
authority that enacted the municipal ordinance, sat on the case as judges. 
Waties observed, "Any one who will consider this at all, must see in it a most 
unnatural combination of the legislative, the executive, and judicial powers."282 
(The other two judges on the court did not reach this issue.) Neither Waties nor 
Bay pointed to constitutional text as the basis of their holding and the Court of 
Wardens practice seems to have predated the state constitution, so it had 
historical sanction.283 Thus, the municipal ordinance was not clearly 
274. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (1794). For a discussion of the facts in State v. ----, see supra 
notes 247-50 and accompanying text. 
275. State v. ----, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 29. 
276. See also id. at 33 (argument of state attorney general) (developing this point). 
277. /d. 
278. See id. at 31. 
279. See id. at 40. 
280. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794). 
281. See supra notes 235-42. 
282. Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 396. Judge Bay adopted Judge Waties's reasoning. 
See id. at 398. 
283. See id. (Waties, J.). 
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unconstitutional. 
The final opinions in this category are from Virginia: Cases of the Judges 
of the Court of Appeals284 and Kamper v. Hawkins. 285 As historian Charles 
Grove Haines has observed, "None of the early [judicial review] cases caused 
more comment or was more widely known" than the Cases of the Judges,286 
and the opinions in Kamper appeared in book form the year after the case was 
decided. 287 
The Cases of the Judges were not actual cases. Rather, they were a series 
of judicial responses to state statutes affecting their offices. The first statute 
was a 1788 statute that had assigned to court of appeals judges the additional 
obligation to sit on newly established district courts. The state constitutional 
clause implicated by the statute provided that judges on specifically identified 
courts should "continue in office during good behaviour'' and that they should 
have "fixed and adequate salaries. "288 
The report of the case notes that, at the time of its passage, the statute had 
occasioned significant public debate. Referring to the "good behaviour" clause 
of the constitution, proponents of the statute made the textual argument that the 
state constitution protected only tenure of office. They also advanced an 
originalist argument. They pointed out that the 1779 statute creating the court 
of appeals had assigned to that court judges of other, already existing courts, 
without relieving these judges of their original duties. The judges' 
"acquiescence [in accepting additional responsibilities] might be considered as 
a cotemporaneous exposition of the constitution; which formed a precedent not 
to be resisted."289 Critics of the act "contended, that it was contrary to the 
constitution to impose new duties ... [and] clearly so, if no additional 
compensation was made them for it. "290 
When they next convened, the court of appeals sent the le~islature a letter 
entitled ''The respectful remonstrance of the court of appeals." 91 In that letter, 
the court "declare[d], that the constitution and the act are in opposition and 
cannot exist together; and that the former must control the operation of the 
latter."292 The argument that the court advanced was essentially structural, 
although it drew on constitutional text. The judges observed, "The propriety 
and necessity of the independence of the judges is evident in reason and the 
nature of their office; since they are to decide between government and the 
284. 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). 
285. 3 Va. (IVa. Cas.) 20 (1793). 
286. HAINES, supra note 19, at 150. 
287. See id. at 157. 
288. VA. CONST. § XII ( 1776). 
289. Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call.) at 140. 
290. /d. at 139. 
291. /d. at 141. 
292. /d. at 142 (emphasis omitted). 
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people, as well as between contending citizens .... "293 The constitution 
recognized this independence, they continued, in two ways. First, "[it] declared 
that judges should hold their offices during good behavior."294 Second, "the 
constitution gives a principle, not to be departed from, declaring that the 
salaries shall be adequate and fixed, leaving it to the legislature to judge what 
would be adequate when they should appoint the duties."295 The new statute, 
by sharply increasing judicial duties without increasing judicial compensation, 
"appeared so evident an attack upon the independency of the judges, that they 
thought it inconsistent with a conscientious discharge of their duty to pass it 
over."296 The act, the judges asserted, was "contrary to the spirit of the 
constitution."297 Thus, the court took the position that St. George Tucker had 
taken in Case of the Prisoners: the statute is unconstitutional because it is at 
odds with the constitution's "spirit." 
The legislature responded by enacting a statute ousting the judges from the 
court of appeals (although allowing them to retain their lower court 
responsibilities). The court of appeals judges signed an order that they "could 
not be constitutionally deprived" of their responsibilities and resigned, carefully 
observing that the statute had not stripped them of their duties and that they left 
the bench of "their mere free will. "298 
The next controversy arose when the legislature passed a statute assigning 
general court judges responsibility also to sit as district court judges and giving 
district courts the ~ower, previously assigned only to the chancery court, to 
issue injunctions.2 9 The relevant constitutional provision stated, "The two 
Houses of Assembly shall, by joint ballot, appoint Judges of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals, and General Court, Judges in Chancery, [and] Judges of 
Admiralty."300 The constitutionality of the statute was presented in the case of 
Kamper v. Hawkins. Kamper instituted proceedings in district court and sought 
an injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment obtained the previous term. 
The district court "adjourned [the question] to the General Court for novelty 
293. Id. at 143 (emphasis omitted). 
294. /d. (emphasis omitted). 
295. /d. 
296. Id. at 145. 
297. /d. at 146. 
298. /d. at 149-50. The judges appointed in their stead in 1792 confronted a statute 
that, in consolidating the Virginia judicial system, arguably reconstituted the court of 
appeals, although no new appointments were made. The sitting judges then informed the bar 
that "as they held their offices under the constitution, the new law could not have taken them 
away, had it even been intended; but ... that it was not the intention of the legislature to 
deprive them." /d. at 150-51. 
299. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 21, 66 (1793) (quoting "[an act] 
reducing into one, the several acts concerning the establishment, jurisdiction, and powers of 
District Courts"). 
300. VA. CONST. § XI (1776). 
November 2005] JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE MARBURY 515 
and difficulty as to the constitutionality of said law."301 None of the five judges 
on the general court suggested that the unconstitutionality of the statute was 
readily apparent, and they disagreed about how to analyze the question. 
Nonetheless, all five found the statute unconstitutional. 
Judge Roane started his opinion by noting that his initial reaction had been 
to uphold the statute, stating, "I doubted how far the judiciary were [sic] 
authorized to refuse to execute a law, on the ground of its being against the 
spirit of the Constitution."302 He continued: 
My opinion, on more mature consideration, is changed in this respect, and 
I now think that the judiciary may and ought not only to refuse to execute a 
law expressly repugnant to the Constitution; but also one which is, by a plain 
and natural construction, in opposition to the fundamental principles thereof . 
. . . By fundamental principles I understand, those great principles growing 
out of the Constitution, by the aid of which, in dubious cases, the Constitution 
may be explained and preserved inviolate; those land-marks, which it may be 
necessary to resort to, on account of the impossibility to foresee or provide for 
cases within the spirit, but without the letter of the Constitution.303 
The "fundamental principles" of the constitution dictated that the statute was 
unconstitutional because the statute allowed judges who did not hold office 
during good behavior (i.e., district court judges other than those who also 
served on the general court) to exercise power previously limited to tenure-
protectedjudges (i.e., chancery court judges). Roane concluded: 
[T]hese dependent tribunals being the creatures of the Legislature itself, will 
not dare to oppose an unconstitutional law, and the principles I set out upon, 
viz: that such laws ought to be opposed, would become a dead letter, or in 
other words, this would pave the way to an uncontrolled power in the 
L . I 304 egis ature. 
Judge St. George Tucker similarly invoked the concept of spirit as an 
interpretive guide. He began: "I shall first state my own impressions, arising 
from the text of the constitution, and the spirit of our government .... "305 He 
classified the district court as a "legislative court" since it was not mandated by 
the constitution and since the legislature could therefore abolish the court, as 
well as create it. Invoking the legislature's earlier actions to oust the members 
of the court of appeals, he declared, "[T]he judiciary can never be independent, 
so long as the existence of the office depends upon the will of the ordinary 
legislature, and not upon a constitutional foundation."306 The fact that the 
constitution provided for the creation of certain courts, whose judges would 
301. Kamper, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) at 22. 
302. /d. at 35. 
303. /d. at 35-36, 40. 
304. /d. at 41. 
305. /d. at 68. 
306. /d. at 86. 
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serve during good behavior, meant that the legislature could not create other 
courts whose judges did not enjoy such tenure: "[S]uch an arrangement must 
ever render the judiciary the mere creature of the legislative department, which 
both the constitution and the bill of rights most pointedly appear to have 
guarded against."307 
Judge Nelson employed both textual and structural arguments. The fact 
that the constitution spoke separately of general court judges and chancery 
judges "evinced an intention that the ~udges of the General Court and those in 
chancery should be distinct persons." 08 He noted that the constitution required 
that general court judges who were impeached should be tried in the court of 
appeals, while judges of the chancery court who were impeached were to be 
tried in the general court. "My inference," he concluded, "is that a judge in 
chancery, and a judge of the General Court, were intended under the 
Constitution to be distinct individuals."309 
Judge Tyler found the impeachment argument elegant, but unconvincing. 
He declared, "This is too nice a deduction, and is a better argument in favor of 
an amendment to the Constitution, than of the question under consideration. 
We cannot supply defects, nor can we reconcile absurdities."310 For Tyler, the 
statute was unconstitutional because the constitution set up only one 
mechanism for creating chancery judges-a mechanism that gave the judges 
their commission during good behavior; the statute, in contrast, gave equity 
powers to those from whom these powers could also be removed by legislative 
act. Tyler declared that judges given power without adequate protection would 
lack independence, and, like Judge Tucker, he invoked the history of the court 
of appeals as exemplifying the legislature's willingness to undermine judicial 
decisionmaking: 
For how would the rights of individuals stand when brought in contest with 
the public, or even an influential character, if the judges may be removed from 
office by the same power who appointed them, to wit: by a statute 
appointment, as in this case, and by a statute disappointment as was the case in 
the Court of Appeals.311 
Finally, Judge Henry declared the statute unconstitutional because the 
constitution established only one entity with the power to issue injunctions: the 
court of chancery. He explained, "To exercise this duty [the power to issue 
injunctions] without the appointment and commission prescribed by the 
constitution, would be an exercise of a power according to the will of the 
legislature, who are servants of the people, not only without, but expressly 
307. /d. at 92-93. 
308. /d. at 33. 
309. /d. at 34. 
310. /d. at 62. 
311. /d. at64. 
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against the will of the people."312 Henry then invoked the example of the court 
of appeals as exemplifying the danger of relying on the legislature: "If the 
legislature were authorized to take this step at that time, it surely furnishes all 
succeeding judges, as they value their reputation and their independence, to see 
that their appointment be regular, before entering upon the duties of their 
office, in future. "313 
The five opinions in the case, then, display a range of analytic approaches, 
but each reflects an approach to judicial review that goes well beyond 
literalism. Taken as a group, these opinions evidence structural analysis, 
reliance on spirit rather than text, and, with the repeated references to the 
legislature's earlier retaliation against the court of appeals, invocation of policy 
concerns. 
D. Conclusion: Significance of Type of Statute 
The state court cases from the early Republic reflect a similar interpretive 
stance to the previously discussed state court cases from the revolutionary era. 
The type of statute is of critical significance. The nineteen cases in which 
statutes were invalidated fall into three categories. In two cases, state statutes 
were invalidated on Federal Contract Clause grounds. In both, the statute 
appears to have been clearly unconstitutional. In five cases, state statutes that 
affected the jury trial right were overturned; in two, there were plausible 
arguments on behalf of the statute. In eleven cases and one advisory opinion, 
state statutes affecting judicial matters were overturned. I argue that none of 
these statutes was clearly unconstitutional. 
IV. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
This Part examines the circuit court decisions invalidating statutes in the 
years before Marbury, most of which have been ignored in the modem judicial 
review literature. Almost all of the relevant decisions involve state statutes: a 
total of seven state statutes were held invalid. In six of these seven cases, there 
was at least a colorable argument for the state statute. Thus, the early federal 
circuit case law reflects a notably close scrutiny of state statutes, a scrutiny not 
recognized in the scholarly literature. Moreover, these decisions taken together 
reflect not simply a close scrutiny of state statutes in general, but a strongly 
nationalist approach-again, something not recognized previously. 
Two cases discussed here concern federal statutes. One is Rayburn's 
Case,314 which involved a congressional statute that assigned arguably 
nonjudicial duties to federal judges. Although the case was rendered moot 
312. /d. at 53. 
313. /d. at 54. 
314. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
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before the Supreme Court decided it, the circuit court hearing the case 
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, and the other two circuit courts, 
in advisory opinions, had taken the position that the statute was 
unconstitutional if literally applied. The statute was not, however, clearly 
unconstitutional, and these various opinions evidence a broad conception of 
judicial review when a statute affected judicial role and judicial autonomy.315 
The other is United States v. Ravara,316 which involved the question whether 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional because it gave concurrent 
jurisdiction to lower federal courts over cases involving foreign consul. While 
two judges rejected the claim, Iredell thought the Judiciary Act unconstitutional 
in this regard,317 a striking holding for the Justice most often associated with 
the "clearly unconstitutional approach." 
A. Review of State Statutes in Circuit Courts 
With the exception of Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,318 the seven cases 
discussed here have largely not been discussed in the modern literature on the 
original understanding of judicial review. 319 The number of these cases and the 
close level of scrutiny that they typically involve indicate that early federal 
courts were rigorous in their approach to state statutes in a way that recent 
scholarship has wholly failed to recognize. 
The first cases in which a federal court invalidated a state statute occurred 
in 1792. One of the decisions was handed down in a case in the Circuit Court 
for the District of Rhode Island decision Champion & Dickason v. Casey. The 
statute at issue was private legislation obtained by defendant Silas Casey. 
Casey had petitioned the Rhode Island legislature, asking that collection of the 
debts he owed be stayed for three years and "that in the meantime he be 
exempted from all arrests and attachments. "320 In February 1791, the 
legislature responded by enacting a resolution stating, "It is voted and resolved 
315. In addition to the cases discussed in this Part, in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 171 (1796), the circuit court split on the constitutionality of a federal tax statute. When 
the case went before the Supreme Court, the statute was upheld. Hylton is discussed in Part 
V, infra. 
316. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). 
317. /d. at 298-99. 
318. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). 
319. These cases have been previously discussed in Professor Goebel's history of the 
early Supreme Court. See GOEBEL, supra note 80; see also Warren, supra note 19. 
Nonetheless, despite Goebel's and Warren's work, this body of case law has been almost 
completely ignored by modem commentators on judicial review. While Vanhorne's Lessee 
is a staple of the literature, it is generally the only circuit court case discussed. Snowiss's 
work, the leading modem historical account, looks only at Vanhorne's Lessee. See, e.g., 
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20 (1793); SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 56-57, 60; see 
also SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 33, 37, 54-55. 
320. Petition of Silas Casey, quoted in Warren, supra note 19, at 27 n.27. 
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that the prayer of this petition be and the same is hereby granted."321 
British merchants Alexander Champion and Thomas Dickason brought suit 
in federal court in 1792, seeking to collect debts against Casey and two other 
Rhode Island merchants. In his plea in response, Casey asserted the 
legislature's resolution. Chief Justice Jay and District Court Judge Henry 
Marchant, the presiding judges, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The official 
record states that "it is considered by the Court that the plea of the Defendant 
[relying on the statute] is insufficient."322 Although the written judgment did 
not elaborate on the court's reasoning, contemporaneous newspaper accounts 
did, and they made clear that the court had decided that the state statute was 
without legal effect because it was at odds with the Contract Clause of the 
Federal Constitution. 323 
Strikingly, the opinion appears to have produced no critical response.324 
Indeed, the state assembly resolved that "[i]n conformity to a decision of the 
Circuit Court, [it] would not grant to any individual an exem~tion from arrests 
and attachments for his private debts, for any term of time." 25 The aftermath 
of Dickason, then, stood in marked contrast to that of Trevett, where the Rhode 
Island legislature had ousted all but one of the members of the court. This 
difference-and the response to the previously noted Rhode Island state court 
decisions rejecting the 1789 legal tender law-suggests that by the early 1790s, 
the principle of judicial review had won general acceptance, even in Rhode 
Island. 
Any analysis of the court's reasoning necessarily rests on speculation, 
given the paucity of the record. It appears, however, that the basis for the 
judgment was a straightforward application of the text of the United States 
Constitution's Contract Clause, and thus this is a case in which an invalidated 
321. Resolve of Rhode Island Legislature, quoted in Warren, supra note 19, at 27 n.27. 
322. Record in Champion and Others v. Silas Casey and Others (Ms. Case Papers, 
Circuit Court, Mass. Dist.) (on file with author). 
323. Thus, the Boston Columbian Centinel reported: 
The Court also determined in the case of Champion and Dickason against Silas Casey that 
the Legislature of a State have no right to make a Jaw to exempt an individual from arrests, 
and his estate from attachments, for his private debts, for any term of time, it being clearly a 
law impairing the obligation of contracts, and therefore contrary to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
BOSTON COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, June 20, 1792, quoted in Warren, supra note 19, at 27. The 
story in the Providence Gazette was to the same effect: 
The defendant's counsel pleaded a resolution of the State in bar of the action, by which he 
was allowed three years to pay his debts and during which he was to be free from arrests on 
that account. The Judges were unanimously of opinion that, as by the Constitution of the 
United States, the individual States are prohibited from making laws which shall impair the 
obligation of contracts, and as the resolution in question, if operative, would impair the 
obligation of the contract in question, therefore it could not be admitted to bar the action. 
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE &COUNTRY J., June 16, 1792, quoted in Warren, supra note 19, at 27. 
324. See Warren, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
325. PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., June 23, 1792, quoted in Warren, supra 
note 19, at 28. 
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statute was clearly unconstitutional. 326 
In the same year, in Hamilton v. Eaton,327 the circuit court held invalid a 
revolutionary-era North Carolina statute that confiscated loyalist contract 
claims. Hamilton, a loyalist, claimed that Article IV of the Treaty of Paris had 
invalidated the statute and revived his contract claim against Eaton. That 
Article provided, "It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no 
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all 
bona fide debts heretofore contracted. "328 
Eaton responded that the Article was irrelevant. The state statute had 
required that he pay the amount of his debt to the state treasury. Eaton had done 
so and, as a result, Hamilton was not a creditor within the meaning of the 
Treaty, since Eaton's debt to him had been legally extinguished before the 
Treaty was ratified. The argument was not frivolous: a very similar claim was 
raised in Ware v. Hylton, which will be discussed in Part V on Supreme Court 
case law, and Justice Iredell accepted it.329 Nonetheless, Judge Sitgreaves 
ignored it, and Justice Ellsworth dismissed the claim as inconsistent with the 
"design" of Article IV?30 In other words, both rejected a colorable argument 
that would have led them to uphold the statute. Both judges also found that the 
Treaty, when ratified, had invalidated the statute. As justification for this 
conclusion, Justice Ellsworth analogized the relationship between the Treaty 
and the statute to the relationship between two statutes enacted at different 
times: "[T]he maxim [is] ... the latter abrogates the former." 331 Thus, the 
result in the case did not rest on the primacy of the Federal Constitution. 
Nonetheless, both judges offered the Supremacy Clause as an alternate ground 
for establishing the superiority of the Treaty to the statute. Justice Ellsworth 
wrote: 
And in 1789 was adopted here the present constitution of the United States, 
which declared that all treaties made, or which should be made, under the 
authority of the United States, should be the supreme law of the land, and that 
326. The Contract Clause provides: "No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. It appears that the circuit court 
concluded that Casey's private legislation, by granting him a delay in paying debts that he 
was contractually obliged to pay, was, to quote the Columbian Centinel, "clearly a law 
impairing the obligation of contracts." BOSTON COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, June 20, 1792, quoted 
in Warren, supra note 19, at 27. Such a reading of the Clause as prohibiting debtor stay laws 
was not only the natural reading of the text, it was consistent with the original understanding 
of the Clause. At the same time, it is also notable that the newspaper accounts suggest that 
the court relied on only one ground of decision. The court did not, for example, conclude in 
the alternative that the state legislature, by enacting legislation effectively resolving disputes 
involving an individual, violated some conception of separation of powers. Rather, the court 
relied only on the clear textual prohibition. 
327. 11 F. Cas. 336 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792). 
328. Treaty of Peace, art. IV, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
329. See infra Part V.C. 
330. Hamilton, 11 F. Cas. at 340. 
331. /d. 
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the judges in every state should be bound thereby; anything in the constitution 
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. Surely, then, the treaty is 
now law in this state~ and the confiscation act, so far as the treaty interferes 
. h. . II d 33.t wit It, IS annu e . 
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To the extent that the very limited record provides illumination, the 
constitutional prohibition in the third case in which a federal court exercised the 
power of judicial review to invalidate a statute was not clear. In Skinner v. May, 
an unreported 1794 decision from the Circuit Court for the Massachusetts 
District, an informer sued to recover a penalty provided for by the 
Massachusetts Act of 1788 to prevent the slave trade. That statute prohibited 
Massachusetts residents and citizens from participating in the African slave 
trade.333 The plaintiff initially instituted the case in state court. It was then 
removed to federal district court, where the plaintiff prevailed. On appeal 
before Justice Cushing and Judge Lowell, the defendants raised two substantive 
arguments. First, they contended that the Act had been "repealed by the 
Constitution," and specifically by Article I, Section 8.334 Presumably, the 
reference was to the Foreign Commerce Clause, which provides that "[t]he 
Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations .... "335 Second, the defendants argued that Massachusetts did not have 
the right or authority to make criminal laws that applied to acts of citizens and 
aliens abroad. 336 The court found for the defendants. According to Professor 
Goebel, who examined the circuit court's manuscript record book, "[t]he form 
of the jud§ment indicates that it was based upon the constitutional ground 
advanced." 37 It thus appears that the statute was invalidated on Foreign 
Commerce Clause grounds. 
If this conclusion is correct, Skinner reflects an expansive reading of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause. The Clause, by its literal terms, is only a grant to 
Congress of a regulatory power, not a prohibition on state activity. Nonetheless, 
the circuit court appears to have read into that grant a broad preemptive effect. 
The state legislation was denied effect even though Congress had not 
332. /d.; see also id. at 338 (Sitgreaves, J.) ("This is evinced by that plain and strong 
expression in the constitution of the United States, which declares that all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the 
land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby; anything in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."). 
333. An Act to Prevent the Slave Trade, 1788 Mass. Acts 672. 
334. Final Record Book, Circuit Court for the Massachusetts District, 1790-99, June 
Term 1794, quoted in GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 590. The Massachusetts statute had been 
passed in March 1788, after Massachusetts had ratified the United States Constitution, but 
before the Constitution was ratified by the requisite nine states necessary for it to become 
effective. See Lance Banning, Virginia, Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING 
THE CONSTITUTION 261, 286 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989) 
(stating that Virginia became the ninth state to ratify on June 25, 1788). 
335. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
336. GoEBEL, supra note 80, at 590. 
337. /d. 
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affirmatively acted to bar states from enacting such legislation. The judgment 
would appear to rest on the conclusion that the Massachusetts statute was 
invalid simply because of its effect on foreign commerce. This broad 
conception of the federal role is particularly remarkable because the state 
legislation was connected to an area in which states had authority under the 
Federal Constitution. Before passage of the Constitution, ten states (including 
Massachusetts) had banned the importation of slaves. During the ratification 
debates, antislavery proponents of the Constitution, such as Tench Coxe, 
pressed the claim that the states would retain this authority (even though 
Congress would not be able to end the slave trade until 1808).338 The 
Massachusetts statute seemingly built on this established state power: it 
prohibited state residents and citizens from engaging abroad in an activity that 
they could not lawfully pursue in their home state-the importation of slaves. 
Perhaps because there was no published decision, Skinner appears to have 
attracted little notice. Indeed, more than a quarter century later, counsel for 
Ogden in Gibbons v. Ogden highlighted the Massachusetts statute denied effect 
in Skinner as an example of a state's permissible exercise of its power over 
commerce outside of its borders.339 Nonetheless, the case is significant because 
it appears to offer an early use of a structural approach in the context of judicial 
review of state legislation. The only way to make sense of the result is to 
conclude that Cushing and Lowell believed that, because the African slave 
trade was foreign commerce, a state could not pass legislation barring its 
citizens and residents from participating in that trade, even though there was no 
express constitutional or congressional prohibition barring such legislation. 
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,340 the next case in which a circuit court 
struck down a state statute, also reflected an expansive conception of the scope 
of federal judicial review with respect to state statutes. Unlike the two earlier 
circuit court cases, Vanhorne's Lessee appeared in a published reporter; to be 
precise, Justice Paterson's jury charge appeared in a published reporter.341 
Moreover, Paterson's discussion of judicial review was not only the most 
extensive in any of the pre-Marbury federal judicial review cases; subsequent 
citation indicates that it was also the most influential of these opinions.342 
338. See "An American" [Tench Coxe], Virginia's Power Under the Constitution and 
the Dangers of Failing To Ratify: Advice from a Respectful Countryman, in 2 THE DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION 451, 454 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (1788); General William Heath, 
On Slavery: Speech Before Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, in I id. at 915. For further 
discussion, see James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient": Justifying a Pros/avery 
Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 2023, 2047-48 (1996). 
339. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 137 (1824). 
340. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). 
341. Dallas's report of the case appeared in 1798; a pamphlet version had appeared in 
1796. See GoEBEL, supra note 80, at 590 n.177. 
342. For example, Justice Chase initially reserved the question whether judicial review 
of congressional legislation was legitimate. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 387, 392 
(1798) (Chase, J.); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.); see 
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At issue in Vanhorne's Lessee were competing Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania titles to land that had, by the time of the case, been determined to 
be in Pennsylvania pursuant to an agreement between the two states.343 
Vanhorne's title was traced back to the Penn family; Dorrance's title was 
initially derived from Connecticut.344 Because the land was in Pennsylvania, 
however, the critical question was whether a 1787 Pennsylvania quiet title 
statute designed to vest property in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, in 
Connecticut (rather than Pennsylvania) claimants was constitutional under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.345 The secondary constitutional question was 
whether the subsequent suspending and repealing acts-statutes that overturned 
the 1787 statute-violated the Federal Constitution. 346 Justices Paterson and 
Peters participated in the case and, after a fifteen-day trial, Justice Paterson 
issued the jury charge. He instructed the jury that the 1787 statute was 
unconstitutional under the state constitution, that the subsequent statutes did not 
violate the Federal Constitution, and that the jurors should find for the 
plaintiff. 34 7 
In developing the argument for judicial review, Paterson framed the 
appropriateness of judicial invalidation by offering a series of easy cases, a 
technique Marshall was to employ in Marbury. Paterson contrasted law in the 
United States and England, observing that "every state in the Union has its 
also infra Part V (discussing these cases). When he eventually embraced judicial review in 
an 1800 grand jury charge, he invoked Paterson's opinion as justification. See Justice 
Samuel Chase, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of 
Pennsylvania (Apr. 12, 1800), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 408, 412 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) [hereinafter DHSC]; see 
also id. at 412 n.5 (noting citation in margin to Justice Paterson). In his opinion in Marbury, 
Chief Justice Marshall drew on Paterson's phrasing in Vanhorne's Lessee. Compare 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (concluding that "an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void," that this is a "fundamental" principle, and 
that "[i]t is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject"), with 
Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 309 ("The constitution is the basis of legislative 
authority . . . . It is an important principle, which, in the discussion of questions of the 
present kind, ought never to be lost sight of, that the judiciary in this country is not a 
subordinate, but co-ordinate, branch of government."). See also SNOWISS, supra note 9, at 
112 (noting that the phrase "to be lost sight of' in Marbury was "taken directly" from 
Vanhorne's Lessee, and the structure of Marbury-with its use of easy cases to illustrate the 
importance of judicial review before overturning a statute not facially inconsistent with the 
Constitution--echoes Vanhorne's Lessee). When Pennsylvania Chief Justice Gibson wrote 
his classic attack on judicial review-his dissent in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 
344 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting)-he highlighted two cases as the leading defenses of 
judicial review: Marbury and Vanhorne's Lessee. See Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 346. 
343. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 335-36 (1950). 
344. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 304-05. 
345. For discussion ofthe statute, see id. at 316-18. 
346. /d. at 319-20. 
347. /d. at 304, 320. 
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constitution reduced to written exactitude and precision."348 He then quoted the 
clauses of the state bill of rights concerning religious establishment, freedom of 
religion, and election by ballot, and asked: "Could the legislature have annulled 
these articles, respecting religion, the rights of conscience, and elections by 
ballot? Surely no."349 
The question before him, however, was not easy. It was whether the 
legislature "had ... authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his 
freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just compensation."350 Unlike in 
the hypothetical cases raised by Paterson, the relevant state constitution did not 
clearly bar such legislative acts. While Pennsylvania had a just compensation 
provision in its 1790 constitution, the challenged statute had been passed (and 
repealed) when the 1776 constitution had been in effect, and that constitution 
had no such provision. Justice Paterson's charge does not address the 
implication that the revision suggests that there was no constitutional right to 
compensation before the later constitution was adopted; indeed, the charge does 
not even acknowledge the constitutional change with respect to compensation. 
The constitutional provisions on which he focused were the guarantees of an 
inherent and inalienable right to property and, to a lesser extent, the jury trial 
right. 
Justice Paterson reads the right to compensation into the constitutional 
guarantee "[t]hat all men ... have certain natural, inherent and unalienable 
rights, amongst which are . . . acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property .... "351 He stated: 
The legislature ... had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his 
freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just compensation. It is 
inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice and moral rectitude; it is 
incompatible with the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary 
to the principles of social alliance, in every free government; and lastly, it is 
contrary both to the letter and spirit of the constitution. In short, it is what 
every one would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case.352 
At one level, Paterson is appealing here to the text of the state constitution. 
He grounds his argument in a specific provision and claims that uncompensated 
takings are "contrary ... to the letter ... of the constitution." Yet Paterson's 
argument is not premised on close reading of the text. He does not, for 
example, probe the precise nature of the right in "protecting property" or 
discuss how the challenged legislation violates that right. My point here is not 
that Justice Paterson could not have made such an argument; it is that he did 
not. The focus of his methodological approach is different. In the discussion of 
348. /d. at 308. 
349. /d. at 309. 
350. /d. at 310. 
351. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I (1776). 
352. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310 (footnote omitted). 
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the right to compensation, Paterson, having established that the fundamental 
right to property is embodied in the state constitution, is principally concerned 
with what the fundamental right is, rather than with its precise embodiment in 
constitutional text. He appeals to "principles of reason, justice and moral 
rectitude," to "the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind," and "to the 
principles of social alliance."353 Significantly, like Virginia's judges, he 
appeals to the constitutional "spirit" as well as the text. Text is a critical 
factor-Paterson's argument is premised on the existence of text embodying 
the particular right-but text is not the focus of the interpretative approach. 
Having established that property could be taken only with compensation, 
Justice Paterson turned to the question of whether the compensation provided 
under the act was adequate. The act provided that, if it caused individuals to be 
divested of property that was ri~htfully theirs, a board of property would award 
them land of equivalent value.3 4 Paterson's analytic approach here was similar 
to the one he had adopted with respect to the fundamental question whether the 
legislature could take without compensation. The relevant constitutional 
provision was the one guaranteeing a jury trial right: "That in controversies 
respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right 
to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred."355 Paterson did not analyze 
whether the legislative action was a "controvers[y]" within the meaning of the 
constitution or whether there was a right to a jury trial, even though the 
constitution used the word "ought," rather than the inflexible "shall." Instead, 
he again turned to fundamental principles: 
The interposition of a jury is ... a constitutional guard upon property, and a 
necessary check to legislative authority. It is a barrier between the individual 
and the legislature, and ought never to be removed; as long as it is preserved, 
the rights of private property will be in no da?fer of violation, except in cases 
of absolute necessity, or great public utility.35 
Similarly, invoking first principles, Paterson found the act unconstitutional 
because it permitted compensation in land. Paterson declared, "No just 
compensation can be made, except in money. Money is a common standard, by 
comparison with which the value of anything may be ascertained .... It is 
obvious, that if a jury pass upon the subject, or value of the property, their 
verdict must be in money."357 
Having shown the confirming act's unconstitutionality, Justice Paterson 
informed the jury that "it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or avail, than if 
it never had been made."358 He therefore devoted little attention to the 
353. /d. 
354. /d. at 313. 
355. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776). For discussion, see Vanhorne's 
Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310,312-16. 
356. !d. at 315. 
357. /d. 
358. /d. at 316. 
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argument that the suspending and repealing acts violated the Federal 
Constitution. 359 
Paterson's charge, as previously noted, is the most extensive federal court 
discussion of judicial review before Marbury and merits close scrutiny for that 
reason. It is a case in which the reasoning is premised on the existence of 
constitutional text-it is not a natural law decision, although it has been read in 
that fashion360 -but the constitutional text is understood in the light of first 
principles, and Justice Paterson's focus is much more on the principles than on 
the text. Finally, the charge reflects close federal court scrutiny of state statutes, 
although the factual situation was complex. Paterson and Peters were 
invalidating a statute that had already been repealed; the fact that the statute 
was no longer on the books mitigated the challenge to state sovereignty posed 
by the decision. Moreover, the state statute pronounced unconstitutional was 
not one that had advanced parochial interests at the expense of outsiders. 
Indeed, it accorded with a suggestion made by the commissioners of a 
federal court during the Articles of Confederation era, which had ruled that the 
land claimed by Connecticut and Pennsylvania had belonged to Pennsylvania. 
(Their resolution of the dispute had been ineffective; the disagreement was 
subsequently resolved by Connecticut and Pennsylvania themselves.361 ) The 
commissioners had urged, however, that the claims of the individual 
Connecticut settlers be recognized.362 Thus, the circuit court was holding 
359. With respect to the former act, he noted that it had been passed in 1788: "This act 
was passed before the adoption of the constitution of the United States, and therefore, is not 
affected by it." /d. at 319. This part of the charge is conclusory. Justice Paterson did not 
explain why the Federal Constitution did not operate retroactively on this legislation, 
although the implication of his statement is that, as a general matter, the Constitution did not 
operate retroactively. 
Because the repealing act had been passed in 1790, Justice Paterson treated it as 
governed by the Federal Constitution, but he thought the constitutional challenge to this 
legislation insubstantial. It did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the process of 
shifting title to the Connecticut settlers was incomplete when the suspending legislation went 
into effect. Paterson declared, "Other acts were necessary to be performed, but before the 
performance of them, the law was suspended and then repealed." /d. at 319-20. The Contract 
Clause claim failed because 
if the confirming act be a contract between the legislature of Pennsylvania and the 
Connecticut settlers, it must be regulated by the rules and principles which pervade and 
govern all cases of contracts; and if so, it is clearly void, because it tends, in its operation and 
consequences, to defraud the Pennsylvania claimants, who are third persons, of their just 
rights o o o o 
/d. at 320. 
360. See Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American 
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" 
Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 421, 490 (1991). The case is not among those discussed 
by Professor Sherry. 
361. See JENSEN, supra note 343, at 335-36; GoEBEL, supra note 80, at 193. 
3620 JENSEN, supra note 343, at 336; GoEBEL, supra note 80, at 193 n.210. Jensen 
states that the commissioners were acting in their official capacity; Goebel convincingly 
argues that they were making their recommendation as private citizens. 
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unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that had the consequence of benefiting 
Connecticut settlers, while discriminating against the state's own settlers. As a 
result, the decision did not, as a factual matter, undercut a state's exercise of its 
authority to benefit state citizens. 
In his charge, Paterson stated that he hoped the case would be brought 
before the Supreme Court: "The great points on which the cause turns, are of a 
legal nature; they are questions of law; and therefore, for the sake of the parties, 
as well as for my own sake, they ought to put in a train for ultimate 
adjudication by the supreme court."363 It may be that Paterson envisioned 
Vanhorne's Lessee as a perfect test case from a political vantage point for his 
philosophy of judicial review: one in which the Supreme Court could exercise 
strong oversight over state legislation, but in a context in which the actual 
decision would not undercut state interests. If Paterson had such hopes, they 
were not realized. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case without 
issuing an opinion on the merits,364 but the case was nonetheless important 
because Paterson's charge became prominent and is a leading example of the 
strong conception of judicial review of legislation (and state legislation in 
particular). 
Two years after Vanhorne's Lessee, in United States v. Villato,365 the 
circuit court again struck down a Pennsylvania state statute. Mr. Villato366 had 
been charged with treason against the United States because in 1794, while 
employed on a French privateer, he had participated in the capture of the John, 
a United States vessel. In his habeas proceeding, he claimed he could not be 
prosecuted for treason because he was not a United States citizen.367 By birth a 
Spanish citizen, Villato had taken an oath of citizenship in 1793 pursuant to a 
Pennsylvania naturalization statute, but he claimed that this statute was 
unconstitutional under the state's 1790 constitution and that he had therefore 
remained a Spanish citizen. 
The published report does not record the prosecution's defense of the 
statute's constitutionality in any detail-it simply notes that the Government 
responded to Villato's challenge with the claim that the 1789 statute "was not 
affected by the establishment of the new state constitution"368 -but the hurdles 
363. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 304. 
364. The case was docketed in the Supreme Court in August 1796 and then continued 
five times. In February 1799, the defendant in error moved that the writ of error be 
nonprossed because the plaintiff in error had not appeared-for reasons that are not clear. 
That Term, the Court dismissed the case. See I DHSC, supra note 342, at 296, 306, 308, 
309,314,316,508-09. 
365. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797). 
366. According to the unpublished court records, the defendant's name was "Billato." 
See GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 591 n.179. The published opinions report his name with the 
spelling used in the text. 
367. Villato, 2 U.S.(2 Dall.) at 370. 
368. !d. 
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Villato confronted in making his constitutional claim are clear from his 
attorneys' arguments. The challenged statute had been enacted while the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was in effect. That constitution had a 
provision regulating naturalization, and Villato did not claim that the 1789 
statute was unconstitutional when enacted. 369 While the 1790 constitution in 
effect at the time of the case did not have a naturalization provision, it provided 
that "all laws of this commonwealth, in force at the time of making [this 
constitution] ... and not inconsistent therewith ... shall continue as if [the 
constitution] had not been made."370 Moreover, the circuit court had held two 
years earlier in Collett v. Colletf71-a case involving a challenge to the 1789 
Pennsylvania statute as unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution-that 
the Pennsylvania statute was constitutional because the state and federal 
government had concurrent naturalization powers. 
Against this background, Villato made the argument that, because the 1790 
constitution was adopted shortly after Congress had passed a naturalization 
statute, "the state convention . . . by omitting to prescribe any state mode of 
naturalization [left] the subject implicitly to the rules which congress had 
previously prescribed."372 The defense further argued that the savings 
provision of the 1790 constitution-which preserved laws "not inconsistent" 
with that constitution-did not preserve the 1789 statute because the 1789 
statute gave new citizens full rights after one year whereas the 1790 state 
constitution established a two-year residency requirement for the vote and a 
longer period for those seeking elective office.373 
While colorable, Villato's arguments were at the same time far from 
compelling. The tension between statute and state constitution was only-by 
his own recognition-"implicit," and the same statute had just been upheld 
against a related federal constitutional challenge. Moreover, whereas he used 
the different residency requirements of the state constitution and the statute to 
argue against the latter's constitutionality, in practice the statute had been given 
a narrowing construction in the wake of the new state constitution, so that the 
residency requirements under both were the same and the tension resolved.374 
369. For the relevant constitutional provision, see PA. CONST. of 1776, § 42. For 
discussion, see Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 372. 
370. PA. CONST. of 1790. For discussion, see Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 372-73. 
371. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792). While the Supreme Court issued a writ of 
error, the case was not heard because petitioner discontinued the writ. See 6 DHSC, supra 
note 342, at 29. 
372. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 371-72. 
373. /d. at 372. 
374. See id. at 372-73 ("If, then, the act of assembly is in force, an alien, naturalized 
under it, having the rights of the old, is in a situation preferable to a natural-born citizen 
under the accumulative restraints of the new constitution. But a contrary construction has 
been given whenever the point was directly presented for consideration (which was not the 
case in Collet v. Collet) by the legislature, by our courts, and by the bar."). These sentences 
from the defense argument indicate that the statute had been given a narrowing 
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Nonetheless, Judge Peters and Justice Iredell, the two judges considering 
the case, both ruled in favor of the defendant and treated the case as 
unproblematic. Judge Peters observed: 
The act of assembly is obviously inconsistent with the existing constitution of 
the state; and therefore, cannot be saved by the general provision of the 
schedule annexed to it. On that ground only, my opinion is formed; but it is 
sufficient to authorize a declaration, that the [naturalization] proceeding before 
the mayor was, ipso facto, void; that, the prisoner is not a citizen of the United 
State; and that, consequently, he must be released from the charge of high 
treason.375 
In a slightly lengthier opinion, Justice Iredell ftrst touched on the federal 
constitutional issue. He stated: 
[l]f the question had not previously occurred, I should be disposed to think, 
that the power of naturalization operated exclusively, as soon as it was 
exercised by congress. But the circumstances of the case now before the court, 
render it unnecessary to inquire into the relative jurisdictions of the state and 
federal govemments."376 
He thus reserves the federal constitutional question, even as he indicates that, if 
the federal constitutional issue were one of ftrst impression, he would have 
reached a different result from that reached in Collett (though he did not 
mention the earlier case by name). He then disposed of the state court claim in 
a sentence: 
The only act of naturalization suggested, depends upon the existence or non-
existence of a law of Pennsylvania; and it is plain, that upon the abolition of 
the old constitution of the state, the law became inconsistent with the 
provisions of the new constitution, and of course3 ceased to exist, long before 
the supposed act of naturalization was performed. 77 
These opinions reflect a similar approach to the question of state 
constitutional law. They both ftnd it clear that the state statute and the state 
constitution are inconsistent. Peters ftnds the inconsistency "obvious[]"; Iredell 
terms it "plain." As indicated above, however, any inconsistency between the 
statute and the constitution is far from apparent. The two opinions then suggest 
that a statute can be "plain[ly ]" unconstitutional even if close legal reasoning is 
necessary to reveal the unconstitutionality. This point should be highlighted. 
Contrary to Kramer's reading-in which "plain[ly]" is treated as synonymous 
with "blatantly"378-Iredell's usage-and Peters' usage of "obvious[]"-was 
different. "[P]lain" and "obvious[]" connote the best reading of the constitution, 
rather than a reading in which only a "blatantly" unconstitutional statute is 
"construction" under which foreign-born naturalized citizens were treated the same as 
United States citizens who had become Pennsylvania residents. 
375. /d. at 372. 
376. ld. at 372-73. 
377. /d. at 373. 
378. See KRAMER, supra note 6, at 103. 
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void. 
These opinions also reflect an unwillingness to search for a way to preserve 
a statute-at least when the statute preceded the adoption of the current 
constitution. As noted, Pennsylvania practice had been to limit the statute in a 
way that rendered it consistent with the state constitution. The court in Villato 
did not pursue that approach. 
Finally, Justice Iredell's dicta regarding the federal constitutional question 
suggests a lack of deference to state statutes when those statutes implicate 
national concerns. The relevant constitutional clause simply provided, ''The 
Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization .... "379 The court in Collett had offered textual and structural 
reasons for not reading this as an exclusive power.380 Iredell, in contrast, was 
raising doubts about the Pennsylvania statute's constitutionality under the 
Federal Constitution, even though the state statute plausibly could be defended 
(and was supported by governing precedent). 
The next circuit court decision to invalidate a state statute came, like 
Vanhorne's Lessee, from Justice Paterson. Pettibone (ex dem the Selectmen of 
Manchester) concerned a 1794 Vermont statute that had expropriated lands 
previously given to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and 
authorized town selectmen to take glebe lands-earlier set aside for the support 
of the Church of England-and to lease them to provide funds for teachers .. 381 
Under the statute, Pettibone had brought an ejectment action against a 
Reverend Barber. Although the record here is very limited, a local paper stated 
that Justice Paterson "'adjudged"' the statute to be unconstitutional.382 The 
Church Review reported a little more than fifty years later that Paterson was 
379. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
380. The circuit court in Collett v. Collett, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792), 
noted: 
The objection founded on the word uniform, and the arguments ab. inconvenienti, have been 
carried too far. It is, likewise, declared by the Constitution (art. I. s. 8.) that all duties, 
imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; and yet, if express words 
of exclusion had not been inserted, as in a subsequent part of the same article (s. 10.) the 
individual States would still, undoubtedly, have been at liberty, without the consent of 
Congress, to Jay and collect duties and impost~. Again;-when, it is said, that one State ought 
not to be privileged to admit obnoxious citizens, to the injury of another, it should be 
recollected, that the State which communicates the infection, must herself be first infected; 
and in this, as in all other cases, we may be assured, that the principle of self-preservation 
will inculcate every reasonable precaution. 
/d. at 296 (emphasis in original). 
381. See Goebel, supra note 80, at 591-92. 
382. See id. (quoting Farmer's Museum, or Lay Preacher's Gazette, Apr. 29, 1799 
(Walpole, N.H.)). The November 9, 1798, Philadelphia Aurora suggested that Paterson left 
the question of constitutionality to the jury (and apparently criticized him for not having 
done the same in the Lyons case). See 3 DHSC, supra note 342, at 236 n.24. As Professor 
Goebel has pointed out, it seems unlikely that Justice Paterson would have left the matter to 
the jury, since he treated constitutionality as a question for the court in Vanhorne. See 
GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 592 n.l86. 
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reported as having said "'that legislatures are not omnipotent. They cannot take 
this man's property and give it to that man."'383 
Although the evidence is not complete enough to say with certainty, it 
appears-particularly in light of the Church Review statement-that Justice 
Paterson struck down the Vermont statute under the Vermont takings clause. 
The Church Review statement suggests that in Pettibone, as in Vanhorne's 
Lessee, the critical issue in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute was 
whether a state could constitutionally take property from one person and give it 
to another. In Pettibone, there was a takings clause in the state constitution. 
Vermont's takings clause provided that "whenever any particular man's 
property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an 
equivalent in money."384 Judicial invalidation in Pettibone would thus have a 
clear textual basis, in contrast to Vanhorne, where the state constitution had no 
such clause. 
The final pre-Marbury circuit court case in which a state statute was held 
void was the 1802 decision Ogden v. Witherspoon.385 North Carolina had 
passed three acts governing the statute of limitations for filing contract claims 
against estates. An act of 1715 provided that claims would be barred if not 
brought within seven years. 386 An act of 1789 provided that claims would be 
barred if not brought within two years (or within three years if the creditor was 
not a North Carolina resident). This second act, however, had a tolling 
provision, providing that the statute of limitations would not run if the creditor 
suffered from a disability. It also contained the following clause: "That all laws 
and parts of laws, that come within the meaning and purview of this act, are 
hereby declared void, and of no effect."387 Finally, in 1799, the legislature 
enacted a statute providing that "the act of 1715 hath continued and shall 
continue to be in force. "388 The issue in the case was whether the 1799 statute 
violated the North Carolina Constitution's separation of powers clause by 
purporting to determine that the 1715 statute had at all times been good law. 
Although the facts of the case receive little attention in the report of the 
opinion, it appears that Ogden was a contracts suit between two estates that 
turned on whether the seven-year statute of limitations in the 1715 act served as 
an upper limit on the tolling period for disabilities established under the 1789 
act. The defendant-debtor appears to have taken the position that the 1799 
statute established that the 1715 statute had always remained in effect. As a 
383. GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 592 (quoting 4 CHURCH REV. & ECCLESIASTICAL REG. 
587 (1852)). 
384. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. II ( 1786). On the origins of the Vermont clause, see William 
Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALEL.J. 694, 701-04 (1985). 
385. 18 F. Cas. 618 (C.C.D.N.C. 1802). 
386. /d. 
387. /d. (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting 1789 act). 
388. /d. at 619. 
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result, the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff-creditor's claim 
sometime before 1799 because, despite the fact that the plaintiff-creditor was 
under a disability, more than seven years had elapsed from the accrual of the 
cause of action. The plaintiff-creditor appears to have argued that, between 
1789 and 1799, the statute of limitations was tolled for those under disabilities 
and that the claim had not lapsed. 389 
The defendant-debtor's position that the 1715 and 1789 statutes could be 
read together to establish a seven-year statute of limitations on claims brought 
by those under disabilities was one that appears to have had substantial force. 
Not only did the 1799 statute apparently reflect legislative acceptance of that 
position, but the reporter's note also indicates that some state court judges 
"held the act of 1715 not to have been repealed by that of 1789."390 (The note 
does not indicate whether the state court decision preceded or followed Ogden, 
and Ogden makes no mention of the state decision.) Finally, before being 
appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Iredell, in his 1791 compilation of 
North Carolina laws, included the 1715 statute without declaring it to be 
"repealed or obsolete," which suggests that he believed that it continued to be 
in force to some extent.391 Nonetheless, both District Judge Potter and Chief 
Justice Marshall ruled in favor of the plaintiff-creditor. 
Potter's opinion is brief, and it is conclusory on the issue of judicial 
review. He simply declared, "The act of 1799, declaring the act of 1715 not to 
have been repealed, and to have continued in force, has not the effect of making 
that act to have been in force after it was repealed, till re-enacted."392 
Marshall found that the 1799 statute violated the state's separation of 
powers clause, which provided "'that the legislative, executive, and supreme 
judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from 
each other. "'393 This provision had been violated because "the matter decided 
by [the 1799 statute], namely, whether the act of 1789 be a rereal of the 9th 
section of 1715, is a judicial matter, and not a legislative one."39 Marshall thus 
seems to have been proceeding in the same way as many of the state court 
389. I think that these arguments necessarily underlie the case. The plaintiff-creditor 
was seeking to have the court invalidate the 1799 statute's declaration that the 1715 statute 
was at all times in effect. Only a creditor under a disability would prefer the regime 
established by the 1789 statute to that established by the 1715 (and 1799) statute. It appears 
that the plaintiff-creditor was a British subject who had been barred from bringing suit under 
North Carolina law until 1787, and this would have been the relevant disability. See id. at 
618 (Potter, J.); id. at 619 (Marshall, C.J.). 
390. /d. at 619 (Reporter's Note). 
391. See id. Chief Justice Marshall notes the argument that inclusion in Justice 
Iredell's compilation suggests that Iredell believed that statute to be in force. Marshall did 
not contest the accuracy of this reading of Iredell's position; rather, he simply explained why 
he thought that the 1789 statute had repealed the 1715 statute. See id. 
392. /d. at 618 (Potter, J.). 
393. /d. at 619 (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS§ 4 (1776)). 
394. /d. 
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judges in this period: he determined that a function traditionally engaged in by 
legislatures was judicial and, relying on open-ended constitutional text, he 
invalidated it. 
Marshall also opined, apparently in dicta, that the 1799 statute "seems ... 
to be void for another reason": it violated the Federal Contract Clause.395 
Observing that the Contract Clause barred state statutes impairing contracts, 
Marshall asked, "[W]ill it not impair this obligation, if a contract which, at the 
time of passing the act of 1789, might be recovered on by the creditor, shall by 
the operation of the act of 1799, be entirely deprived of his remedy?"396 Except 
for the fact that he was reaching for a constitutional issue not presented, 
Marshall was not acting aggressively here. He was simply reading the Contract 
Clause to mean that a state cannot enact legislation that operates retroactively 
to bar valid contractual causes of action. 397 
B. Review of Congressional Statutes Affecting the Judicial Role: Rayburn's 
Case and United States v. Ravara 
Rayburn's Case398 was a landmark in the history of judicial review and 
was recognized as such at the time. In 1800, when in Cooper v. Telfai?99 the 
Supreme Court was considering a challenge to a state statute on state 
constitutional grounds, Justice Chase in the course of oral argument observed 
that "there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point" 
whether a congressional statute could be held unconstitutional, but also noted, 
"It is ... a general opinion, it is expressly admitted by all this bar, and some of 
the Judges have, individually, in the Circuits, decided, that the Supreme Court 
can declare an act of congress to be unconstitutional .... "400 He was referring 
to Rayburn's Case, the first case in which Supreme Court Justices concluded 
that a congressional statute was unconstitutional. 
At issue in Rayburn's Case was the Invalid Pensions Act, adopted in 
1792.401 Under the Act, applicants for pensions were to appear before the 
395. /d. 
396. /d. 
397. One final case in which the circuit court reviewed a state statute for 
constitutionality should be noted. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), the circuit 
court determined by a two-to-one vote that a Virginia confiscation statute was not rendered 
invalid by the Supremacy Clause. The Supreme Court reversed. For discussion, see infra 
Part V.A. 
398. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408,409 (1792). 
399. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800). 
400. /d. at 19. 
401. Invalid Pensions Act, Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243-245 (1792). The 
case is discussed at length and with great insight in an important headnote in the 
Documentary History of the Supreme Court, see 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 33-45, and in 
Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. 
L. REV. 527. 
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circuit court. If the circuit court found an individual eligible, it would inform 
the Secretary of War. The Secretary could then put the person on the pension 
list. But, if he decided that there was "cause to suspect imposition or mistake," 
he could decide not to put the person on the pension list and inform Congress 
of that action.402 The statute had implications both for the judicial role and for 
judicial independence of oversight by the political branches. 
Before any claimant came forward, the Circuit Court for New York (Chief 
Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and Judge Duane) concluded that, if read literally, 
the statute was unconstitutional. "[N]either the legislative nor the executive 
branches," they observed, "can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, 
but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner."403 
The statute assigned to the judiciary such nonjudicial duties because it made 
their determinations subject to review by the Secretary of War and by 
Congress. "[B]y the constitution, neither the secretary at war, nor any other 
executive officer, nor even the legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of 
errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.'.404 The court, however, 
adopted a saving construction. The judges concluded that they could sit, in their 
individual capacity, as commissioners, rather than as judges.405 They 
proceeded to consider petitions in this capacity.406 
Shortly thereafter, the constitutionality of the statute came before a circuit 
court in an actual case. When William Hayburn filed for a pension in the 
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, Justices Wilson and Blair and 
Judge Peters decided not to consider that application. Although they did not 
issue an opinion, the judges gave their opinion orally on April 11, 1792.407 The 
result promptly produced a debate on the floor of the House. The General 
Advertiser, a Philadelphia newspaper, reported, "This being the ftrst instance, 
in which a court of justice had declared a law of Congress to be 
unconstitutional, the novelty of the opinion produced a variety of opinions with 
respect to the measures to be taken on the occasion.'.40S Some members of the 
House raised the possibility of impeachment, but no motion to that effect was 
made.409 A House committee, which included James Madison, was appointed 
to report on the matter, but its report was simply a brief statement of facts. 410 In 
402. Invalid Pensions Act§ 4; see also Haybum 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 412. 
403. Haybum 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410. 
404. ld. 
405. /d. 
406. See, e.g., 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 373-74 (discussing judges sitting as 
"commissioners" and considering the petition ofYa1e Todd). 
407. See GEN. ADVERTISER, Apr. 13, 1792, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 48 
(providing Congressman Boudinot's account of decision to the House). 
408. /d. 
409. NAT'L GAZETTE, Apr. 23, 1792, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 56-57. 
410. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(Apr. 18, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 52. 
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a private letter to Virginia Governor Henry Lee, Madison wrote of the power of 
judicial review that "evidence of its existence gives inquietude to those who do 
not wish congress to be controuled or doubted whilst its proceedings 
correspond with their views. "411 While noting the talk of impeachment, 
Chancellor Pendleton wrote Madison that the decision "seem[s] [to] give Gen. 
pleasure.'412 
One week after deciding the case, Justices Wilson and Blair and Judge 
Peters wrote a letter to President Washington explaining the two grounds for 
their decision. They wrote: 
I. Because the business directed by this Act is not of a judicial nature: it 
forms no part of the power vested, by the Constitution, in the Courts of the 
United States: The Circuit Court must, consequently have proceeded without 
constitutional authority. 
2. Because, if, upon that business, the Court had proceeded, its 
judgments-for its opinions are its judgments-might, under the same Act, 
have been revised an [sic] controuled by the Legislature and by an Officer in 
the Executive Department. Such revision and controul we deemed radically 
inconsistent with the Independence of that judicial power, which is vested in 
the Courts, and, consequently, with that important principle which is so 
strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States.413 
To some extent, the reasoning echoes that in the New York Circuit Court's 
letter to Washington, but the two grounds-that the Act called on the court to 
exercise nonjudicial powers and that it impermissibly made the court's ruling 
subject to nonjudicial oversight-were analytically linked in the New York 
Circuit Court's letter, whereas here they are treated separately. More 
importantly, the reasoning in the second point echoes that in Case of the Judges 
and Kamper. Opinions in those cases had stressed the need for judicial 
independence as the basis for the result. The same is true here. The court noted, 
"Independence of [the] judicial power, which is vested in the Courts [is an] ... 
important princi~le which is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the 
United States.'4 4 Thus, the three most extensive decisions invalidating statutes 
implicating judicial matters all touch on the same theme. 
Finally, the Circuit Court for North Carolina (Justice Iredell and Judge 
Sitgreaves) entered the debate. Like the New York Circuit Court, the North 
Carolina Circuit Court acted before it had heard a case, sendin~ a letter to 
President Washington that was, in effect, an advisory opinion. 15 Like the 
411. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Apr. 15, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, 
supra note 342, at 50. 
412. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Apr. 28, 1792) (underlining in 
original omitted), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 58. 
413. Letter from James Wilson, John Blair, and Richard Peters to George Washington 
(Apr. 18, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 53-54. 
414. ld. 
415. See Letter from James Iredell and John Sitgreaves to George Washington (June 8, 
1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 284-88. 
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Pennsylvania Circuit Court, the North Carolina Circuit Court highlighted the 
importance of judicial independence as a basis for its decision. It began its 
analysis: "That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments are each 
formed in a separate and independent manner ... .'416 The court strongly 
suggested that the statute violated the Constitution because it purported to 
authorize courts to exercise a "[p]ower not in its nature Judicial.'417 It 
decisively stated that, regardless of "whether the power in question is properly 
of a Judicial nature," the statute's provision that the court's determinations 
concerning pensions could be overturned by the Secretary of War or by 
Congress was "unwarranted by the Constitution."418 The court left open the 
possibility that it might eventually conclude that judges could, in their 
individual capacity, hear pension claims, thus saving the statute. It was not, 
however, optimistic: "[W]e confess we have great doubts on this head."419 
Hayburn brought his case to the Supreme Court. Before the Court heard the 
case, five of the six Justices of the Court had taken the position in the letters 
just quoted that the statute was, on a plain reading, unconstitutional. Shortly 
thereafter, while riding circuit, Thomas Johnson, the last Justice, refused to 
consider pension petitions because "this Court cannot constitutionally take 
Cognixance" of them.420 Thus, all six Justices were of the view that on a plain 
reading the statute was unconstitutional. They seem, however, to have been 
split evenly on whether a saving construction, under which the judges could act 
in their individual capacity, was possible.421 It appears that, rather than 
affirming by an equally divided bench the Pennsylvania Circuit Court's 
invalidation of the statute, the Court decided to delay to see if Congress would 
respond to the constitutional concerns that had been raised and repeal the 
Invalid Pensions Act.422 In 1793, Congress repealed the 1792 Act, rendering 
416. /d. at 284. 
417. /d. at 286 (emphasis omitted). 
418. /d. 
419. /d. at 286-87. The following year, however, Justice Iredell decided to hear 
pension claims in his individual capacity. He stood by his initial determination that judges 
acting as judges "cannot constitutionally exercise the authority in question." James Iredell, 
Reasons for Acting as a Commissioner on the Invalid Act, (Sept. 26, 1792), reprinted in 6 
DHSC, supra note 342, at 288. Reading the statute as empowering judges to act in their 
individual capacity was "not an obvious construction." /d. It was warranted, however, 
because the text could be read in this way and because it should be assumed that Congress 
acted in a constitutionally permissible fashion. See id. at 290-91. 
420. Extract from the Minutes of the United States Circuit Court for the District of 
South Carolina (Oct. 26, 1972), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 70. 
421. See 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 39 (analyzing vote count). Justices Cushing, Jay, 
and Iredell had heard petitions in their individual capacity. Justices Wilson, Blair, and 
Thomas had not. 
422. This theory is convincingly advanced in The Documentary History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. /d. When the Court was first presented with Haybum's 
Case by Attorney General Randolph, it concluded by an equally divided vote that he could 
not proceed without explicit direction from the President. For analysis, see Marcus & Teir, 
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Rayburn's Case moot and removing the Court's dilemma.423 
supra note 401, at 534-41. 
423. 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 40-41. The Invalid Pensions Act of 1793 sought to 
address the concerns raised by the circuit courts by providing that the district court judge 
(presumably acting in his individual capacity) or his designees were to gather evidence and 
send a list of claimants to the Secretary of War, who would forward a statement of the cases 
to Congress, who would make the final pension determinations. The 1793 Act, however, also 
required the Attorney General to seek a determination from the Supreme Court whether the 
decisions made by judges acting as commissioners were valid. See id. This requirement led, 
in turn, to two cases that are sometimes claimed to be early judicial review cases: Ex Parte 
Chandler and United States v. Yale Todd. For the claim that Ex Parte Chandler was a 
judicial review case, see Gordon E. Sherman, The Case of John Chandler v. The Secretary of 
War, 14 YALE L.J. 431 (1904-05) (arguing that Chandler involved the exercise of judicial 
review). For the claim that Yale Todd was such a case, see Wilfrid J. Ritz, United States v. 
Yale Todd (U.S. 1794), 15 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 220 (1958). 
It seems clear, however, that Chandler did not involve judicial invalidation of a statute. 
Justice Iredell and Judge Law, sitting as commissioners, had approved John Chandler's 
pension application, but the Secretary of War had not authorized the pension. In Ex Parte 
Chandler, the veteran sought a mandamus directing the Secretary of War to award him a 
pension. See 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 41-42 (setting forth the case's history). The 
Supreme Court ruled against him, but the record does not reveal the reasoning. See Extract 
from the Minutes of the Supreme Court (Feb. 14, 1794), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 
342, at 295. Thus, the reason for the decision is a matter of speculation. As the editors of the 
Documentary History of the Supreme Court point out, however, the fact that the day after its 
decision in Ex Parte Chandler, the Court heard a second test case-Yale Todd-suggests 
that Chandler's claim was likely rejected for reasons peculiar to his case (such as failure of 
proof of his injuries) rather than because the 1792 Act was deemed invalid. See 6 DHSC, 
supra note 342, at 42-43. 
The question whether Yale Todd was one in which a statute was, in part, held 
unconstitutional is a tougher one. Todd, unlike Chandler, had been awarded a pension under 
the 1792 Act. Justices Jay and Cushing, sitting as commissioners, had decided on his behalf, 
and the Secretary of War had put him on the pension list. Yale Todd was thus a suit brought 
by the United States to recover monies paid to the veteran. The Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of the United States, but we have no record of its reasoning. See Extract from the Minutes of 
the Supreme Court (Feb. 17, 1794 ), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 380-81. Thus, 
Professor Ritz has argued that the Court must have ruled against Todd on the grounds that 
the 1792 Act was invalid. See Ritz, supra. It may also have been the case, however, that the 
Court ruled on the statutory grounds that the 1792 Act did not empower circuit court judges 
to sit as commissioners. As the Documentary History editors note, after Yale Todd, Congress 
and the Attorney General acted to allow petitioners whose claims had been authorized under 
the 1792 Act by district court judges to receive pensions, but not petitioners whose claims 
had been authorized by circuit court judges. See 6 DHSC, supra note 342, at 44-45. They 
conclude from this that Yale Todd was decided on statutory grounds. See id. at 44; see also 
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 53 (1851) (Note of Chief Justice Taney, 
Inserted by Order of the Court) (noting that Yale Todd involved statutory construction). This 
is a possibility, but not a certainty. Before Yale Todd, the six Justices had uniformly 
concluded that circuit judges, sitting as circuit judges, could not review pension claims. 
Allowing them to sit in their individual capacity had been offered as a saving construction to 
prevent a holding that the statute was unconstitutional. The decision in Yale Todd meant that 
the Court rejected the saving construction. Taken together, the various decisions on the 1792 
Act and Yale Todd meant that the 1792 Act was unconstitutional as it applied to circuit 
judges. The only question is whether the Court in Yale Todd drew this connection-in which 
case it would have held the 1792 Act partially invalid-or refrained from discussing the 
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Hayburn's Case is particularly important for two reasons. First, it shows 
that in 1792, every Supreme Court Justice was ready to hold a congressional 
statute invalid. Second, the reasons that the Justices all considered the 1792 Act 
unconstitutional were broad structural concerns-their conception of the 
judicial role, their belief that their actions could not be subject to review by the 
Executive or Congress, their overarching concern with judicial independence-
rather than because of clearly expressed textual mandates. Despite the fact that 
the Justices' view of the statute was uniform, their view of the Constitution was 
very debatable. For example, while accepting the existence of the power of 
judicial review, Madison thought that the Justices "may be wrong in the 
exertion of their power."424 Professor Mark Tushnet has persuasively argued 
that, under modern case law, the statutory scheme set forth in the 1792 Act 
would pass muster.425 In sum, in the very first case in which members of the 
Court grappled with the question whether a congressional statute was 
unconstitutional, they did not limit themselves to whether the statute was 
clearly unconstitutional, but considered the question in light of broad principles 
concerning the judicial role and judicial independence. 
United States v. Ravara426 involved the prosecution of a consul from 
Genoa. In his defense, Ravara challenged the constitutionality of the Judiciary 
Act's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to lower federal courts in cases involving 
consul. He claimed that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution-"In all cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls . . . the Supreme 
Court shall have original jurisdiction"427 -----conferred exclusive jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court, and thus the prosecution against him could not commence 
in the circuit court.428 In brief opinions, Justices Wilson and Peters rejected this 
argument. As Justice Wilson observed, "[A]lthough the Constitution vests in 
the Supreme Court an original jurisdiction, in cases like the present, it does not 
preclude the Legislature from exercising the power of vesting a concurrent 
larger question of constitutionality. Given the records that have been discovered, the answer 
to that question is unknown. 
424. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Apr. 15, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, 
supra note 342, at 50. 
425. Mark Tushnet, Dual Office Holding and the Constitution: A View from Haybum's 
Case, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 196, 
201 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). As Tushnet points out, courts make factual determinations; 
the Secretary of War's determination that an applicant was on the list because of "imposition 
or mistake" would not have involved a revision of a determination made by the circuit court; 
and subsequent Supreme Court case law involving the court of claims indicated that a largely 
theoretical ability by Congress to deny payment would not defeat justiciability. For the case 
law, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,570 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J., announcing 
the judgment of the Court). 
426. 27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 16,122). 
427. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
428. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81 (noting that the Supreme 
Court shall have "original, but not exclusive" jurisdiction over cases involving consuls). 
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jurisdiction, in such inferior Courts, as might by law be established."429 But, in 
an equally brief opinion, Iredell disagreed: "[F]or obvious reasons of public 
policy, the Constitution intended to vest an exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court, upon all questions relating to the Public Agents of Foreign 
Nations.'430 
Iredell's opinion is striking for two reasons. First, it reflects a notably 
aggressive exercise of the power of judicial review. It is constitutional 
orthodoxy that the type of concurrent jurisdiction at issue in Ravara is 
permissible.431 While the treatment of original jurisdiction in Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in Marbury432 reflects an approach similar to Iredell's in 
Ravara, these two opinions are at odds with the subsequent jurisprudence.433 
Thus, once again, the early case law-as evidenced in Iredell's dissent as well 
as Marbury-evidences an expansive approach to judicial review when 
legislation affecting the judiciary was under challenge. Second, it is particularly 
significant that Iredell was the one adopting this approach. Iredell's nonjudicial 
writings are a principal source of the concededly unconstitutional test that 
Snowiss and Kramer see as the touchstone of the early case law.434 In Ravara, 
however, Iredell did not employ the approach he had previous~ articulated. 
Indeed, as we have seen in Hayburn's Case435 and Villato,43 Iredell took 
positions that reflected an expansive conception of judicial review. Although 
the case is not discussed in this Article (since it did not involve a finding of 
429. 27 F. Cas. at 714 (Wilson, J.). 
430. /d. (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
431. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-
International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdictions over 
Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (2004) 
("[T]he Court has long presumed that the Original Jurisdiction Clause contains no 
constitutional mandate of original jurisdiction exclusive to the Court."); see also Ames v. 
Kansas, 111 U.S. 449,469 (1884) ("[W]e are unable to say that it is not within the power of 
Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the 
Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction."); Bors v. 
Preston, Ill U.S. 252, 260 (1884) ("[W]e concur ... that as Congress was not expressly 
prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial 
tribunals ... neither public policy nor convenience would justify the court in implying such 
prohibition, and, upon such implication pronounce the Act of 1789 to be unconstitutional 
and void."). 
432. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("If it had been intended 
to leave it in the discretion of the legislature, to apportion the judicial power between the 
supreme and inferior courts, according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been 
useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals 
in which it should be vested."). On the similarities between Marbury and Iredell's opinion in 
Ravara, see Lee, supra note 431, at 1796. 
433. See Lee, supra note 431, at 1795-97 (discussing case law). 
434. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
435. See supra notes 415-19 and accompanying text. 
436. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text. 
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unconstitutionality), Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm437 also 
reflects an expansive conception of judicial review. The author of the 
concededly unconstitutional test did not always practice what he preached.438 
C. Conclusion: Neglected Evidence of Judicial Review 
This Part has analyzed the eight cases in which circuit courts found statutes 
unconstitutional and one in which one Supreme Court Justice concluded that a 
statute was unconstitutional. 
Most of these statutes involve state laws. This body of case law is one that 
has largely escaped the attention of modem scholars studying the early 
conception of judicial review. Of the seven cases in which circuit courts 
deemed state statutes unconstitutional, only two have figured in an important 
way in the literature on the original understanding of the scope of judicial 
review. The relatively high number of state statutes that were invalidated 
(seven) and the fact that, in six of these cases, the court had available to it a 
plausible way to save the statute suggest a fairly active scrutiny of state statutes 
that previous scholars have failed to see. 
437. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,433 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
Early in his opinion, Justice Iredell embraced the doctrine of judicial review: 
Upon this [congressional] authority, there is, that I know, but one limit; that is, "that they 
shall not exceed their authority." If they do, I have no hesitation to say, that any act to that 
effect would be utterly void, because it would be inconsistent with the constitution, which is 
a fundamental law paramount to all others, which we are not only bound to consult, but 
sworn to observe; and therefore, where there is an interference, being superior in obligation 
to the other, we must unquestionably obey that in preference. 
/d.; see also CURRIE, supra note 19, at 20 (stating that it was "dictum ... anticipated by ten 
years the decision in Marbury v. Madison"). While Iredell's opinion is grounded in statutory 
interpretation, he closed by suggesting that, if he had to reach the constitutional question, he 
would have found that the statute could not constitutionally authorize "a compulsive suit 
against a State for the recovery of money." See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449 (Iredell, J., 
dissenting). Justice Iredell continues: 
So much, however, has been said on the constitution, that it may not be improper to intimate, 
that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it, which will admit, under 
any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money. I think every 
word in the constitution may have its full effect without involving this consequence, and that 
nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of which I consider, 
can be found in this case), would authorize the deduction of so high a power. This opinion, I 
hold, however, with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to my sentiments in this 
case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial. 
/d. at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). As in Ravara, then, Iredell's opinion reflects a more 
aggressive conception of judicial review than that embraced by his brethren when a statute 
implicated judicial matters. 
438. In an excellent article, Professor Casto suggests that Iredell struggled with this 
inconsistency and, in recollecting Ravara two years after the decision, laid more emphasis 
on statutory interpretation as the basis of his decision than was evidenced by his published 
opinion. See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 
27 CONN. L. REV. 329, 344-45 (1995). Nonetheless, the aggressive approach to judicial 
review in Iredell's original opinion in Ravara also finds echoes in his dissent in Chisholm, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433 (Iredell, J., dissenting). For more discussion, see supra note 437. 
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Two cases surveyed here involved challenges to federal statutes. At issue 
in Rayburn's Case was the constitutionality of the 1792 Invalid Pensioners Act. 
The case shows that, by 1792, all the members of the Supreme Court were 
ready to pronounce a congressional statute unconstitutional, that one circuit 
court actually reached that result, and that members of the Supreme Court were 
employing the same broad approach that we have previously seen state courts 
employ when reviewing legislation affecting judicial matters. United States v. 
Ravara is notable because of the expansive approach to judicial review taken 
by Justice Iredell, the dissenter, in a case involving a statute establishing 
jurisdiction. 
V. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
This Part looks at the early Supreme Court cases in which at least one 
judge (either in a Supreme Court decision or at the circuit court level) 
concluded a statute was unconstitutional. While the body of opinions is small, 
the cases reflect the same basic pattern revealed by the circuit court decisions. 
This is not surprising, since the Supreme Court Justices rode circuit, and so the 
circuit decisions are in large part decisions written by Supreme Court Justices. 
The Court upheld the one substantive congressional statute that it examined, 
and it did so even though there was a very strong argument that the statute ran 
afoul of constitutional text. Arguably, in three cases, the Court determined that, 
in the wake of the Eleventh Amendment, part of the jurisdictional grant of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, although there was a plausible 
argument that the statute was constitutional as applied to the cases before the 
Court. Finally, the Court struck down a state statute that implicated national 
policy, even though there were plausible arguments in its favor. 
A. National Government Powers 
Hylton v. United States439 was, as legal historian Julius Goebel observed, 
"the first clear-cut challenge of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress to 
come before the Court."440 It was also the only case from the period covered by 
this Article in which the Court decided whether a substantive congressional 
statute (as opposed to a congressional statute concerned with jurisdiction) ran 
afoul of the Constitution. At issue was whether a tax on individual carriages 
imposed by an act of Congress was constitutional. The immediate significance 
of the case was great because, as legal historian William Casto has noted, "the 
439. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
440. GOEBEL, supra note 80, at 778. For a superb recent study of the case, see Robert 
P. Frankel, Jr., Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review, 
28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (2003). 
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government's practical ability to raise revenue was at issue."441 Attorney 
General William Bradford wrote Alexander Hamilton that the constitutional 
issue presented by the case was "the greatest one that ever came before that 
Court."442 While there was a tension between the statute and the relevant 
constitutional text, the Court upheld the statute. In reaching that result, the 
Justices placed primary weight on considerations of policy and structure, rather 
than on the words of the Constitution, and the decisions reflect deference to 
congressional will and a nationalist vision of the Constitution. 
The legal question was whether a congressional statute imposing a tax on 
individual carriages violated the constitutional requirements that "direct Taxes 
shall be a~ortioned among the several States ... according to their respective 
Numbers" 3 and that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless 
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration ... directed to be taken.'M4 
Because it was not apportioned by state but simply on each carriage, if the 
carriage tax was a "direct tax," the statute would be unconstitutional. 
The case did not admit of an easy answer. "Direct tax"-the critical term at 
issue in Hylton--did not have a clearly defined meaning. At the Constitutional 
Convention, a peffslexed Rufus King "asked what was the precise meaning of 
direct taxation?' 5 Madison, in his notes, informs us, "No one answ[ere]d.'M6 
When the carriage tax statute was debated in Congress, Madison contended that 
it was unconstitutional.447 Hamilton-who argued in support of the statute 
before the Supreme Court-thought it passed constitutional muster.448 The 
circuit court divided on the issue, with Justice Wilson, riding circuit, voting in 
favor of the statute's constitutionality, while District Judge Griffin thought it 
unconstitutional.449 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously upheld the 
statute, with Justices Iredell, Chase, and Paterson each issuing separate 
opinions. 
The attitude that the Justices took is reflected in the final paragraph of 
Chase's opinion, where he explicitly reserved the question whether the 
Supreme Court can invalidate congressional statutes, and he announced that, if 
a congressional statute is to be invalidated, it can only be "in a very clear 
441. CASTO, supra note 24, at 104. 
442. Letter from William Bradford to Alexander Hamilton (July 2, 1795), quoted in 
CASTO, supra note 24, at 105. 
443. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3. 
444. /d. art I, § 9, cl. 4. 
445. 2 RECORDS, supra note 28, at 350. 
446. /d. 
447. See CURRIE, supra note 19, at 36 n.40 (discussing Madison's arguments in 
Congress). 
448. See Alexander Hamilton's Brief, reprinted in 7 DHSC, supra note 342, at 456-64. 
449. See Letter from Cyrus Griffin to George Washington (May 23, 1796), reprinted 
in l DHSC, supra note 342, at 849; Editorial note, in 7 DHSC, supra note 342, at 364 & 
n.36. 
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case.'.4SO Chase's reservation of the judicial review issue should not be 
overemphasized-no other Supreme Court Justice in the years before Marbury 
voiced similar concerns, and, as previously noted, during the 1792 litigation 
involving the Invalid Pensioners Act, all six Justices then on the Court acted as 
if they had the power to review the constitutionality of a congressional statute. 
But Chase's embrace of a position of deference merits highlighting. This is the 
first time the "very clear case" formulation appears in a Supreme Court 
opinion,451 and Hylton is a case in which the Court's opinions can fairly be 
described as strongly deferential. As David Currie has written, "In Hylton, the 
Justices relied mostly on unverified tradition and their own conception of sound 
policy, paying little attention to the Constitution's words."452 My point here is 
not that Hylton was wrongly decided; arguments can certainly be made 
justifying the result.453 The opinions, however, reflect result orientation, rather 
than careful reasoning. The Justices were motivated by a desire to protect a 
broad scope of congressional authority in the realm of taxation. The Justices' 
commitment to a nationalist vision of the Constitution-a vision that is 
asserted, rather than defended as a matter of law-led them to uphold the 
statute. 
Justice Chase opened his opinion by highlighting the centrality of structural 
concerns to judicial review of congressional legislation and stressing deference 
to Congress: "The deliberate decision of the national legislature, (who did not 
consider a tax on carriages a direct tax, but thought it was within the 
description of a duty), would determine me, if the case was doubtful, to receive 
the construction of the legislature ... .'.454 Judicial review is thus limited in 
scope and sensitive to constraints on the judicial role. 
In stating his conclusion, Chase declared, "I am inclined to think, that a tax 
on carriages is not a direct tax, within the letter, or meaning, of the 
constitution.''455 His reasoning reflected an overarching concern with 
450. Justice Chase wrote: 
As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this time, for me 
to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of 
congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the 
constitution; but if the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise 
it, but in a very clear case. 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796). 
451. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 33. 
452. /d. 
453. For a recent, sympathetic account of the opinions in Hylton, see Bruce Ackerman, 
Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. I, 20-25 (1999). Professor Ackerman 
approvingly discusses what he calls the "rule of reason" approach that the Justices took to 
the question of what constitutes a "direct tax." /d. The editors of the Documentary History of 
the Supreme Court conclude, ''The Court's judgment affirmed that Congress could exercise 
wide latitude in its method of taxation, unhampered, to a large extent, by the Article I 
language on direct taxes." Editorial Note, in 7 DHSC, supra note 342, at 369. 
454. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173. 
455. /d. 
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protecting the national taxing power. As he writes, "The great object of the 
constitution was, to give congress a power to lay taxes adequate to the 
exigencies of government ... .'456 That larger end-the grant of the taxing 
power adequate for the needs of the national government-then shapes the way 
in which Chase construes the term "direct tax": 
The constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only 
such as congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of 
apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably 
applv~ and the subject taxed, must ever determine the application of the 
rule.'lb7 
According to Chase, because direct taxes must be levied in pr~rtion to the 
census, if it would cause "very great inequality and injustice"4 to tax some 
item in that fashion, then a tax on that item cannot be a direct tax. The meaning 
of the term "direct tax" is established by the constitutional background, not by 
any independent meaning possessed by the term. 459 
Chase then argued that a carriage tax that required states to pay the national 
government a share proportionate to the number of their citizens, rather than 
proportionate to the number of their carriages, would result in "very great 
inequality and injustice" because it meant that, in states where there were fewer 
carriages per capita, the individual owning a carriage would have to pay a much 
heavier tax than an individual in a state with many carriages per capita.460 A 
carriage tax could not be a direct tax because that conclusion would lead to 
inequitable results. Chase declared, "If it is proposed to tax any specific article 
by the rule of apportionment [among the states], and it would evidently create 
great inequality and injustice, it is unreasonable to say, that the Constitution 
intended such tax should be laid by that rule."461 In short, because of a 
structural concern-the principle that citizens of different states must be treated 
alike-a carriage tax could not be a direct tax because classification of the 
carriage tax as a direct tax would mean that citizens of different states would be 
treated differently, and this conclusion led Chase to uphold the statute. 
456. /d. 
457. /d. at 174. 
458. /d. 
459. Chase's opinion assumes that, in view of the background principle that Congress 
has the general power to tax, if a certain item cannot equitably be taxed in accordance with 
the constitutional mandates governing direct taxes, then the logical conclusion is, not that the 
item cannot be taxed, but that a tax on the item is not a direct tax. His conception of the 
Constitution thus led him directly away from the states rights position embraced by those 
who opposed the statute. These opponents recognized that the apportionment rule led to 
practical problems; they therefore concluded, however, not that the rule had to be interpreted 
so that it was narrow in scope, but that it served as an important limitation on the federal 
government's taxing power. See CASTO, supra note 24, at 104. Chase reached the opposite 
conclusion and narrowly viewed the apportionment rule. 
460. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796). 
461. /d. 
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Justice Iredell's opinion resembled Chase's in its focus on structural 
concerns, as well as in some of the specific arguments made. Like Chase's 
opinion, it is only convincing if one accepts the strong nationalist position that 
it assumes to be correct. 
Thus, like Chase, Iredell advances the unconvincing argument that a tax 
cannot be a direct tax if application of the rule of apportionment-the rule that 
the Constitution mandates for direct taxes-would cause individuals from 
different states to be taxed differently.462 Similarly, Iredell's nationalism leads 
him to contend that there is a presumption that a tax is not a direct tax. The fact 
that the "constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not 
states,"463 establishes a default rule: taxes are to be uniform "except in 
particular cases specified."464 
Justice Paterson's opinion, in contrast to Iredell's and Chase's, employed 
textualist and originalist arguments. Indeed, examination of Paterson's opinion 
highlights the striking absence of attention to text on the part of Iredell and 
Chase, as Paterson, unlike his brethren, offered a textual argument to support 
his conclusion. At the same time, Paterson's textual argument is of limited 
significance, as policy and structural concerns ultimately guided his analysis. 
Like his brethren, the starting point of analysis for Paterson was the 
breadth of the congressional taxing power. He wrote that it was "obviously the 
intention of the framers of the constitution, that congress should possess full 
power over every species of taxable property, except exports. The term taxes, is 
genetical, and was made use of, to vest in congress plenary authority in all 
cases of taxation."465 Paterson then offered a series of reasons why "the rule of 
uniformity"-the principle embodied in the carriage tax statute-was to be 
preferred to "the rule of apportionment"-the principle argued for by those 
challenginj the statute-in those cases in which constitutional meaning was 
unclear.46 First, speaking from his personal experience as a framer, he said 
that the Direct Tax Clause had been included in the Constitution because the 
Southern states wanted to bar Congress from taxing slaves and land.467 Rather 
than standing for a sensible principle, the Direct Tax Clause was a "work of 
compromise,"468 and Paterson attacked its coherence and moral legitimacy: 
"[I]t is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning. Why 
462. See id. at 181-82. As previously noted, this argument proves too much. Any tax 
imposed subject to a rule of apportionment will cause individuals from different states to be 
taxed differently. The approach employed by Chase and Iredell suggests that no tax should 
be classified as a direct tax, yet the Constitution clearly contemplates direct taxes assessed 
subject to the rule of apportionment. 
463. Id. at 182. 
464. /d. 
465. /d. at 176. 
466. /d. at 177-81. 
467. See id. at 176-79. 
468. /d. at 178. 
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should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented more than any 
other prope~? The rule, therefore, ought not to be extended by 
construction.' 69 Second, a taxation scheme requiring states to make payments 
on the basis of their population was a poor way of taxin~ wealth because 
"numbers do not afford a just estimate or rule of wealth.'47 He noted that a 
system that imposed a tax on states on the basis of their population and then 
required assessment of individuals in the state was "scarcely practicable" for 
administrative reasons.471 In contrast, Paterson highlighted the practical virtue 
of his conclusion that, where possible, the Constitution should be read to permit 
uniform taxation: "Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without 
the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states, and is at once easy, 
certain and efficacious.'472 
He then offered a definition of "indirect taxes" under which the carriage 
tax is an indirect tax (and therefore constitutionally imposed). Paterson wrote, 
"All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes,'473 and he ended the 
opinion by quoting a passage from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations which 
conceives of indirect taxes in this way.474 But this evidence of usage is far from 
the heart of the opinion. Paterson's central concern is with reading the 
Constitution so that Congress's power to tax can be effective. 
Clearly, the members of the Court were working hard to save both the 
statute and, more broadly, Congress's ability to raise revenue for the national 
government. The nationalism of the Federalists who served on the Supreme 
Court underlies their analysis.475 It is important to recognize that Hylton is only 
one case. Nonetheless, it is significant evidence concerning the original 
understanding of judicial review that, in the one early case before the Court 
involving a challenge to a substantive congressional statute, the Justices 
unanimously voted in favor of the statute, despite the difficulty involved in 
squaring the statute with the Constitution's text. Hylton is evidence of a strong 
degree of deference to Congress. 
B. Judicial Role 
In 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia,416 the Supreme Court read the Judiciary 
469. /d. 
470. /d. 
471. /d. at 180. 
472. /d. 
473. ld. 
474. /d. at 180-81. 
475. For discussion of the strong Federalist convictions of the members of the 
Supreme Court in the 1790s, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 324 (1991). 
476. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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Act of 1789 to permit a citizen of one state to sue another state.477 Adopted in 
the wake of Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'.478 When the 
Eleventh Amendment was adopted in 1798,479 the Supreme Court had on its 
docket three cases in which states were sued by citizens of another state: 
Brailsford v. Georgia, Hollingsworth v. Virginia,480 and Moultrie v. 
Georgia.481 Attorneys for Hollingsworth and Moultrie (and, although the 
record is less clear, apparently for Brailsford as well) argued that their suits 
should go forward because the Eleventh Amendment did not operate 
retroactively.482 The Court, however, dismissed all three cases. 
The only published opinion of the three is Hollingsworth. Without offering 
any reasoning, the Court in that case simply declared that "there could not be 
exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued 
by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign 
state."483 While it has been suggested that the Court's holding was based on its 
reading of the Judiciary Act, this seems unlikely since, as a matter of statutory 
construction, the Court in Chisholm had read the same language to permit 
suability and since the published record does not reflect statutory arguments by 
either counsel or the Court.484 It appears more likely that the Court in 
Hollingsworth was reading the Eleventh Amendment retroactively to invalidate 
the Judiciary Act to the extent that the Act permitted suits against a state by 
another state's citizens.485 
The minutes from Moultrie are even clearer. In dismissing that suit, the 
Court stated, "[O]n Consideration of the Amendment of the Constitution 
477. While the decision in Chisholm is outside the scope of this Article-no Justice 
found the Judiciary Act unconstitutional-it should be noted that Justice Iredell's opinion 
suggests that, if he had reached the issue, he would have concluded that the Act's 
jurisdictional grant was unconstitutional. See id. at 434-35. 
478. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
479. On the timing of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, see 5 DHSC, supra 
note 342, at 604 n.35 (observing that as a technical matter the Eleventh Amendment might 
have been adopted in 1795, when North Carolina ratified it, but that it was 
contemporaneously understood as having been ratified in 1798, when President Adams 
informed Congress of ratification). 
480. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
481. See 5 DHSC, supra note 342, at 604 & n.36 (discussing Supreme Court docket at 
time of Eleventh Amendment's adoption). 
482. See id. at 289 (Moultrie); id. at 511 (Moultrie and Hollingsworth); id. at 604 n.36 
(all three cases). 
483. Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 382. 
484. See CURRIE, supra note 19, at 22-23. 
485. See id. at 23 (suggesting that Hollingsworth was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court held a congressional statute unconstitutional). 
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respecting Suits against States it has no Jurisdiction of this Cause.',..86 Thus, 
clearly, the result in Moultrie was based on the proposition that the Eleventh 
Amendment rendered an aspect of the Judiciary Act of 1789 invalid. 
Presumably, the same was true in Brailsford. 
It appears, then, that in all three cases the Court exercised the power of 
judicial review-since a statute was being invalidated because it was 
inconsistent with the Constitution. It has fareviously been suggested that 
Hollingsworth was a judicial review case. 87 It appears that no one has 
previously suggested that Moultrie and Brailsford were such cases.488 These 
cases are, admittedly, not classic judicial review cases. The constitutional 
amendment is, on one view, almost like a superseding statute because it 
followed enactment of the relevant statute and was so closely focused on the 
same subject matter. At the same time, the Supreme Court was deciding that its 
prerogative was not to enforce the statute in light of the Constitution, rather 
than leaving the matter to Congress for determination through repeal or 
revision of the statute. 
Thus, the available evidence indicates that there were three cases before 
Marbury in which the Supreme Court exercised the power of judicial review 
over a congressional statute. It should be emphasized that in none of these cases 
did the Court acknowledge it was exercising this power. At the same time, the 
fact that the Court behaved in this fashion without anyone apparently 
commenting on it suggests that, by 1798, judicial exercise of power over 
statutes was not a matter that excited close scrutiny. 
Moreover, there was certainly a plausible argument that the suits could 
have been allowed to go forward without violating the Constitution. They were 
permissible under Chisholm and had been before the Court at the time the 
Eleventh Amendment was ratified. The text of the Eleventh Amendment does 
not clearly speak to whether the Amendment applies to suits already instituted, 
and, as attorneys in at least two of the cases argued, there was a fair question as 
to its retroactive application. Nonetheless, the Court's ruling indicates that it 
applied the Amendment retroactively to prevent suits that the Judiciary Act 
would have permitted. The record thus shows that, once again, in a case 
implicating judicial power, judicial review was applied in a situation in which 
there was a plausible argument that the statute could constitutionally be 
486. Minutes of the Supreme Court (Feb. 14, 1798), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 
342, at 305; Drafts Relating to Court Proceedings (Feb. 14, 1798), in 1 DHSC, supra note 
342, at 482; see also 5 DHSC, supra note 342, at 511 (discussing the case). 
487. See CURRIE, supra note 19, at 22-23. 
488. For example, a Lexis-Nexis search found no articles in which one of these cases 
was mentioned within one hundred words of '1udicial review." The editors of the 
Documentary History of the Supreme Court also do not treat any of these three cases as 
involving the exercise of judicial review. For the relevant headnotes, see 5 DHSC, supra 
note 342, at 274-90 (Hollingsworth); id. at 496-514 (Moultrie); id. at 597-604 (Eleventh 
Amendment). 
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applied. 
C. Review of State Statutes: Ware v. Hylton 
In Ware v. Hylton,489 the administrator of the estate of a British subject 
sued two Virginia citizens to recover on a bond they had entered into before the 
Revolutionary War. In 1780, one of the defendants had paid part of the amount 
owed the British subject into Virginia's loan office. Under a Virginia statute of 
1777, payment into the loan office by a Virginia debtor "shall discharge him 
from so much of the said debt" owed to a British subject.490 Thus, the 
defendants claimed that the 1777 statute excused them of their original 
obligation. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the statute when enacted and 
argued that, even if it had been initially valid, the 1783 Treaty of Paris had 
revived the obligation because Article IV of the Treaty provided "that creditors 
on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full 
value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted."491 The 
plaintiff further argued that-even if the Treaty had not initially revived the 
debt-it now had that effect because of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 
The defendants prevailed before a divided circuit court. Justice Iredell and 
Judge Griffin gave effect to the 1777 Virginia statute, while Justice Jay 
dissented.492 The Supreme Court then reversed. Justices Chase, Paterson, 
Wilson, and Cushing delivered separate opinions, each favoring the British 
administrator. While Justice Iredell did not vote, since he had participated in 
the decision below, he made clear that he disagreed with the Court's result by 
reading his circuit court opinion and observing that he still considered it to be 
correct. 493 
Justice Cushing's opinion is brief. He did not challenge Virginia's right to 
enact the statute in the first instance, but concluded that the Treaty "entirely ... 
remove[d] ... this bar .... "494 Cushing ignored the question of whether the 
489. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
490. /d. at 200. 
491. Treaty of Peace, art. IV, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, quoted in Ware, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 213. 
492. On the result below, see 7 DHSC, supra note 342, at 211-13. 
493. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 256 n.6. Chief Justice Jay resigned from the 
Supreme Court before it heard Ware. 
494. /d. at 282 (Cushing, J.). He justified his reading of the Treaty, in part, on plain-
meaning grounds: "[T]he plain and obvious meaning of [the Treaty] goes to nullify, ab 
initio, all laws, or the impediments of any law, as far as they might have been designed to 
impair, or impede, the creditor's right, or remedy, against his original debtor." /d. He 
justified his reading of the Treaty, as well, by an appeal to background principles and 
presumed intent: The "sense of all Europe [is] that such debts could not be touched by states, 
without a breach of public faith: and for that, and other reasons, no doubt, this provision was 
insisted upon, in full latitude, by the British negotiators." /d. 
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Treaty had invalidated the statute during the Confederacy,495 focusing instead 
on the effect of the Treaty after ratification of the Constitution. He treated the 
binding effect of the Treaty under the Constitution as a simple matter. Without 
elaboration, he invoked the Supremacy Clause as the basis for his holding that a 
treaty invalidated an inconsistent statute: "[T]he treaty ... [is] sanctioned as the 
supreme law, by the constitution of the United States, which nobody pretends 
to deny to be paramount and controlling to all state laws, and even state 
constitutions, wheresoever they interfere or disagree."496 He added, "[H]ere is a 
treaty, the supreme law, which overrules all state laws upon the subject, to all 
intents and purposes ... .'497 Without any discussion whether the Court had 
the power to exercise judicial review over a state statute, Cushing voted to 
invalidate the statute. 
Justice Wilson's opinion is even briefer than Cushing's. First, he found the 
statute without legal effect because, under the law of nations, only a "nation" 
can confiscate property. Because Congress-"which clearly possessed the right 
of confiscation, as an incident of the powers of war and peace"-had not 
authorized Virginia to confiscate property, the state had lacked the power to do 
so.498 Second, he stated that, even if the statute were initially valid, "the treaty 
annuls the confiscation."499 The Treaty then trumped the statute because the 
Treaty was the product of the will of the nation: "The State made the law; the 
State was a party to the making of the treaty: a law does nothing more than 
express the will of a nation; and a treaty does the same."500 
Wilson made clear that his holding was not based on an interpretation of 
the Federal Constitution, although he suggested that the statute might have been 
invalid under the Contract Clause (as well as the two grounds on which he 
relied).501 At the same time, Wilson's first ground reflects an expansive notion 
of judicial review. His position is that the Court should deny the statute legal 
effect because it is at odds with the limited role that the law of nations assigns 
495. According to Currie, however, Cushing took the position that "Congress had had 
authority in 1783 to rescind the state confiscation." CURRIE, supra note 19, at 38. I do not 
believe this is correct. The section of the opinion on which Currie relies speaks of the Treaty 
as supreme, and it seems to be referring back to Cushing's early invocation of the 
Supremacy Clause. 
496. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 284; see also id. at 282 (stating that "the treaty having 
been sanctioned, in all its parts, by the constitution of the United States, as the supreme law 
of the land"). 
497. Id. at 282. 
498. /d. at 281 (Wilson, J.). 
499. Id. Like Cushing, Wilson thought the inconsistency between the Treaty and the 
statute was clear: "The fourth article is . . . extended to debts heretofore contracted. It is 
impossible by any glossary, or argument, to make the words more perspicuous, more 
conclusive, than by a bare recital." /d. 
500. /d. 
501. /d. ("Independent, therefore, of the constitution of the United States (which 
authoritatively inculcates the obligations of contracts), the treaty is sufficient to remove 
every impediment founded on the law of Virginia."). 
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subnational government entities. 
Justice Chase's opinion was the most complete and the lengthiest of the 
opinions favoring the creditors. Chase began by finding that the Virginia statute 
had been valid when enacted, and his holding here embodied a strong statement 
of commitment to popular sovereignty.502 Nonetheless, Chase determined that 
the statute did not shield defendants from suit because the Treaty "nullifie[ d]" 
the statute.503 This determination rested, in part, on his conclusion that the 
Treaty and statute were at odds. Unlike the other Justices who ruled in favor of 
the creditors, Chase did not simply treat the contrary view advanced by the 
debtors as without substance. He indicated that the debtors' reading of Article 
IV of the Treaty-under which the plaintiffs in the case were not creditors 
within the meaning of the Treaty because the underlying debts had been 
extinguished by the Virginia statute-made sense if the Article's words were 
parsed literally, but he found that that reading must be rejected in view of the 
larger purpose of the provision and the Treaty. He wrote, "This adhering to the 
letter, is to destroy the plain meaning of the provision .... "504 Chase argued 
that, under the defendants' reading, Article IV achieved "nothing" since, even 
in the absence of a treaty, the law of nations would have protected all existing 
debts. Thus, the only creditors whose rights would have been protected by 
Article IV were those-like the defendants-whose rights to collect on debts 
had previously been extinguished by statute.505 Interestingly, Chase's opinion 
contrasted "plain meaning" and literal meaning ("adher[ence] to the letter"), 
and he embraced the former. 
Not only did Chase discuss why he believed that the Treaty and the statute 
were at odds, he also explained why the Treaty trumped the statute, and his 
reasoning reflected strongly nationalistic views: he reasoned that, because 
Congress had the power to make treaties, in the exercise of that power it could 
"annul the laws of any of the states."506 
While the Constitution did not play a necessary role in Chase's conclusion 
502. Justice Chase wrote, "The legislative power of every nation can only be restrained 
by its own constitution: and it is the duty of its courts of justice not to question the validity of 
any law made in pursuance of the constitution." /d. at 223 (Chase, J.) Like Justice Wilson, 
Chase found that the statute was inconsistent with the law of nations. See id. at 223-24, 229. 
But while Wilson had found that the statute was therefore invalid, Chase's commitment to 
popular sovereignty led him to declare that a properly enacted statute was judicially 
enforceable, even if it violated international law: 
It is admitted, that Virginia could not confiscate private debts without a violation of the 
modem law of nations, yet if in fact, she has so done, the law is obligatory on all the citizens 
of Virginia, and on her Courts of Justice; and, in my opinion, on all the Courts of the United 
States. 
/d. at 229. Chase also observed that courts would enforce a congressional statute that 
violated the law of nations. /d. at 224. 
503. /d. at 235. 
504. /d. at 243. 
505. See id. 
506. /d. at 237. 
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that the Treaty trumped the state statute, it provided further support: 
If doubts could exist before the establishment of the present national 
government, they must be entirely removed by the [Supremacy Clause] .... It 
is the declared will of the people of the United States that every treaty made, 
by the authority of the United States, shall be superior to the constitution and 
laws of any individual state; and their will alone is to decide.507 
The text of the Supremacy Clause made clear that it is "[r]etrospective," as well 
as prospective, in its application, and so the Treaty should be "considered in the 
same light as if the constitution had been established before the making of the 
treaty of 1783."508 
Chase's opinion embodies strikingly different attitudes toward the judicial 
review of state and federal legislation. He is not deferential with respect to the 
state legislature's decision. Under his analysis, the Virginia statute was 
consistent with a literal reading of the Treaty of Paris. Nonetheless, rather than 
seeking to save the statute by embracing that reading, he adopts a reading of the 
Treaty that invalidates the statute. Admittedly, the reading of the Treaty Chase 
advances is the one that he asserts is the natural one. Nonetheless, the critical 
point is that he had available a plausible reading of the Treaty that would have 
saved the statute, and he elected not to adopt it. 
In contrast, he takes an expansive view of national power. His 
determination that the power to make treaties carried with it ancillary powers 
that Congress otherwise did not have is a striking one. David Currie has 
compared it to the expansive view of the treaty-making power in Missouri v. 
Holland.509 Consistent with this interpretation of the treaty-making power 
under the Articles, Chase said that he would vote to invalidate treaties only in a 
"very clear case," and he suggested that judicial review of treaties might be 
impermissible.510 
Justice Iredell disagreed with the other four members of the Court as far as 
the appropriate outcome. His analysis proceeded from the conclusion that 
507. /d. at 236-37. 
508. /d. at 237. Chase did not develop this textual argument. Rather, he treated it as so 
obvious as not to need explanation beyond the underscoring of the word "made" in his 
quotation of the Clause. See id. at 236 ("That all treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding."). 
509. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 39 n.58; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432-35 
(1920). 
510. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 237. The final opinion for the majority was Justice 
Paterson's, which was limited in scope. He did not discuss either the Federal Constitution or 
judicial review. He explicitly reserved the question whether the Continental Congress alone 
had the power to confiscate property and thus Virginia lacked authority to enact the statute. 
/d. at 246 (Paterson, J.). He thus concluded that the Treaty "repeals the legislative act of 
Virginia." /d. at 256. On his reasoning, the Treaty trumps the statute because it was 
subsequently adopted. 
November 2005] JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE MARBURY 553 
Virginia's confiscation act was valid when first passed. His reasoning on this 
point was similar to Chase's. The statute was consistent with the state 
constitution,511 and that was the only relevant issue for a court determining the 
statute's initial validity. Iredell thought the statute likely consistent with the law 
of nations,512 but, if the statute had violated the law of nations, it was "not for 
that reason void."513 Since there was no constitutional bar, the decision whether 
to transgress international law was one for the legislature. Iredell noted, 
It is a discretion no more controllable (as I conceive) by a Court of Justice, 
than a judicial determination is by them, neither department having any right 
to encroach on the exclusive province of the other, in order to rectify any error 
in principle, which it may suppose the other has committed.514 
At the same time, Iredell dismissed the contention that the Supreme Court's 
review should be less rigorous than that of a state court reviewing the state's 
constitution: "I have no conception that this court is in the nature of a foreign 
jurisdiction. The thing itself would be as improper as it would be odious, in 
cases where acts of the State have a concurrent jurisdiction with it."515 
Iredell departed from Chase with respect to the consequences of the Treaty. 
Iredell contended that Article IV of the Treaty had originally been only 
recommendatory in nature. (He based this conclusion on the "high authority" of 
British practice under which treaties were not self-executing and a 1787 letter 
from Congress.516) The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, however, "b~ 
the vigor of its own authority [caused the Treaty] to be executed in fact."51 
While the Supremacy Clause was adopted after the Treaty of Paris, "[t]he 
provision extends to subsisting as well as to future treaties."518 
Thus, because of the Supremacy Clause, the precise reach of Article IV of 
the Treaty of Paris became critical. Here, Iredell accepted the argument that 
Chase had dismissed: because the defendants had complied with the 
sequestration statute, they were not the debtors of the plaintiffs at the time of 
the Treaty, and thus the Treaty did not revive the plaintiffs' rights against 
them.519 He acknowledged that the language of Article N was ambiguous. He 
argued, however, that if Congress had sought to impose under the Treaty a 
legal obligation on people, such as the defendants, that required them to pay 
511. /d. at 265 (Iredell, J.). 
512. /d. at 263. 
513. /d. at 266. 
514. /d. 
515. /d. 
516. /d. at 276. 
517. /d. at277. 
518. /d. While Iredell treated the issue off-handedly, this conclusion has a solid textual 
basis, since, as previously noted in the discussion of Justice Chase's opinion, the text of the 
Supremacy Clause supports the view that the Clause extended to treaties previously adopted, 
as well as those adopted after the ratification of the Constitution. See supra note 508. 
519. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 278. 
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their debt twice (once into the loan office and once to the creditor), it would 
have done so with language "clearly comprehending such cases."520 
Three points about Ware merit highlighting. First, while this is the first 
case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute and possibly the 
first case in which it invalidated a statute of any kind, the power of judicial 
review was largely assumed. The report of counsel's argument suggests that 
they did not raise the issue. (It is worth noting that one of defendants' two 
counsel was John Marshall.) Of the Justices, only Chase and Iredell dealt with 
the issue, and both treated it as unproblematic. As David Currie aptly observes: 
"The most important constitutional holding of Ware v. Hylton was that the 
federal courts had the power to determine the constitutionality of state laws. 
This crucial point ... passed almost unnoticed. "521 
Second, the opinions reflect different positions on judicial review. Wilson 
would have invalidated the statute because it was inconsistent with the law of 
nations. Iredell and Chase did not think the Supreme Court could invalidate the 
statute on that ground. Chase's opinion suggests that he was more deferential to 
federal than to state legislation (and that he considered the propriety of judicial 
review of federal treaties an open question). Iredell rejected the idea that 
federal courts should be more deferential to state legislation than state courts. 
Finally, while Iredell did not suggest that he was trying to avoid a finding 
of unconstitutionality, he upheld the statute because he embraced the same 
argument that Chase rejected. In a recent article, Professor Eskridge has argued 
that the reasoning of the Court in Ware was strained.522 While this may be too 
strong, Iredell's reading of the Treaty is plausible, and it would have preserved 
the statute; yet no other Justice embraced it, which suggests a lack of deference 
to state legislatures. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE LAW 
In this Part, the case law is placed in context in two different ways. First, it 
shows how the pre-Marbury case law illuminates Marbury because Chief 
Justice Marshall's decision reflected prevailing practice. Second, it suggests 
that the approach to judicial review reflected in the case law manifested a 
prevailing conception of legislative power as subject to limitations established 
by the spheres of power of other governmental entities. 
A. Marbury: Building on a Firmly Established Foundation 
Marbury is classically thought of as having established judicial review. As 
520. /d. at 280. 
521. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 39. 
522. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial 
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1071 (2001). 
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Professor William Van Alstyne begins his influential article, A Critical Guide 
to Marbury v. Madison: "[T]he concept of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of state and federal statutes by the Suf:reme Court is generally 
rested upon the eric decision in Marbury v. Madison." 23 As noted at the outset 
of this Article, 52 the most famous statement of this approach is contained in 
The Most Dangerous Branch, in which Bickel declared: "If any social process 
can be said to have been 'done' at a given time and by a given act, it is 
Marshall's achievement. The time was 1803; the act was the decision in the 
case of Marbury v Madison."525 
It is not novel to counter this point of view by observing that, before 
Marbury, judicial review had gained wide support.526 This Article, however, 
moves the debate about Marbury's significance forward by showing how 
relatively common the exercise of judicial review was before Marbury. The 
fact that judicial review was exercised much more frequently than previously 
recognized in the years before Marbury helps explain why Marshall's assertion 
of the power to exercise judicial review in the case elicited so little comment 
and also highlights the consistency between Marbury and the prior body of case 
law. 
Of course, judicial review had not won universal acceptance by 1803, and 
in the years after Marbury, there was certainly some opposition to the doctrine. 
In particular, assertions of the power to invalidate statutes provoked 
controversy in the frontier states of Ohio and Kentucky in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century,527 and, in the 1825 case of Eakin v. Raub,528 Chief 
Justice Gibson in dissent wrote one of the classic critiques of the doctrine.529 
523. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE 
L.J. 1, 1. 
524. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
525. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 1. 
526. See. e.g., 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-
1815, at 190 (1981) ("[T]he idea of judicial review was hardly a new one when Marbury was 
decided."); Klarman, supra note 28, at 1113-14 ("Marbury cannot have established the 
power to judicial review, since that power already was widely accepted before the Supreme 
Court's ruling."); James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REv. 219, 227-30 (1992) 
(claiming that there was a "clear majority" in Congress for judicial review before Marbury; 
describing competing conceptions of judicial review). 
527. In Ohio in 1810, judges who had asserted the power to invalidate statutes were 
impeached, although not convicted, by the legislature. See HAINES, supra note 19, at 255-57. 
In Kentucky, a state court decision in 1821 invalidating a state debtor relief law led to 
impeachment (and again, acquittal) of the judge and a larger political debate that ultimately 
led to electoral victory by proponents of judicial review in the elections of 1825 and 1826. 
See id. at 258-59; Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses a Nation": The Early 
Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 
(2004). 
528. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825). 
529. See id. at 344 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). 
556 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:455 
But the isolated nature of these instances serves only to highlight how 
remarkably quickly judicial review won acceptance. Of the cases surveyed here 
from the early Republic, none of the judges announced opposition to judicial 
review, and Justice Chase was notable for even treating it as an open question. 
Thus, Marshall was building on a flnnly established foundation. Indeed, from a 
personal level, he must have experienced judicial review as long-established, 
since he came from Virginia, the state in which it was particularly well 
established by the case law and in which it was repeatedly endorsed during the 
debate over the Constitution. Moreover, George Wythe, who issued a strong 
statement in favor of judicial review in the Case of the Prisoners, taught 
Marshall law, and there is some evidence that Marshall was present in the 
courtroom when the decision in Case of the Prisoners was announced in 
1782.530 Thus, for Marshall-and for the nation as a whole-judicial review 
had become an established part of the legal culture before Marbury. 
The case law surveyed here also helps us understand Marshall's reasoning 
in the case. Marshall has been repeatedly criticized for holding that Article III 
did not allow Congress in the Judiciary Act to confer original jurisdiction on 
the Court in a case like Marbury.531 Marbury was brought as a case of original 
jurisdiction. Article III gives the Court original jurisdiction in "Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be a Party,"532 and the mandamus action brought by Marbury clearly did 
not fall into any of these categories. Article III further states that in all other 
cases the Court shall have "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with 
such Exceptions ... as the Congress shall make."533 Thus, the question before 
the Court was whether the Constitution allowed Congress to expand the Court's 
original jurisdiction to encompass cases that would otherwise be within its 
appellate jurisdiction. Marshall held that it did not: "If congress remains at 
liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has 
declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the 
constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, 
made in the constitution, is form without substance."534 
It has repeatedly been argued that Marshall did not have to reach this 
result, that the "Exceptions" Clause permitted Congress to create an 
530. Treanor, supra note 157, at 568. 
531. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 19, at 68 (Marshall's "reasoning is far from 
obvious"); KRAMER, supra note 6, at 181 ("far from obvious"); Klarman, supra note 28, at 
122 n.50 ("strained"); Van Alstyne, supra note 523, at 32 ("The Court should assume the 
first Congress knew what it was doing."). Marshall's opinion is also criticized for holding 
that the Judiciary Act authorized Marbury to bring the case in the first instance before the 
Court. See HAINES, supra note 19, at 202; Van Alstyne, supra note 523, at 14-16. My focus 
here, however, is with scholars' critique of Marshall's constitutional interpretation, rather 
than the critique of his statutory interpretation. 
532. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
533. /d. 
534. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
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"[e]xception[]" to appellate jurisdiction by statutorily expanding original 
jurisdiction535 or that the grant of original jurisdiction in Article III established 
a floor, not a ceiling, on original jurisdiction and that Congress had the power 
to enact statutes that expanded the Court's original jurisdiction.536 If Marbury 
is understood as set against a backdrop in which only "clearly unconstitutional" 
statutes were invalidated, this critique has force, for it makes it look like 
Marshall was going out of his way to find the statute unconstitutional. But the 
case law surveyed here shows courts repeatedly striking down similar statutes 
in order to protect their autonomy from legislative interference. If Congress 
could expand the Court's original jurisdiction, it would have the ability to 
overwhelm the Court's docket with trials. As discussed, similar concerns about 
overburdening by the legislature had, for example, animated the Virginia courts 
in Cases of the Judges and Kamper and the circuit courts in Hayburn 's Case. 
In making this point, I am not negating the larger political context shaping 
the decision, but it is critical to recognize that Marshall-both in asserting the 
power of judicial review and in reading the Constitution to invalidate a statute 
that affected the judiciary and was not "clearly unconstitutional"-was acting 
in accordance with common practice. 
B. Understanding the Scope of Judicial Review 
The case law described in this Article reflects a general pattern: courts 
exercised the power of judicial review to keep legislatures and Congress from 
overstepping their bounds with respect to the power of other governmental 
entities. Statutes that affected the judiciary and juries were struck down, even 
when they were not clearly unconstitutional. Federal courts struck down state 
statutes, even when they were not clearly unconstitutional, in situations 
implicating national power. Judicial review thus was not about protecting 
individual rights or about protecting minorities from majoritarian abuse. 
Rather, it was about policing the boundaries between governmental entities, 
and courts viewed their role here expansively. 
This Part makes an initial attempt at understanding why this pattern is 
reflected in the case law. This effort is very preliminary and speculative. As 
noted in Part I, there is relatively little explicit commentary from this period on 
the proper scope of judicial review. The case law reveals the results and the 
larger pattern, but there is little self-conscious discussion of the scope of 
judicial review. So, the question is whether there is some larger jurisprudential 
535. See, e.g., 2 HASKINS & ROBERTS, supra note 526, at 20 l; Van Alstyne, supra note 
523, at 31-32. For a textualist defense of Marshall's reading, see Akhil Amar, Marbury, 
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443,465-
67 (1989). 
536. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 41 
(1997). 
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concept that implicitly underlay the case law. 
The pathbreaking work of John Phillip Reid concerning the structure of 
eighteenth-century constitutional thought and the legal arguments for the 
Revolution suggests an answer. Reid has convincingly contended that, by the 
time of the American Revolution, British and American constitutional thought 
had moved in sharply different directions. Breaking with traditional views, 
British constitutionalist thought-reflected most prominently in Blackstone-
had come to embrace parliamentary supremacy as the safeguard for liberty.537 
American thought, in contrast, reflected "the old constitutionalism of custom, 
prescription and contract."538 As they moved toward revolution, Americans 
saw in British assertions of parliamentary supremacy "the ascendancy of what 
[the old] constitutionalism had taught ... Americans to fear most-arbitrary 
power-and the demise of what that constitutionalism had taught them most to 
cherish-liberty founded on restraints to power and protected by the rule of 
law. "539 The critical precondition for the preservation of American liberty was 
parliamentary respect for the vested rights of colonies. While Parliament might 
enact statutes that transgressed these boundaries, such statutes were not, to use 
the terminology employed by Americans, "law. "540 Parliamentary disregard of 
the sphere of colonial power was unacceptable and illegitimate because, if 
Parliamentary power was not subject to limitation by competing power, it 
would threaten freedom. 
The mindset underlying American arguments at the time of the Revolution 
can be seen in the approach to judicial review reflected in the later case law 
discussed here. In the revolutionary-era and the early Republic, courts were 
acting to protect from legislative intrusion the scope of authority of government 
actors who were not part of the legislative process-juries, the courts, and, with 
respect to state legislation, the national government. They were seeking to 
restrain power by protecting boundaries, much as American revolutionaries had 
been. 
It should be recognized that, at another level, judicial review existed to 
ensure that legislatures honored the limits to their power established when the 
people adopted the Constitution. This is, of course, an essential point in 
Iredell's and Hamilton's arguments (and Marshall's, as well). But the case law 
suggests that not all limits were enforced with the same vigor. While there was 
no theoretical limit to what types of cases could be the occasion for an exercise 
of judicial review, in practice, courts, in exercising that authority, were 
concerned almost exclusively with ensuring that legislatures did not overstep 
the boundaries at the expense of other governmental components. The 
537. See 4 JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 43-51, 69-82 ( 1993). 
538. /d. at 29. 
539. /d. 
540. See id. at 30-33. 
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underlying concern with promoting the rule of law and liberty by protecting 
spheres of power echoed the animating concern of the American 
revolutionaries in the 1770s. 
This Article has been concerned with looking at the cases in which at least 
one judge found a statute unconstitutional, and one consequence of this focus 
has been to highlight the limits imposed on state governments by Federalist 
judges.541 But it should be noted that Republicans, with their pro-state 
orientation, were taking an approach to judicial review that was, with respect to 
federalism, the mirror image of the case law-reflecting their belief that the 
threat to liberty was when Congress, rather than state legislatures, overstepped 
its bounds. The arguments made by the plaintiff in Hylton v. United States are 
one example. Similarly, Republicans in Congress urged judicial invalidation of 
the 1791 Bank Bill and the Alien and Sedition Acts because Congress lacked 
the power to enact the statutes. 542 Defendants in criminal prosecutions under 
the Alien and Sedition Acts repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) pressed their 
claims that the congressional statutes were unconstitutional.543 
Thus, both the Federalists who dominated the judiciary and the 
Republicans in opposition seem to have shared a common approach to judicial 
review as most critically concerned with boundary protection. They disagreed 
on which boundaries most needed protection, but they seem to have shared an 
541. A subsequent article will discuss the pre-Marbury cases in which arguments for 
judicial review were unsuccessful. In addition to the challenges to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts noted infra note 542, the most prominent such cases are the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), in which the Court rejected a claim that a 
Connecticut statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
14 ( 1800), in which the Court rejected a challenge to a Georgia statute that in which the 
challenger had claimed that the statute violated the state constitution's jury trial and 
separation of powers provisions. In both cases, the challenges were certainly colorable, 
which means that, at one level, these cases are worth noting because they indicate that 
federal courts did not uniformly look searchingly at state statutes. At the same time, my 
basic point is that federal courts were principally concerned with ensuring that state statutes 
did not undermine federal authority, and that was not the case with the statutes challenged in 
either case. 
Calder is primarily known for Justice Chase's discussion of natural law. See 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 388-89 (Chase, J.). As Larry Kramer convincingly shows, this discussion should be 
narrowly understood. Rather than embracing the view that courts had a broad power to 
invalidate statutes they deemed at odds with principles of natural justice, Chase's argument 
was "grounded in a kind of positive law, albeit one based on custom, prescription, and 
implicit popular consent." Kramer, supra note 5, at 43. 
542. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 68 (1956) ("[Republicans] focus[ed] their discussion on this 
basic constitutional question: Does the federal government ... have any power to deport 
alien friends?"); Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE 
"EXTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA 25, 34-35, 48 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. 
Albert eds., 1996) (reporting arguments); see also CURRIE, supra note 19, at 73 (noting other 
statutes that Republican legislators in the 1790s claimed were unconstitutional). 
543. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 542, at 232, 279, 379 (discussing cases in which 
defenses of unconstitutionality were rejected). 
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underlying approach that reflects the old constitutionalism described by Reid. 
To recap, judicial review protected the spheres of power of the judiciary 
and the jury from legislative interference. In addition, for the Federalists, it 
ensured that state legislatures did not overstep their bounds in ways that 
implicated national power, while Republicans invoked it to limit congressional 
power. Reid's work suggests that, on a deep level, underlying this approach 
was the view that liberty was preserved through the existence of multiple and 
competing repositories of power. During the struggle for independence, this 
philosophy led to a challenge to imperial assertions of authority. In the 
revolutionary era and the early Republic, the scope of judicial review reflected 
the same underlying philosophy. Although there was little self-conscious 
discussion of a larger principle, the pattern of the case law suggests that judicial 
review, by keeping legislative power from overstepping its bounds with respect 
to other and competing institutional actors, had the goal of protecting against 
arbitrary government. 
CONCLUSION 
In an effort to illuminate the original understanding of judicial review in 
practice, this Article has examined the decisions from the revolutionary era and 
the early Republic in which at least one judge voted to invalidate a statute or in 
which the opinions significantly illuminate the early understanding of the 
legitimacy and scope of judicial review. 
Previous scholars studying the early case law have had different views on 
what interpretive approaches the case law manifests. Under the dominant 
school of thought, the exercise of judicial review was rare and limited to cases 
of clear unconstitutionality. It has also been argued, however, that it was 
commonly thought that statutes could be invalidated for inconsistency with 
general principles of natural law. Modem Supreme Court case law reflects the 
view that, under the original understanding, courts, in exercising judicial 
review, did not defer to legislatures at all. The examination of the case law here 
leads to conclusions that are inconsistent with all of these approaches. 
This study has shown that the exercise of judicial review was dramatically 
more common than recent scholarship has indicated. There are more than five 
times as many cases in which a statute was invalidated as indicated in Professor 
Snowiss' s account, the leading modem study. As a result, judicial review was 
much better established in the years immediately after adoption of the 
Constitution than has been previously recognized, and it was far from rare. 
In addition to showing the relative frequency of assertions of judicial 
review, the Article has also shown that, beginning in the revolutionary era, 
judicial invalidation of statutes fell into certain patterns. In fifteen cases 
involving statutes that affected the right to a jury trial or that implicated judicial 
concerns (by, for example, altering jurisdiction or resolving private disputes), 
state courts struck down the statute, even though in thirteen of these cases there 
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was a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the statute. On the other 
hand, the case law suggests that state courts were deferential when confronting 
a statute that did not fall into these categories. Indeed, with the exception of 
two state cases involving the Contract Clause, I have not found any state case 
before Marbury in which a statute that did not involve the right to a jury trial or 
some judicial matter was struck down. 
Similar patterns emerge from examination of the federal cases, though the 
body of decisional law here is more limited. In Rayburn's Case, which 
involved a congressional statute that affected judicial activities, five Supreme 
Court Justices and three district court judges relied on broad structural concerns 
in determining that the statute was invalid, although there was a plausible 
argument in favor of the statute. In three cases, the Supreme Court refused to 
consider claims that the Judiciary Act would have allowed it to consider 
because the Judiciary Act gave the Eleventh Amendment retroactive effect, 
even though the Eleventh Amendment does not clearly operate retroactively. In 
Hylton, in which the Court reviewed a substantive congressional statute and did 
so in a context that had significant implications for the scope of the 
congressional taxing power, the Court upheld the statute in the face of a strong 
textual argument that it was unconstitutional. Thus, there is evidence in the 
federal case law, as in the state case law, of general deference to a coequal 
legislature's substantive constitutional decisionmaking but close scrutiny of 
that body's decisionmaking where it affected the judiciary. 
The federal case law, however, also involved a category of cases for which 
there was no state court analogue: federal courts had repeated occasion to 
review the constitutionality of the acts of a subordinate legislature (i.e., the 
state legislatures). While the state and federal case law reveals a pattern of 
deference to the decisions of coequal legislatures, federal courts reviewing state 
statutes were notably aggressive. There are seven circuit court cases in which 
state statutes were invalidated, and in six of these cases there was a colorable 
argument for the statute's validity. Similarly, in Ware, in which the Court 
denied effect to a Virginia statute, only Justice Iredell in dissent embraced a 
plausible reading of the Treaty of Paris that would have preserved the statute. 
Overall, the body of federal case law involving the review of state statutes 
suggests another type of policing of boundaries: federal courts took care to 
constrain the activities of state governments. 
The case law surveyed here illuminates Marbury: it shows that judicial 
review was much better established at the time of Marbury than previously 
recognized and that Marshall's often-criticized constitutional construction was 
consistent with common practice of invalidating statutes that affected the 
judiciary. 
More fundamentally, the case law also indicates a structural approach to 
judicial review in which the level of scrutiny was linked to the type of statute 
involved and in which the courts, in determining when to invalidate statutes, 
were concerned with policing boundaries, rather than with the modern concerns 
562 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:455 
of protecting individual liberties or protecting minorities from majoritarian 
overreaching. This approach is consistent with the constitutional theory earlier 
reflected in American revolutionaries' legal claims-under which protection of 
spheres of governmental authority was critical to the rule of law and the 
protection of individual liberty-which suggests that constitutional theory may 
have shaped early approaches to the scope of judicial review. 
